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Introduction
The three chapters of this thesis contain contributions to distinct branches of
the finance literature—corporate finance, accounting, and household finance.
Although the chapters address questions with little overlap, they share one com-
mon element. All chapters emphasise the paramount role of expectations in finan-
cial markets.
Theoretical arguments, both rational and irrational (e.g., Fama, 1970; Shiller,
1981), suggest that investors’ expectations are central to the formation of stock
prices. Because expectations themselves are rarely directly observable, much re-
search in empirical finance uses changes in stock prices to infer changes in ex-
pectations. The first two chapters of this thesis build on the appealing intuition
of this approach. In both chapters, I inspect the behaviour of stock prices around
events that prior literature considers value-relevant. In neither chapter, however, I
treat changes in prices as ends in themselves. Rather, to understand why investors
changed their expectations of firm value, both chapters attempt to simultaneously
identify changes in fundamentally relevant information. While the first chapter
takes a purely empirical, exploratory approach to this issue, the second chapter em-
beds the same rationale in a stylised theoretical model that allows me to put more
structure on the empirical analysis.
The third chapter of this thesis analyses the role of expectations in investors’ de-
cisions to invest in the stock market. Expectations, in particular those about risk and
return, are assigned a major part in models of stock market participation. Patterns
in empirically elicited expectations, however, suggest that the latter are measured
with error (e.g., Manski, 2004; Hurd, 2009). In the paper that underlies this chapter,
Benjamin Enke, Hans-Martin von Gaudecker, and I argue that the magnitude of this
measurement error can be used to uncover heterogeneity in households’ choice be-
haviour. We empirically assess this hypothesis using data on expectations and stock
market participation specifically collected for this purpose as part of a representa-
tive survey.
The following pages describe each chapter and its relation to the respective liter-
ature in more detail.
1
Introduction
Chapter 1.1 The first chapter is a contribution to the literature on shareholder
activism by hedge funds. Evidence in Anglo-Saxon countries indicates that activist
hedge funds create value by successfully affecting their target firms (e.g., Clifford,
2008; Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009). The empirical literature on hedge fund
activism in Germany, however, is comparably scarce—even though the issue has
been part of intense public and political debate. Since Anglo-Saxon and German
institutional environments differ substantially, in particular in terms of ownership
concentration and shareholder rights, it is questionable whether activism by hedge
funds as minority shareholders can be equally successful in Germany.
In this chapter, I analyse whether and how hedge funds affect the firms they in-
vest in in the context of the German capital market. Thereby, I extend both the gen-
eral literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds and the literature for Ger-
many in particular, specifically Bessler, Drobetz, and Holler (2013) and Mietzner
and Schweizer (2014), in a number of ways.
Both Bessler, Drobetz, and Holler (2013) and Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) put
their focus on the analysis of long-term changes in stock market valuation. To thor-
oughly understand the effects and effectiveness of hedge funds’ investments, how-
ever, one should also explore whether potential changes in firm valuation are ac-
companied by changes in firm fundamentals and policies. To this end, I analyse
how central variables an activist hedge fund might attempt to affect within a firm,
e.g., payout policy, capital structure, or management turnover, change in the two
years following a fund’s investment. Moreover, since the analysis of long-term val-
uation effects tends to be sensitive to methodology, I probe the robustness of the
two studies’ results under alternative methods of risk adjustment, namely by es-
timating calendar-time regressions in the spirit of Carhart (1997) and calculating
buy-and-hold abnormal returns akin to Daniel et al. (1997). Finally, by working with
hand-collected hedge fund investments between 1999 and 2010, I employ a larger
and more comprehensive sample than both studies. Also, existing evidence predom-
inantly exists for periods of extended up-markets. Since my sample contains a num-
ber of events following the advent of the financial crisis, my results help assessing
whether the effects of activism persist in less favorable market conditions.
The chapter’s empirical analyses begin with a characterisation of hedge funds’
target selection and investment patterns. Resembling previous evidence, I show that
activist hedge funds purchase more votes and commit larger amounts to their in-
vestments than their passive peers. While they tend to invest in firms with relatively
1 This chapter is based on Drerup (2014a).
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weak incumbent shareholders (relative to other CDAX firms), the stakes they pur-
chase are still on average very small in comparison to the size of the largest block-
holder in their target. Notably, I find that activist hedge funds’ targets are not partic-
ularly exceptional along central firm characteristics. In particular, they are neither
exceptionally profitable nor distressed—both in absolute terms and in relation to
other firms in CDAX.
Next, I analyse investors’ reactions to hedge fund engagements. I show that mar-
ket participants only respond significantly when the investing fund is known to be
an activist. Average positive abnormal returns of more than 4% in activists’ targets
are accompanied by abnormally high levels of trading volume. While the immedi-
ate return response is consistent with expectected value creation, the strong corre-
lation of 0.4 between abnormal returns and abnormal volumes suggests that price
pressure associated with intense buying may be an alternative explanation. A cross-
sectional analysis finds that none of the variables suggested to affect the immediate
reaction (e.g., the size of the initial stake or the measure for illiquidity by Amihud,
2002) is significantly associated with it, thus favouring neither explanation over the
other.
In the main part of this chapter, I turn to the long-term effects of activism on fun-
damentals and valuation. If hedge fund activism generates shareholder value, then
the initially positive abnormal returns should be followed by non-negative returns
in the long run. I document, however, that long-term abnormal stock returns fol-
lowing the initial investments are negative and reverse the initially positive return
response. This results in a combined effect that is indistinguishable from zero. At
the same time, I find that only management turnover seems to change significantly
and increase in response to the funds’ investments, while other central corporate
variables like profitability or capital structure seem unaffected.
In combination, the results suggest that hedge fund activism in Germany is fun-
damentally ineffective. I interpret the patterns in returns and trading volume as
evidence that investors buy attention-grabbing stocks as suggested in Barber and
Odean (2008). Anecdotal evidence indicates that hedge funds cause and even proac-
tively enforce public reactions to their investments. Calls for changes in manage-
ment in particular may make for interesting news and direct market participants’
attention towards a stock. As investors respond to such news and flock into a fund’s
target, they temporarily drive up its price. When the target firm eventually leaves the




Chapter 2.2 The second chapter is a contribution to the literature on the value
of analyst research. Existing research (e.g., Womack, 1996 or more recently Bradley
et al., 2014) finds that revisions of analysts’ recommendations are associated with
significant movements in stock prices, typically increasing following upgrades and
decreasing following downgrades. These cross-sectional patterns suggest that in-
vestors use analysts’ opinions to revise their own expectations of a firm’s prospects.
In this chapter, I attempt to assess what information investors respond to when
reacting to recommendation revisions. For this purpose, I compare patterns in in-
vestors’ responses to recommendations—a proxy for the information investors ex-
tract—to patterns in how recommendations relate to firms’ earnings processes—a
proxy for the information recommendations contain.
Recommendation revisions following an earnings release provide a unique set-
ting to compare investors’ and analysts’ earnings interpretation. As analysts revise
their pre-earnings recommendations following an earnings release, they indicate
whether they agree with investors’ response to the earnings release. Employing a
simple model built on this premise, I devise two distinct empirical strategies to as-
sess the informational content of recommendation revisions. The first strategy is to
use observable data to model investors’ expectation of future earnings. If analysts’
earnings interpretation is on average superior to investors’, then recommendation
revisions should improve this estimate in a specific, predictable way. A caveat with
this strategy, however, is that it relies heavily on the appropriateness of the model
imposed to proxy investors’ expectations. The second strategy is based on the idea
that investors’ responses to recommendation revisions can be used as a proxy for
the extracted information. Thus, because changes in expected earnings are value-
relevant, changes in investors’ estimates of future earnings should cause patterns in
returns around revisions that are in line with the information the revisions contain
about future earnings.
I test these predictions using a large sample of recommendation revisions by ana-
lysts on record with IBES. Supporting the notion that recommendation revisions are
informative about firms’ earnings processes, I find that recommendation revisions
are associated with differences in the earnings process. More concretely and as pre-
dicted by the model, the association between current earnings surprises and future
earnings is exceptionally strong, i.e., more positive than average, when upgrades fol-
low positive surprises or downgrades follow negative surprises. In contrast, it is ex-
ceptionally weak, i.e., less positive than average, when downgrades follow positive
2 This chapter is based on Drerup (2014b).
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surprises or upgrades follow negative surprises. Cross-sectional patterns in the re-
turn response to recommendation revisions suggest that investors value this source
of information. Supporting the model’s predictions, I find that abnormal returns are
positively associated with past surprises when revisions indicate a stronger-than-
average association between past surprises and future earnings, and they are neg-
atively associated when revisions indicate the opposite. Both sets of results persist
in a number of sensitivity checks. They are robust to, among other things, different
ways of measuring expectations, different models of return, or inclusion of control
variables. In further regressions I document that recommendations by more expe-
rienced analysts and analysts from larger brokerage firms provide stronger signals,
indicating enhanced skill at interpreting earnings. Cross-sectional differences in in-
vestors’ responses to revisions suggest that they are also aware of these between-
analyst differences.
The chapter’s main contribution to the extensive literature on the value of ana-
lyst research (e.g., Stickel, 1991; Womack, 1996; Francis and Soffer, 1997; Ivkovic´ and
Jegadeesh, 2004; Asquith, Mikhail, and Au, 2005; Chen, Cheng, and Lo, 2010; Livnat
and Zhang, 2012; Bradley et al., 2014) is to show that patterns in how revisions in ana-
lysts’ recommendations relate to fundamental, value-relevant information—future
earnings—parallel the patterns in how investors respond to their releases. It extends
prior evidence that investors revise their interpretation of past earnings using cor-
roborating firm information like subsequent earnings releases (Freeman and Tse,
1989), dividend changes (Koch and Sun, 2004), or insider transactions (Veenman,
2012). In particular, it lends credence to findings in Mendenhall (1991) and Park and
Pincus (2000), whose results suggest that patterns in returns around changes in con-
sensus forecasts and recommendations indicate a reinterpretation of past earnings.
In addition, my cross-sectional results on analyst heterogeneity provide an explana-
tion why the accuracy of analyst forecasts is larger for more experienced analysts
or analysts from larger brokerage firms (Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 1997, 2003;
Clement, 1999).
Chapter 3.3 In the paper that constitutes the third chapter of this thesis, Ben-
jamin Enke, Hans-Martin von Gaudecker, and I show that measurement error in
subjective expectations data can be put to productive use in understanding the ad-
equacy of economic models of portfolio choice. Stock market expectations are typ-
ically considered central determinants of a household’s decision to participate in
the stock market. However, many empirical studies suggest that measurement error
3 This chapter is based on Drerup, Enke, and von Gaudecker (2014).
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Introduction
permeates subjective beliefs data. For example, large fractions of elicited subjective
expectations do not obey the laws of probability (Manski, 2004; Hurd, Rooij, and
Winter, 2011).
Standard techniques of using corrected estimates instead of the misreported val-
ues (Wansbeek and Meijer, 2000; Schennach, 2013) may lead to improved estimates
in contexts like past income or consumption data, where measurement error can
arise due to imperfect recall (Hoderlein and Winter, 2010) or incongruent variable
definitions, for example. In the context of measurement error in subjective expec-
tations data, however, analysts may be chasing an elusive target: Many people may
simple not hold well-formed beliefs about a given phenomenon. For example, Bru-
ine de Bruin et al. (2000) and Bruine de Bruin and Carman (2012) interpret the preva-
lence of 50-50 responses in expectations surveys in exactly this way. This suggests
that key structural parameters of economic models might not be present in the form
envisioned by the econometrician (Stiglitz, 2002; Rust, 2014). If this is the case, using
corrected estimates will not lead to improved fit of choice models because the cor-
rected estimates are not closer to forming the basis of decisions. Our main idea is to
instead employ the extent of measurement error to uncover heterogeneity in choice
behaviour. Put differently, we argue that the magnitude of measurement error in
stated beliefs will inform us about the extent to which an economic model consti-
tutes an adequate description of the process underlying an individual’s decision to
invest in stocks.
To motivate our empirical analysis, we write down a simple economic model that
relates the decision to participate in the stock market to expectations about risk and
return, risk preferences, and transaction costs. We argue that individuals who em-
ploy alternative decision rationales, e.g., those who rely on others’ advice or follow
rules of thumb, need not maintain particularly meaningful beliefs about the future
evolution of the stock market. In consequence, we hypothesise that data collected
for these individuals will be characterised by two features. First, their stated beliefs
will be prone to measurement error. Second, the sensitivity of their stockholdings
to changes in model primitives will be comparably low. To empirically evaluate this
hypothesis, we collect data on households’ expectations, risk preferences, and fi-
nancial portfolios as part of the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social
Sciences) panel.
We then estimate a Klein and Vella (2009) semiparametric double index model.
In the first index of this model we include the primitives of our theoretical model of
stock market participation. In the second index we include quantitative and quali-
tative indicators of measurement error. We allow both indices to interact in a fully
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nonparametric fashion to obtain predicted probabilities of stock market participa-
tion. Consistent with our hypothesis, we demonstrate that changes in primitives of
the economic model induce large variation in stock market participation only at
low levels of the measurement error index. If measurement error is high, however,
stockholdings respond much less sensitively to variation in the index containing
beliefs and preferences. We show that the results hold up in several different speci-
fications. In addition, we demonstrate that our modelling approach remains useful
when analysing less detailed data. In particular, we show that restricting ourselves
to variables that are commonly available or inexpensive to collect, i.e., simpler mea-
sures of expectations and purely qualitative measurement error proxies, yields a
similar overall pattern. Still, as one would expect, the differences along the measure-
ment error distribution are less pronounced.
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1 Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism in Germany
1.1 Introduction
Hedge fund activism in Germany has been an issue of intense public and political
debate. Publicly fought contests for control of firms like TUI AG or Deutsche Börse
AG have led to allegations that hedge funds myopically pillage German corporations
at the cost of their long-term prospects. The empirical literature on shareholder ac-
tivism in Germany, however, is comparably scarce. While evidence in Anglo-Saxon
countries indicates that hedge funds are in fact creators of shareholder value,1 the
German institutional environment, in particular the high level of ownership concen-
tration and relatively weak shareholder rights, presents a very different and perhaps
more challenging setting for activism by minority shareholders to work.
This paper attempts to answer the questions whether and how hedge funds af-
fect German corporations and thereby extends the existing literature on this topic,
primarily Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) and Bessler, Drobetz, and Holler (2013),
in a number of ways. Foremost, both Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) and Bessler,
Drobetz, and Holler (2013) put their focus on the analysis of long-term changes in
stock market valuation following hedge funds’ investments. However, a full char-
acterisation of how hedge funds affect their target companies should also explore
whether potential changes in firm valuation are accompanied by changes in firm
fundamentals and policies. To fill this gap,2 I explore the unexpected one- and two-
year changes in central variables an activist hedge fund might attempt to affect
within a firm, e.g., payout policy, capital structure, or management turnover. In ad-
dition, the findings in Bessler et al. and Mietzner and Schweizer are ambiguous as
to whether hedge funds generate value in the long run. Bessler, Drobetz, and Holler
1 A longer literature review on the theoretical background and existing empirical evidence on
hedge fund activism is relegated to Section 1.2
2 The analyses in Mietzner, Schweizer, and Tyrell (2011) resemble those in this paper. I will discuss
this point in the next section.
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(2013) find that less aggressive hedge fund investments are associated with short-
and long-term increases in shareholder value, while more aggressive, activist invest-
ments are associated with initially positive abnormal stock returns and eventual re-
versals. Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) focus on activist hedge funds and also doc-
ument long-term reversals of initially positive abnormal returns. Given the impor-
tance of risk-adjustment in long-term event studies, I probe the robustness of the
two studies’ results by estimating calendar-time regressions in the spirit of Carhart
(1997) and calculating buy-and-hold abnormal returns akin to Daniel et al. (1997).
Finally, my study builds on a hand-collected sample of hedge fund shareholdings
that covers the period between 1999 and 2010, whereas the samples in both Bessler,
Drobetz, and Holler (2013) and Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) stop short before the
advent of the financial crisis. This extended timeframe lets me work with a larger
sample than both studies and extends the evidence concerning activism to a pe-
riod that includes times of emphasised down-markets. Prior evidence in US studies
mainly comes from activist investments during long up-markets. Including the re-
cent extended downturn thus helps in assessing whether hedge funds’ abilities to
create shareholder value persist in less favorable market conditions.
My analyses begin with a characterisation of hedge funds’ target selection and
investment patterns. Similar to previous work, I document that activist hedge funds
purchase more votes and commit larger amounts to their investments than their
passive peers. However, with an average fraction of 6.4% of the voting rights in their
target companies, the purchased blocks are small in comparison to the average size
of the largest blockholder in their target firms whose share is almost 30% of the
votes. A comparison of targets to the remaining firms in Germany’s CDAX reveals
that these 30% are still comparably small relative to the votes owned by the aver-
age largest blockholder in CDAX, suggesting that hedge funds invest into firms with
relatively—but not absolutely—weak incumbent shareholders. Beyond this result,
activist hedge funds’ targets are not particularly exceptional along central firm char-
acteristics. Notably, activist hedge fund targets are neither exceptionally profitable
nor distressed—both in absolute terms and in relation to other firms in CDAX.
The main analyses evaluate how hedge funds affect their target companies. I start
with an analysis of the market’s immediate reaction to hedge fund engagements. To
this end, I use standard event study methodology and estimate abnormal returns
around the initial publication of hedge funds’ shareholdings. I find that there is only
a significant market reaction when the investing fund is known to follow an activist
strategy. The 20 days leading to the publication of an activist fund’s investment are
associated with abnormal returns of 4.22% in the target firms. This increase is ac-
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companied by abnormally high levels of trading volume. The correlation between
abnormal returns and abnormal volumes is 0.4, indicating that firms with stronger
stock market return responses also have larger abnormal trading volumes.
Both the anticipation of value creation as well as price pressure due to intense
buying provide possible explanations for these patterns. A cross-sectional analysis
of abnormal returns, however, favors neither of the explanations over the other as
none of the variables suggested to affect the reaction (e.g., the size of the initial stake
or the measure of illiquidity by Amihud, 2002) is significantly associated with the
immediate response.
I next turn to the long-term effects of activism. If hedge fund activism generates
shareholder value, then the initially positive abnormal returns should be followed
by non-negative returns in the long run. Moreover, fundamental changes to cor-
porate policies and performance induced by hedge fund activism should also be
detectable in the dynamics of firm characteristics in the years following the funds’
investments. This is, however, not what I find. In fact, I document that long-term ab-
normal stock returns following the initial investments are negative and reverse the
initially positive return response, resulting in a combined effect that is indistinguish-
able from zero. Moreover, when looking at changes in the targets’ values of central
corporate variables like profitability, capital structure, or management turnover, I
find that only management turnover seems to change significantly and increase in
response to the funds’ investments.
Together, the results provide an ambiguous picture. On the one hand, the short-
term response suggests that market participants attribute value to activist hedge
fund shareholders. On the other hand, they seem to reverse this assessment in
the long run. Moreover, the lack of any observable changes in fundamental perfor-
mance suggests that they are right to do so. I conjecture that there are two possible
(and mutually not exclusive) explanations for these results, both of which hint at a
short episode of market inefficiency. Irrespective of which of them accounts for the
results, both have in common that hedge fund activism in Germany seems to be
fundamentally ineffective.
The first explanation is that market participants initially overestimate the degree
to which hedge funds can overcome the existing blockholders’ resistance to mean-
ingfully affect a firm. As a consequence, they react enthusiastically to the presence
of a hedge fund. However, as market participants realise that hedge fund activism is
not associated with the expected improvements in corporate fundamentals, they re-
verse their initially positive response. This explanation can account for the initially
positive response, the long-term reversal, and the lack of changes in firm fundamen-
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tals. Still, it is unclear why market participants would misjudge the implications of
hedge funds’ investments to begin with.
A second interpretation of the results is that the pronounced initial return and
volume responses indicate that investors buy attention-grabbing stocks as sug-
gested in Barber and Odean (2008). Hedge funds are known to stir and even proac-
tively enforce public reactions to their investments. Calls for changes in manage-
ment in particular may direct market participants’ attention towards a stock. It is
conceivable that investors respond to such news by flocking into the funds’ targets,
thereby temporarily driving up their prices. As target firms eventually leave the spot-
light, investors’ excess demand dies down and firms’ valuations return to their initial
levels. This explanation can also explain the initial response, the eventual reversal,
and the lack of changes in fundamentals. In addition, it finds support in the strong
association between initial abnormal returns and abnormal volumes.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the previ-
ous literature on hedge fund activism and the institutional background. Section 1.3
presents the data collection procedure. Section 1.4 summarises the sample’s char-
acteristics and compares passive and activist targets and investment characteristics.
Section 1.5 presents the short- and long-run analyses of the funds’ investments. Sec-
tion 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Previous Literature
The idea that large blockholders can overcome the problems that result from the
separation of ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Grossman and Hart,
1980) has intuitive appeal, yet surveys of previous empirical literature like Karpoff
(2001) document that shareholder activism has little if any positive effect on target
performance or value.
The effectiveness of activism by institutional investors is presumably hampered
by a variety of reasons: collective attempts suffer from the incentive to free-ride on
the monitors’ efforts (Black, 1990); business ties between investor and target prevent
confrontational voting on the investor’s side (Davis and Kim, 2007); the preference
to sell positions rather than engage in insecure outcomes (Parrino, Sias, and Starks,
2003); a lack of sufficiently credible threatening power for classic institutional in-
vestors to be recognised as influential monitors by either management or market
(Clifford, 2008); political (Romano, 1993) and regulatory (Black, 1990) barriers; insuf-
ficient monetary incentives for fund managers to bear the personal costs of activism
(Rock, 1991); inadequate managerial expertise to alter central firm policies (Lipton
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and Rosenblum, 1991). Moreover, managers in a state of activist siege may devote
considerable time and resources to assure their position and in turn inadvertently
impair corporate performance (Karpoff, 2001; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005).
The literature lists a number reasons why one class of market participants, hedge
funds, may still be able to do well in a role as shareholder activists.3 For one, be-
cause hedge fund managers participate in the performance of their own fund both
through performance-linked pay and their own investment in the fund, they have
strong incentives to maximise returns. While institutional investors like mutual and
pension funds also disburse boni to their managers, they do so to a lesser degree
than hedge funds and are limited by regulation (Brav et al., 2008). Accordingly,
hedge fund managers may be more incentivised to increase firm value by affecting a
firm’s management than other institutional investors. Secondly, hedge funds can be
more credible and thus successful as monitors due to their organizational form. For
instance, they are free from investment limitations and liquidity constraints other
investors can be subject to. And in contrast to most institutional investors, hedge
funds can circumvent the problem of capital redemption by locking up capital or
keeping it in a side pocket for illiquid investments (Aragon, 2007), thus guarantee-
ing a sufficient investment horizon to affect a firm. Thirdly, contrary to pension or
mutual funds, hedge funds are free from political pressure and other conflicts of in-
terest that prevent them from solely focusing on their own and their investors’ ben-
efits (Brav et al., 2008). And absent any conflicting business ties to the target firm,
hedge funds are able to adopt a fully confrontational demeanor towards manage-
ment. Fourthly, the strategic maneuverability that comes with freedom from regula-
tion allows for an optimal mix of value-maximising techniques. For example, hedge
funds sometimes engage in what is referred to as empty voting or hidden owner-
ship (Hu and Black, 2007). They often either lend votes or have readily available
access to further votes and thereby increased effective or potential share in a com-
pany’s control. Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that hedge funds regularly engage
in concerted behaviour. Even though this is legally controversial, especially if the
funds circumvent regulatory obligations for collective ownership, it can exert sig-
nificant pressure on management. In addition, while it is hard for institutional in-
vestors to combine activism with an overall diversification strategy (Kahan and Rock,
2007), hedge funds are free from diversification restrictions (Brav et al., 2008) and
can therefore take very concentrated positions in target companies. Thus, in case a
3 See among others Clifford (2008), Klein and Zur (2009), Boyson and Mooradian (2011), Brav et al.
(2008), Kahan and Rock (2007), or Bratton (2007).
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management does not acquit to a fund’s demands, the fund can threaten to buy out
the company (Clifford, 2008). Finally, due to their alleged aptitude towards activist
influence, hedge funds can invest strategic and ex ante by identifying promising tar-
gets early, whereas other institutional investors tend to act incidental and ex post
by reacting to possible insufficiencies if they occur (Kahan and Rock, 2007, p. 1022).
Activism by hedge funds is not merely a coerced reaction but rather a conscious
approach.
Recent literature explores the consequences of hedge fund activism around the
world. In one of the most extensive studies, Brav et al. (2008) document that hedge
funds often succeed in provoking a variety of changes in corporate structure and
performance in the US. For example, they find both initial and long-term positive
valuation effects subsequent to a hedge fund’s entry as well as changes in corpo-
rate performance and policy. Klein and Zur (2009) similarly detect significant and
persistent increases in stock valuation at hedge funds’ target firms. They show that
the initial market reaction seems to correctly anticipate the outcome of following
activist campaigns as stated in obligatory filings. However, Klein and Zur also find
decreases in various measures of target profitability. Boyson and Mooradian (2011)
find that hedge funds following activist strategies outperform their non-activist
peers in terms of risk-adjusted performance. Clifford (2008) puts specific focus on
the investing funds’ stated objectives. He shows that the outcome and returns to
hedge fund investments differ between activist and passive blockholdings and ob-
serves that funds seem to align their operational form with their applied strategy.
Even if hedge funds follow an activist strategy, it is unclear whether they can be
successful in Germany. For one, German shareholder rights are comparably weak
(La Porta et al., 2000), perhaps withholding from hedge funds the legal arsenal nec-
essary to affect target firms’ policies. Moreover, the presence of large incumbent
shareholders is a central feature of the German market (Franks and Mayer, 2001; An-
dres, 2008). Stronger incumbent shareholders in controlling positions may present
a considerable obstacle for shareholder activism to work.
The literature on hedge fund activism in Germany in general and its long-term
consequences in particular is comparably scarce. In a study of 67 German transac-
tions, Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) analyse the short- and long-term valuation
effects. Even though their results of significantly positive announcement returns
are consistent with hedge funds generating shareholder value, they observe that
targeted firms underperform their benchmark, the CDAX, in the long run. They at-
tribute this to the structure of the German corporate governance system that pre-
vents funds from exerting control. In an attempt to explain their seemingly contra-
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dictory observations, Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) hypothesise that initially pos-
itive and ultimately negative returns may reflect a market misjudgment of hedge
funds’ intentions and capabilities to reduce agency costs. Bessler, Drobetz, and
Holler (2013) show that hedge funds target poorly governed firms. Similar to Mi-
etzner and Schweizer, they detect significant positive market reactions to hedge
fund shareholdings. In addition, they find that only non-aggressive hedge fund in-
vestments are followed by future stock market outperformance. However, they also
show that the initially positive returns to aggressive forms of activism are followed
by a reversal in abnormal returns thereafter.
Achleitner, Betzer, and Gider (2010) compare the German targets of hedge funds
and private equity funds. They suggest that targeting choices of hedge funds indi-
cate a short-term orientation, but since they focus on the targeting choice only, they
concede that “[a] more comprehensive assessment therefore necessitates analysis
of the long-term consequences” (Achleitner, Betzer, and Gider, 2010, p. 826). Weber
and Zimmermann (2013) provide evidence suggesting that hedge fund investments
in Germany are associated with both an information-driven effect around their pub-
lication and a volume-driven effect around the actual transaction.
My paper is very close to Mietzner, Schweizer, and Tyrell (2011), who also look
at the development of long-term fundamentals following hedge fund investments
in German firms. I only became aware of their work after having finished the initial
draft of this paper.4 In consequence, some of the analyses resemble those in their
work. There are, however, a few notable differences. First, while Mietzner, Schweizer,
and Tyrell (2011) focus on hedge fund activists and their industry peers (as well as
private equity firms and their peers), I compare the effects of hedge funds both with
and without an activist agenda. Second, my analyses include a substantially larger
number of events (142 vs. 78 activist events) and cover the period following the ad-
vent of the financial crisis. This allows me to both check the robustness of their
findings and provide an assessment of whether the ability of hedge funds to create
shareholder value in the long run is contingent upon market environment. Third,
I use a differences-in-differences design to compare how hedge fund targets de-
velop over time to how their industry peers develop. Mietzner, Schweizer, and Tyrell
(2011) instead compare the levels of target firms’ fundamentals to the levels of their
peers’ fundamentals at different points in time. In order to make a (statistical) state-
ment on how hedge funds affect their target firms, it is necessary to benchmark the
4 The first draft of this paper was finished in 2009. The sample period of their paper ends in the
same year.
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changes in the fundamentals of target firms against a proxy for expected changes,
e.g., the changes in the fundamentals of industry peers. To this end, a differences-
in-differences design is more appropriate than the analysis of differences-in-levels,
which only allows statements on how targets and peers differ at a particular point in
time. Finally, my conclusions are different. In contrast to Mietzner, Schweizer, and
Tyrell (2011), I conclude that there are —with the exception of a change in manage-
ment turnover— no discernible effects of hedge funds’ investments on firm funda-
mentals.
1.3 Dataset
To construct my sample, I analyse all firms listed in the CDAX market segment be-
tween 1999 and July 2010. I work with several sources to gather all relevant hedge
fund shareholdings over the sample period. My point of departure is the filings
database provided by BaFin, the German supervisory organization for financial ser-
vices, that contains mandatory filings of significant shareholdings according to ar-
ticle 21 of the German Securities Trading Act (’Wertpapierhandelsgesetz WpHG’).5
To compensate for the possibility that some funds do not submit their holdings to
BaFin, I further search all disclosures provided by dgap.de, a website focusing on
corporate news reporting. In addition, I go through all filings reported on corporate
websites, where I hand-collect shareholdings from annual documents as well as vot-
ing rights announcements not found in the previous two sources.
The next step in my analysis is the classification of which shareholder constitutes
a hedge fund. Absent an official definition of the term hedge fund, I use industry-
and fund-websites to classify investors. To this end, I individually check the iden-
tity of all investors owning significant stakes in each company. In cases where the
manager of a hedge fund is listed as a shareholder, I assume that he represents the
fund. Some companies run both private equity and hedge fund subsidiaries. Lack-
ing a definite means of drawing a distinction, I leave out these ambiguous cases. For
each hedge fund shareholder found with this procedure, I then search Bing, Yahoo!,
and Google as well as news on Bloomberg for the combination of the fund’s name
and the terms ’wphg’, ’voting rights’, ’holding’, or ’shareholdings’ as well as the re-
spective German translations to identify additional investments by the same fund.
Beyond mandatory disclosures, I also collect shareholdings that become publicly
5 By the 2010 version of article 21 of WpHG it has to be filed with BaFin once voting rights cross the




known through press releases or alternative and publicly accessible channels. Most
of these cases constitute a hedge fund’s open critique of corporate policy.
To enhance the accuracy of event dates, i.e., the dates where hedge fund share-
holdings become publicly known, I search for the conjunction of firm and fund
name using the above sources. For every firm-fund combination I finally pick the
earliest date of publication as the effective event date. Later increases or decreases
of a fund’s holdings are not included as separate events, yet I record the maximal
stake during a funds’ investment period.
This yields an interim sample of 353 potential observations. From these, I ex-
clude various types of events (75 in total). Following Brav et al. (2008), I drop all cases
where the target company is subject to an announced merger and cases where the
hedge fund enters by a debt-equity swap. I further exclude events where the fund
holds shares prior to the IPO, the company is not publicly traded, or the fund quits
within the first 30 days of investment. I do explicitly not exclude co-investments into
a company where another fund is or was present. If available, I also collect the date
of the funds’ exits which is usually the date where it drops below the lowest thresh-
old with filing requirement.
Next, I distinguish between events with activist background and those where the in-
vestment indicates a passive position. I classify events as of an activist nature if one
of the following holds true for the fund in question:
1. The fund describes itself as taking activist stances towards firm management
on its website;
2. Publications concerning the hedge fund industry or the item of news sur-
rounding the launch of the fund describe it as a shareholder activist;
3. I contact the fund to inquire and activism is named as the applied strategy;
4. I observe cases of overt activism by the fund in the past or upon entry into the
company. I use a news search in Bloomberg and the above mentioned search
engines to look for news in this regard. A public call for a higher dividend, for
example, leads me to classify a fund as an activist;
5. Press releases surrounding the event indicate that the fund is taking a possibly
confrontational stance towards management.
I classify all remaining funds as passive, and I classify each of the sample’s hedge
funds as either always active or always passive. Admittedly, this classification is im-
perfect. However, it should come reasonably close to the actually applied strategy.
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In contrast to the studies in the US, the absence of filings of purpose prevents a
clear-cut dissection of strategies in Germany. Importantly, this strategy of identify-
ing activists is more likely to misclassify activists as passive funds than passive funds
as activists. In consequence, if it biases the sample of activists, then it will most likely
bias it to stronger forms of activism rather than the opposite.
Several of the subsequent analyses compare the collected sample of firms to
companies that are identified to be of similar type. These matching firms serve as
the benchmark to explore abnormal changes in firm policies and fundamentals in
the years following the hedge fund investments. Moreover, they provide each firm’s
individual benchmark in the analysis of long-run buy-and-hold returns.6 The pro-
cedure I use to assign matching firms follows Brav et al. (2008). In the first step, I
choose all CDAX firms that fall into the same industry as each target. Then, I select
the firms among these whose size in terms of sales is not larger than 125% or smaller
than 75% of the target company’s pre-event fiscal year value. In the resulting list, the
company with the closest book-to-market ratio is selected. If step two or three fails,
the closest in sales is picked. I drop financial and real estate firms in all analyses
with a focus on accounting variables. For the event studies, I select the respective
Deutsche Börse sector index as the benchmark for all financial and real estate firms
to minimise the interference of the financial crisis. All event-study results are robust
to their exclusion.
1.4 Investment Characteristics and Target Selection
The final sample consists of 278 events across 170 firms. 53 of the 111 different
hedge fund families investing are activists, resulting in 142 activist blockholdings.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide a breakdown of all investments in terms of industry and
temporal distributions. No specific industrial sector seems to be strongly over- or
underrepresented. Still, there is a distinctive temporal pattern. Germany has seen
a steady increase in hedge fund investments until 2007, yet the number of new as
well as concurring investments dropped substantially following the onset of the fi-
nancial crisis. This development is remarkably similar to the change in assets under
management in the hedge fund industry in general and coincides with the overall
stock market conditions. Some of the target firms are subject to only one signifi-
cant blockholding over the entire sample period. However, a large number of firms
(≈59%) see various contemporaneous as well as subsequent investments, with one
6 Owing to the small number of firms in CDAX, I assign only one firm as each target’s benchmark
instead of a matching portfolio as in Daniel et al. (1997).
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firm hosting 9 different hedge funds between 2003 and 2010.
Table 1.1. Industry distribution
Sector Sample CDAX
Automobiles & Parts 10 3.60% 21 3.08%
Banks 7 2.52% 7 1.03%
Basic Resources 2 0.72% 11 1.61%
Chemicals 7 2.52% 17 2.49%
Construction & Materials 5 1.80% 24 3.52%
Financial Services 17 6.12% 54 7.92%
Food & Beverage 2 0.72% 18 2.64%
Healthcare 21 7.55% 49 7.18%
Industrial Goods & Services 73 26.26% 121 17.74%
Insurance 0 0.00% 14 2.05%
Media 12 4.32% 45 6.60%
Oil & Gas 5 1.80% 19 2.79%
Personal & Household Goods 11 3.96% 54 7.92%
Real Estate 15 5.40% 31 4.55%
Retail 20 7.19% 31 4.55%
Technology 54 19.42% 140 20.53%
Telecommunications 8 2.88% 4 0.59%
Travel & Leisure 9 3.24% 10 1.47%
Utilities 0 0.00% 12 1.76%
Sum 278 100% 682 100%
Table 1.1 reports the industry distribution of events compared to the distribution in CDAX in 2007.
Table 1.2. Temporal distribution











Table 1.2 shows the distribution of events over time. The sample contains no events prior to 2001.
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Table 1.3. Stakes, invested capital, and holding periods
Activist Blocks Passive Blocks
Percentage Ownership Initial Investment Realised Percentage Ownership Initial Investment Realised
(in millione) Holding Period (in millione) Holding Period
Initial Maximum Initial Maximum
Average 6.40% 8.30% 59.60 467 4.38% 5.47% 25.96 461
Minimum 1.00% 1.00% 0.54 42 3.00% 3.01% 0.12 39
P(10) 3.04% 3.05% 1.73 70 3.03% 3.04% 1.52 113
P(25) 3.21% 3.45% 4.40 154 3.11% 3.19% 3.45 192
P(50) 5.02% 5.31% 14.56 344 3.63% 5.01% 10.08 365
P(75) 6.84% 10.30% 45.64 663 5.10% 5.58% 28.70 613
P(90) 12.65% 18.67% 141.64 1060 6.91% 9.46% 77.16 884
Maximum 29.57% 29.57% 873.31 1865 10.13% 25.32% 264.97 1526
19 still invested 24 still invested
Table 1.3 reports details about the sizes and holding periods for the hedge funds’ investments, separetely for activist blocks and passive blocks. I
report the distributions of the initially purchased voting rights, the maximum reported percentage during the investment, and the approximate
e-value of the initial purchase in millions. The initial investments are calculated using the targets’ market value 30 days prior to the entry date. I
also provide an estimate of the realised holding periods as the number of days between exceeding the lowest threshold with reporting requirement
and falling below it again. In addition, I report the number of funds still invested as of July 2010, the end of the sample period.
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Table 1.3 presents summary statistics for activist and passive blocks in terms of
voting rights acquired, approximate Euro value of the investment, and its holding
period. All information used in the estimates stems from either the news item that
publicised the shareholding or the obligatory filings released by the fund initially
and over the invested period. Similar to Clifford (2008), I find that both initial and
maximal percentage ownership are significantly larger for activist blocks (Wilcoxon
p-value < 0.01). Whereas activists acquire a mean initial stake of 6.40%, passive
funds purchase on average 4.38% of voting rights with their initial investment. The
same pattern characterises the respective maximum stakes over the investment of
both types of funds. While activists average maximum stake in their targets is 8.30%,
the average maximum for passive blocks is 5.47%. The median initial capital com-
mitted to the purchase of an activist block is 14.56 million Euros and 10.08 million
Euros for a passive one. The blocks’ sizes are nevertheless highly variable, with the
smallest block at a mere 120,000 Euros and the largest at 873 million.
Two dominant patterns in Table 1.3 should be highlighted: For one, activists pur-
chase larger shares of their target companies and invest more capital than passively
investing hedge funds. This may reflect that activism has to pay off to the activist,
and for this to happen a necessarily large amount has to be invested on which re-
turns can be realised. Spending time and effort to actively engage management for
a fund equipped with possibly billions of capital may hardly be worthwhile if the
stake in question is comparably small. And secondly, the stakes activist hedge funds
purchase are in the majority of cases small relative to the strongest incumbent share-
holder who on average holds about 30% of the votes. Anecdotal evidence has it that
hedge funds influence corporate policy from a minority position and attempt to or-
ganise support by further shareholders when necessary.7 Brav et al. (2008) suggest
that this is a central feature that differentiates these activists from previous raiders
who attempted to take over control of their targets. Median holding periods of about
a year for both activist and passive blocks casts doubt on the public assertion that
hedge funds are short-sighted investors as discussed in Kahan and Rock (2007). One
activist fund even stays invested for a total of 1865 days or 5.1 years. Brav et al. (2008)
observe similar holding periods, reporting a median period of 369 days across all
events. 43 or 15.5% of investments are still held at the sample period’s end, though
none of them is held for excessively long.
Both time horizon as well as percentage held and capital investment need to
7 After hedge funds got involved with Deutsche Börse AG and ousted its CEO Werner Seifert, Seifert
labeled this behaviour dictatorship of minority shareholders in his book “Invasion of the locusts”
(2007), written by him and Hans-Joachim Voith.
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be interpreted with caution. The holding period leaves out all time before initially
exceeding and after finally falling below the lowest mandatory threshold. Further-
more, percentages of voting rights may largely underestimate a funds’ actual share
in the target as they do not involve derivative instruments, debt positions, or alter-
native sources of additional control. At the same time, hedge funds need not report
changes of voting rights in between reporting thresholds. This necessarily results in
a somewhat inaccurate reporting. In case activist funds tend to report the largest
rather than the average or lowest value after crossing a threshold, the difference be-
tween activist and passive blocks might be overstated.
Next, I turn to the question how hedge funds select their targets. I analyse the
targeting choice with a bivariate probit regression.8 The dependent variable in both
equations is binary, taking on the value 1 if a hedge fund purchased a stake in a par-
ticular month and firm, and 0 otherwise. One of the equations includes all activist
investments, the other the passive ones. The regressions include all firms that have
been listed in the CDAX between 2001 and 2010. As control variables I add dum-
mies for the presence of both activist and passive funds, the logarithm of the mar-
ket value of equity, market-to-book, the ratio of cash holdings to total assets, sales
growth, leverage, return on assets, dividend yield, and free float, all of which are
lagged by one month. In addition, I include year dummies to allow for unobserved
temporal effects triggering hedge fund entry. I winsorise the accounting variables at
the 1 percent level.
Table 1.4 presents the results. All funds seem to exhibit a tendency to cluster in
target firms. Both of the coefficients indicating the presence of either an activist or
passive hedge fund in the previous month have positive and significant loadings, re-
gardless of the fund investing. For example, the presence of an activist hedge fund
increases the monthly probability of being targeted by another one for an otherwise
average firm by 0.40%, the presence of a passive hedge fund increases it by 0.16%.
One explanation for this clustering is that specific unobservable target characteris-
tics trigger entry of hedge funds. However, the comparably larger effect for activist
funds is also suggestive of the interpretation of activism as a joint effort between
several hedge funds. Market value is positively related to the probability of being
targeted by both activist and passive funds, in line with the idea that hedge fund
8 Since I restrict each hedge fund to either always invest as an activist or as a passive blockholder
when classifying funds, I abstain from modelling the target selection sequentially. In other words,
I treat being an activist or a passive blockholder as a fixed hedge fund characteristic and not
as a choice each fund makes upon investment. This setup aligns with anecdotal evidence that
some hedge funds (e.g., Wyser-Pratte Management Inc.) are notorious for their tendencies to get
involved as shareholder activists once they are invested.
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Table 1.4. Targeting choice, bivariate probit
Activist Blocks Passive Blocks
∆Marg. Marg. Coef. ∆Marg. Marg. Coef.
Activist Presence 0.4039% 0.5099*** 0.0137% 0.2513*
(4.38) (1.88)
Passive Presence 0.1635% 0.2918*** 0.0234% 0.3550***
(2.82) (3.49)
Market Value 0.0624% 0.0237% 0.6516*** 0.0039% 0.0015% 0.0455***
(4.24) (3.33)
Market/Book -0.0048% -0.0032% -0.0088 -0.0000% -0.0000% -0.0000
(-0.76) (-0.00)
Cash/Assets 0.0032% 0.0162% 0.0445 0.0027% 0.0122% 0.3598*
(0.20) (1.73)
Sales Growth 0.0127% 0.0183% 0.0501 0.0013% 0.0018% 0.0534
(1.27) (1.59)
Leverage 0.0173% 0.0557% 0.1529 -0.0002% -0.0006% -0.0188
(1.19) (-0.13)
Return on Assets -0.0017% -0.0092% -0.0253 0.0035% 0.0158% 0.4669***
(-0.12) (2.81)
Dividend Yield -0.0173% -0.0075% -0.0206 -0.015% -0.0007% -0.0199
(-0.94) (-1.39)







Table 1.4 summarises the results of a bivariate probit regression. The dependent variables in both
equations are binary, taking the value of 1 in case a hedge fund reported holdings in the particu-
lar month and firm, 0 otherwise. One equation contains all activist reported holdings, the other
those of passive funds. Included in the analyses are all firms with necessary data on all covariates
that have been listed in the CDAX between 2001 and 2010. All covariates are lagged by one month.
Activist Presence and Passive Presence are dummy variables indicating whether an activist or pas-
sive hedge fund, respectively, were present in the month preceding the month in question. Market
Value is the logarithm of the market value of equity lagged by one month. Market/Book is the
market value of equity lagged by one month divided by the book value of equity from the previ-
ous fiscal year. Cash/Assets is the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets. Sales Growth is the
percentage change in sales from two fiscal years ago to the last fiscal year. Leverage is the ratio of
lagged debt to lagged assets. Return on Assets is last year’s EBITDA divided by total assets two years
ago. Dividend Yield is the dividend yield lagged by one month. Float is the percentage of shares
in free float in the previous month. For all covariates, I report coefficients and their z-statistics,
marginal probabilities (Marg.) at the means as well as the change in marginal probabilities in-
duced by a one standard deviation increase from the averages (∆ Marg.), holding all remaining
variables at their means. I also include a set of year dummies. *, **, and *** mark significance levels
of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. I winsor accounting variables at the 1 percent level. ρ is the
correlation between the respective equations’ residuals.
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targets need to be sufficiently large to be worthwhile an investment. Alternatively
stated, many firms may be too small to legitimate investments in the intended size.
Also, as small firms’ businesses are often complicated by personal ties and firm-
specific management knowledge, they may be hard to influence and understand.
Both funds’ investments are more probable if larger percentages of shares are con-
sidered as free float. This likely reflects that hedge funds avoid targets with strong
incumbent shareholders. In addition, if all remaining ownership is dispersed, even
a small blockholder can effectively be the largest and supposedly most influential
among all shareholders. The results also suggest that passive hedge funds seek firms
that operate a profitable business, equipped with a solid amount of cash, and real-
ising relatively high returns on assets. Contrary to that, none of the variables aimed
at capturing corporate performance is related to the probability of becoming an ac-
tivist target. Specifically, the results do neither indicate that activists’ targets are rel-
atively distressed nor that they are particularly profitable relative to other firms in
CDAX.
Table 1.5 provides summary statistics that describe the target firms in absolute
terms. The most notable result in this table is that the median target of both ac-
tivist and passive hedge funds is profitable both in terms of return on equity and re-
turn on assets. The results of probit analysis and summary statistics render it ques-
tionable that activist hedge funds intend to make a short-term profit by pillaging
profitable companies as is sometimes suggested publicly, specifically since the com-
panies they actually target are not particularly profitable, underleveraged, or cash-
laden to begin with. However, the results also do not support the opposite view that
hedge funds invest in firms in financial distress.
1.5 Effects of Hedge Fund Investments
Short-Run Response. I use standard event-study methodology to analyse the short-
run impact of hedge funds’ investments. Defining the event date as the day the
hedge fund’s shareholdings become public knowledge, I estimate normal returns
from day -110 to -21 relative to the event using a market model with the CDAX
as the market return.9 I then calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as the
sum of daily abnormal returns over different event periods and evaluate the sig-
nificance of their differences from zero using the tests of both Patell (1976) and
Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991). The latter accounts for event-induced
9 Different estimation windows produce the same results.
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Table 1.5. Target characteristics and differences in target selection
Activist Blocks Passive Blocks Difference between
Average Median Average Median Averages Medians
Total Assets (in millione) 2,431.93 276.68 848.58 149.94 1,583.34*** 126.75**
(3.09) (2.47)
Market Value (in millione) 1,007.97 299.22 686.19 221.89 321.78 77.34
(1.63) (0.15)
Return on Equity -6.14% 7.53% 6.37% 11.71% -12.51%*** -4.18%***
(-2.50) (-2.60)
Return on Assets 8.62% 10.84% 11.03% 12.60% -2.41% -1.76%*
(-1.59) (-1.95)
Return on Lagged Assets 12.96% 11.49% 16.88% 15.73% -3.91%* -4.24%***
(-1.66) (-3.09)
Market/Book 2.24 1.91 2.84 2.30 -0.61*** -0.39***
(-2.75) (-2.91)
Leverage 0.3582 0.3200 0.2882 0.2445 0.0699* 0.0755**
(1.88) (2.05)
Dividend Yield 1.32% 0% 1.41% 0% -0.18% 0%
(-0.76) (-0.55)
Cash/Assets 0.2420 0.0953 0.3167 0.1435 -0.0748 -0.0482
(-1.30) (-1.52)
Free Cash Flow/Sales 0.0505 0.0583 0.0742 0.0826 -0.0238 -0.0243**
(-1.45) (-2.16)
Table 1.5 reports summary statistics as well as a comparison between activist and passive targets.
Total Assets is the sum of the book values of debt and equity. All remaining variables are defined as
in Table 1.4. I present means and medians for both activist and passive targets. In addition, I report
differences between the means and the medians alongside the t-statistics of unpaired t-tests and the
z-statistics of Wilcoxon signed rank tests. *, **, and *** mark significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent,
respectively.
variance. Since hedge fund investments and the subsequent days are often charac-
terised by highly volatile returns, this seems particularly appropriate.
Table 1.6 presents cumulative abnormal returns over different timeframes for ac-
tivist and passive blocks. Figure 1.1 plots them and adds the cumulative abnormal
volume.10 While there is no discernible pattern in the response to passive events,
market participants react strongly to the presence of activist hedge funds. On the
event day itself, the activists’ targets earn a statistically significant mean abnormal
return of 1.27%, significantly (p < 0.05) larger than the 0.14% CAR associated with
10 As a measure of volume I employ the Euro value of shares traded. I define abnormal volume for
each firm-day as the percentage excess volume over the median volume estimated over trading
days -100 to -21 prior to the event. The graph plots the median volume across all firms for each
day relative to the event. By using medians rather than means I attempt to circumvent the high
degree of skewness in volume data. With very small stocks, I observe volumes during the event
period of up to 17 times the average volume in the estimation period. Using medians allows in-
corporating this information, yet reduces its high leverage.
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Table 1.6. Immediate market reaction
Activist Blocks Passive Blocks
τst ar t τend CAR Patell Boehmer CAR Patell Boehmer
0 1 1.27% 7.09*** 4.62*** 0.14% 0.11 0.07
-1 1 1.22% 4.04*** 3.20*** -0.07% -0.61 -0.50
-20 0 4.22% 4.22*** 3.31*** 0.83% 0.17 0.13
-10 0 3.36% 4.54*** 3.33*** 1.31% 1.15 0.82
-20 20 3.47% 2.94*** 2.37** -0.44% -0.31 -0.24
1 10 0.90% 1.72* 1.96** -1.39% -1.27 -1.03
1 20 -0.75% -0.11 -0.11 -1.27% -0.62 -0.59
Table 1.6 summarises the short-term event study’s results. Normal returns are calculated using a
market model with a 90 day estimation period from day -110 to -21 and the CDAX as the market
index. After dropping events with insufficient return history, there are 137 activist events and 125
passive events. I present the results for various windows surrounding the initial event. The initial
event is defined as the first day the investment of the hedge fund becomes publicly known. *, **, and
*** mark significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent. I report values of both Patell’s (1976) test and
Boehmer’s (1991) test that accounts for event-induced variance.
passive blocks. The lack of significant reactions to the investments of hedge funds
following a passive agenda suggests that market participants do not consider their
investments value-relevant information on average. The largest part of abnormal re-
turns around activist events seems to materialise well in advance of the publication
of the investments with a significant run-up CAR of 4.22% in the 20 days preced-
ing day 0. Abnormal volume for activist events increases during the run-up period,
peaks on the event day with a median abnormal volume of 54.59%, and gradually
moves downward afterwards. One interpretation of the significantly positive returns
and volumes around activist events is that investors buy the target’s stock because
they anticipate that hedge fund activists create shareholder value. Brav et al. (2008)
remark that fund managers at times hint other investors at their upcoming engage-
ment, which may explain why a large fraction of the return response precedes the ac-
tual event. An alternative interpretation why prices increase alongside large abnor-
mal volumes is that buying pressure exerted by either the fund itself or other market
participants drives up the stock price. The strong correlation of 0.39 between CARs
and abnormal trading volumes for activist events (ρ = −0.08 for passive events) is
consistent with both interpretations.
In sum, the market reacts strongly to the presence of hedge funds, yet only if the
funds have a reputation for applying activist strategies. This positive reaction is com-
mon to previous studies on hedge fund activism, including the studies of Bessler,
Drobetz, and Holler (2013) and Mietzner and Schweizer (2014).
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Figure 1.1. Abnormal returns and volumes around activist and passive events
Figure 1.1 plots average cumulative abnormal returns and median daily abnormal volumes for ac-
tivist and passive events. Cumulative abnormal returns are the sum of daily abnormal returns. The
latter are calculated as the difference between actual returns and the predictions of a market model
with parameters estimated over days -110 to -21 relative to the event. A firm’s daily abnormal volume
is defined as the percentage excess volume over the median volume estimated from -100 to -21 trad-
ing days prior to the event, using the Euro value of shares traded as the measure of trading volume.
The upper two graphs plot the average cumulative abnormal return for each day for activist (left) and
passive events (right). The lower two graphs plot the daily abnormal volumes for activist (left) and
passive events (right).
Short-Run Cross-Section. To get a better understanding of the driving forces be-
hind individual CARs, I next regress the CARs for the window with the most pro-
nounced average reaction (day -20 to 0) on a number of variables: the natural loga-
rithm of sales, the return on equity, the market-to-book ratio, the size of the initial
stake, the Amihud illiquidity measure,11 and the free float portion of shares. Rather
11 The Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity is calculated as 1/80
∑−21
t=−100 abs(Ri ,t )/Vi ,t , where
abs(Ri ,t ) and Vi ,t are the stock’s absolute return and Euro trading volume on the specific day
relative to the event date.
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than including a set of covariates that proxy for potential causes of agency prob-
lems,12 I include the return on equity as a measure of profitability and the market-
to-book ratio as a valuation measure to proxy for their consequences.
The results are presented in Table 1.7. I report separate regressions for active
and passive blocks. Not a single coefficient is significant in either of the regressions.
When I consider different timeframes (e.g., abnormal returns on day 0 only or cu-
mulative abnormal returns from day -20 to +20), some coefficients at times become
significant, yet there is no consistent picture across regressions that would allow to
speak of a robust effect.13 Of course, it is possible that the regressions simply fail
to capture characteristics that drive the cross-sectional differences in abnormal re-
turns. I relegate an interpretation of this non-result to a little later and next explore
the long-term stock response and look for changes in central corporate fundamen-
tals.
Long-Run Response. I follow two distinct approaches to evaluate the long-
term stock performance of hedge fund targets. The first approach estimates buy-
and-hold returns in excess of either the CDAX market index or the characteristic-
matched benchmark firm as in Daniel et al. (1997).14 The CDAX index serves as the
first benchmark, even though it is very likely that an index this broad provides an in-
sufficient adjustment as Barber and Lyon (1997) show that empirical rejection rates
of tests based on reference portfolios like the CDAX exceed theoretical ones. Still,
using the CDAX is a nearby method of calculating an investor-oriented assessment
of the hedge funds’ impact and makes the results comparable to some of the results
in the studies of Bessler, Drobetz, and Holler (2013) and Mietzner and Schweizer
(2014). For all buy-and-hold abnormal returns, significance is evaluated using the
skewness-adjusted t-statistic suggested by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). This statis-
tic builds on the statistic by Johnson (1978) that captures skewness in returns, sup-
plemented by a bootstrapping procedure as recommended by Sutton (1993).15 I
drop events with overlapping return windows to avoid misspecified test statistics
as documented in Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999).
12 Bessler, Drobetz, and Holler (2013), for example, include dummies for different types of incum-
bent shareholders.
13 The untabulated cross-section of abnormal volumes provides the same, completely insignificant
results.
14 I only use size, market-to-book, and industry classification to find matching firms. There are too
few firms left within the set of candidate matches to also select firms with similar past stock per-
formance after matching on the first three characteristics.
15 In an earlier version of this paper I also employed the covariance matrix estimator suggested in
Jegadeesh and Karceski (2009). The results are essentially the same.
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Table 1.7. Cross-section of cumulative abnormal returns
CAR (-20 to 0)
Activist Blocks Passive Blocks
Sales -0.0089 0.0035
(-1.12) (0.51)




Initial Stake -0.0024 0.0139
(-0.92) (1.41)
Amihud (× 1000) -7.5600 16.4142
(-1.54) (1.56)






Table 1.7 reports the results of cross-sectional analyses for both all activist and all passive events.
Financial and real estate firms are excluded due to the incomparability of their accounting num-
bers. The dependent variables in both panels are the individual firms’ cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) for days -20 to 0 relative to the event. Sales is the natural logarithm of the previous fiscal year’s
sales. Amihud is the measure for illiquidity developed in Amihud (2002) times 103, a higher value in-
dicating less liquid stocks. The remaining variables are defined as beforehand. *, **, and *** mark
significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent. I employ White’s (1980) covariance estimator. Amihud’s
measure, Market/Book, and Return on Equity are all winsorised at 2.5%. t-values are in parentheses.
The second approach employs calendar-time portfolio regressions with the
Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. In order to estimate the 4-factor model, I create
German equivalents of the size, book-to-market, and momentum factors of Fama
and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) from the universe of all CDAX-listed firms.
All steps in the construction of the factors mimic those taken by Fama and French
(1993) and Carhart (1997) with US data. To mitigate heteroskedasticity in calendar-
time portfolio returns that is due to the changing number of constituents over time
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), I also run calendar-time regressions using only ob-
servations where the portfolio includes at least 5 firms. In addition, this approach
avoids giving excessive weights to periods with little events. The calendar-time re-
gressions incorporate the findings of Artmann et al. (2012) that the Carhart model is
superior to the Fama-French model in explaining the cross-section of German stock
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returns.
Table 1.8 reports results for the pre-event period (day -360 to -20) and for the
post-event period (day +1 to +360). My focus on approximately 1 year after the event
aligns with the observation concerning the funds’ average holding periods. As a ro-
bustness check I also evaluate abnormal returns for the entire holding period of
each investment. While this generates problems in the statistical analysis due to
overlapping investments in the same firm, the general tendency of the results is un-
changed.
In the pre-event period, neither buy-and-hold returns nor calendar-time alphas
are significantly different from zero for activist or passive funds’ investments. This
suggests that target firms on average do not experience any abnormal stock market
performance prior to the funds’ investments and adds to the contradicting findings
in US studies. Klein and Zur (2009) observe that targets of activist hedge funds signif-
icantly outperform prior to the purchase. In contrast, Clifford (2008) sees activists’
targets significantly underperforming.
The results for the post-event period are insignificant for the subsample of pas-
sive blocks. However, the results provide some evidence that activists’ targets signif-
icantly underperform in the year following the investment. Median buy-and-hold
returns are significantly negative when the CDAX is the benchmark (p ≈ 0.05). They
are also negative with the control-firm approach, albeit insignificant. The factor
model alpha is negative and significant (p ≈ 0.08), but only when the restriction
of having at least 5 portfolio constituents is applied. Still, the results in combination
indicate that the initially positive reaction to the hedge funds’ entry is subsequently
followed by significantly negative returns.
In unreported analyses I split the sample into pre- (before August 2007) and
post-financial crisis (after August 2007) subsamples. In both subsamples I find that
activist portfolios earn negative alphas in the post-event period. However, the al-
phas are insignificant, possibly owing to the comparably small number of obser-
vations left in each subsample. These results support the findings of Mietzner and
Schweizer (2014) who analyse events until 2007 and find that activist hedge funds’
targets significantly underperform in the 250 days following the investment. Bessler,
Drobetz, and Holler (2013) look at events until 2006 and provide qualitatively similar
results for activist investments.
In summary, both the analysis of buy-and-hold abnormal returns as well as
calendar-time portfolios suggest that hedge funds do not create shareholder value
in the long run as documented in US studies (Clifford, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009;
Brav et al., 2008) but neither do they seem to destroy it. If anything, the targets’ stock
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Table 1.8. Long-term stock performance
Activist Blocks Buy-and-Hold-Returns 4-Factor-Alpha
Market Size- and B/M- A) B)
Adjusted Adjusted
Pre-Event (Day -360 to -20) -8.40% 2.87% 0.0002 0.0006
(-1.24) (0.96) (0.62) (1.63)
Post-Event (Day +1 to +360) -18.06%** -9.17% -0.0007 -0.0005*
(-1.96) (-1.32) (-1.49) (-1.76)
Passive Blocks Buy-and-Hold-Returns 4-Factor-Alpha
Market Size- and B/M- A) B)
Adjusted Adjusted
Pre-Event (Day -360 to -20) -6.61% 3.19% 0.0006 0.0006
(-0.73) (0.41) (1.64) (1.64)
Post-Event (Day +1 to +360) -14.36% -11.30% 0.0002 0.0001
(-0.45) (-1.63) (0.65) (0.19)
Table 1.8 presents the analysis of the long-term stock performance for the period preceding the
event (day -360 to -20) and the period following the event (day +1 to +360). I report median buy-
and-hold returns in excess of the market index (CDAX) and in excess of the matched firms’ returns
(see text). The alphas are from 4-factor regressions employing the Carhart (1997) model, with (B) or
without (A) the restriction that there are at least 5 constituents in the portfolio. The significance of
buy-and-hold abnormal returns is assessed via the bootstrapped statistic suggested by Lyon, Barber,
and Tsai (1999). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance of 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses.
performance seems to be average when considering the combination of the period
surrounding the initial investment and the following year.
Long-Run Changes in Characteristics. If hedge funds affect corporate policies,
then this might result in discernible changes in observable firm characteristics fol-
lowing their investments. To explore this conjecture, I compare several target firm
characteristics over time, adjusted for the respective changes in matched firms.16 I
first calculate the changes in each characteristic between year 0 and 1 and between
year 0 and 2 for a given firm, and then I subtract the respective contemporaneous
change in the characteristics of the matched firm. The resulting difference provides
a test whether the target firm has abnormally changed in the particular dimension.
I restrict my attention to observations around the entry of the first activist to avoid
16 I winsorise the benchmark-adjusted changes at 2.5% to reduce the influence of a number of far-
outlying observations.
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overlapping timeframes.
One would expect that successful activism is mirrored in some way in core cor-
porate characteristics. For example, if firms suffer from corporate governance prob-
lems that impair firm performance, successful activism aimed at improving corpo-
rate performance should result in abnormal changes in return on equity or assets.
To evaluate the impact of activism, I consider changes in the following firm charac-
teristics: total assets, return on equity, return on (lagged) assets, the ratio of free cash
flow to sales, the market-to-book ratio, leverage, dividend yield, the ratio of cash to
assets, and board turnover.17
Table 1.9 provides the results. With the exception of a significant increase in
board turnover, none of the fundamental characteristics changes significantly when
compared to changes in matched firms.18 The increase in board turnover is consis-
tent with the findings in Klein and Zur (2009) that US hedge funds achieve their
stated objective of altering a board’s composition in more than 7 of 10 activist in-
vestments. However, the observation that targets do not improve in either of the
other firm characteristics indicates that activism in Germany is ineffective in funda-
mentally affecting target firms. Of course, it may be the case that heterogeneity in
activist attempts and goals prevents the identification of effects.19 Nevertheless, the
results are consistent with earlier literature on shareholder activism that finds little
evidence of increases in operational performance (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999;
Karpoff, 2001; Wahal, 1996) as well as the study by Klein and Zur (2009) on hedge
fund activism in particular that even shows a deterioration of profitability.
The results run counter to Clifford’s (2008) finding of significant increases in tar-
gets’ returns on assets. The set of variables considered in this analysis is restricted
to a small number of central variables and it did not include a number of potential
alternative variables that relate to a firm’s governance, for example. However, even
if hedge funds did affect corporate fundamentals in some way, the long-term event
study results suggest that such changes are either not recognised or valued by in-
vestors.
17 I define board turnover as the number of changes in the composition of the board of executives
divided by the number of seats in the year of the fund’s entry.
18 When interpreting the changes, I focus on medians and the results of Wilcoxon’s (1945) signed
rank test.
19 Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) observe heterogeneity in pension fund activists’ strategies and
outcomes. Similarly, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) observe heterogeneity between different
types of blockholders.
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Table 1.9. Changes in activists’ targets’ characteristics
+1 Year +2 Years
Average Average Median Median Average Average Median Median
Difference Adj. Difference Difference Adj. Difference Difference Adj. Difference Difference Adj. Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(Assets) 0.2054** 0.1726 0.0291** -0.0283 0.2392** 0.0618 0.0822** 0.0500
(0.04) (0.12) (0.02) (0.98) (0.02) (0.59) (0.02) (0.76)
Return on Equity -5.90% -3.53% -0.06% 1.56% -5.19% 3.71% -1.86% -1.60%
(0.37) (0.61) (0.35) (0.76) (0.48) (0.69) (0.47) (0.89)
Return on Assets 1.85% 1.19% 0% 0.29% -1.40% 1.40% 0.99% 0.63%
(0.25) (0.44) (0.73) (0.48) (0.53) (0.50) (0.55) (0.84)
Return on Lagged Assets -2.83% -5.37%** -1.09% -1.78% -6.84%** -5.09% -1.79% -0.75%
(0.24) (0.03) (0.24) (0.16) (0.04) (0.15) (0.16) (0.52)
Free Cash Flow/Sales 0.0152 0.0356 0.0030 -0.0136 -0.0250 0.0335 0.0045 0.0182
(0.39) (0.29) (0.83) (0.45) (0.46) (0.59) (0.90) (0.77)
Market/Book 0.0314 -0.3164 -0.0500 0.1100 -0.2749 0.1184 -0.3750** -0.2600
(0.90) (0.41) (0.59) (0.88) (0.30) (0.71) (0.04) (0.68)
Leverage -0.0097 -0.0572** -0.0270 -0.0132 0.0185 -0.0250 -0.0054 0.0062
(0.69) (0.05) (0.40) (0.14) (0.55) (0.50) (0.93) (0.73)
Dividend Yield 0.54%** 0.53% 0%** 0% 0.91%** 0.88%* 0%** 0%
(0.04) (0.13) (0.01) (0.12) (0.03) (0.10) (0.01) (0.15)
Cash/Assets -0.0855 -0.0578 0.0096 0.0048 -0.0863* -0.0475 -0.0062 -0.0082
(0.11) (0.16) (0.57) (0.56) (0.10) (0.28) (0.43) (0.59)
Management Turnover 0.0312 0.1000 0 0.1389* 0.0671 0.1769** 0* 0**
(0.49) (0.10) (0.57) (0.06) (0.23) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03)
Table 1.9 reports changes in various measures of profitability and further characteristics in the first and second year following the entry of the first activist hedge fund
into a company. I separately present unadjusted differences ((1), (3), (5), and (7)) and differences adjusted for the change in the respective matched firm’s characteristics
((2),(4),(6), and (8)). Mean differences are given in (1), (2), (5), and (6), including the p-values of a simple t-test in parentheses. Median differences are given in (3), (4),
(7), and (8), including the p-values of a Wilcoxon (1945) signed rank test in parentheses. The columns of interest are (2), (4), (6), and (8); they present the abnormal
changes in target characteristics. Management Turnover is the number of changes in the board of executives divided by the board’s size in the year of the fund’s entry.
The remaining variables are defined as in the preceding tables. *, **, and *** mark significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
1 Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism in Germany
Interpretation. In summary, activist hedge fund investments are associated with
positive short-term stock returns and abnormal trading volumes, negative long-
term stock returns, and with no changes in central corporate variables in the years
following the funds’ engagement apart from an increase in board turnover.
But how do the significantly positive immediate abnormal stock returns fit
into this picture? Though hedge funds seem to affect corporate control structures,
neither the long-term stock returns nor the variables typically considered value-
relevant justify the immediate positive reactions. One possible explanation is that
this pattern reflects overoptimism on investors’ side. As pointed out by Brav et al.
(2008), shareholders build some belief regarding the expected gains from activism
upon seeing a hedge fund enter a firm. This requires —among other things— an es-
timate of the strength of the incumbent shareholders’ resistance. These incumbent
shareholders own on average approximately 29% of all voting shares (∼30% for pas-
sive blocks) in the month prior to entry. To the extent that hedge fund activism tar-
gets corporate inefficiencies that benefit the shareholders in control, agreement be-
tween the fund and the dominant incumbent becomes unlikely. Owing to the com-
parably weak rights of minority shareholders in Germany, this likely puts the incum-
bent shareholders in a strong defensive position. The fiercely fought public debates
around hedge fund activism at Deutsche Börse, Kuka, TUI, and several other firms
present anecdotal evidence for such disagreements. Still, it raises the question as to
why investors would initially form biased beliefs when responding to hedge fund
investments.
I favour the explanation that the immediate market response to hedge fund
investments reflects attention-induced buying as suggested in Barber and Odean
(2008). Activist hedge fund investments are typically accompanied by plenty of me-
dia coverage as well as press releases by target firms and the investing funds. This
is likely to raise attention among potential shareholders and might induce them to
flock into the target stock. It is thus conceivable that as hedge funds push particu-
lar stocks into the spotlight, these stocks are equally pushed up in price — yet not
because hedge funds are believed to generate value but because they generate sub-
stantial attention among prospective investors. This would explain high abnormal
volumes, and initially positive as well as subsequently negative abnormal returns. It
would also explain why none of the covariates in the cross-sectional regressions of




This paper explores the effects of hedge fund investments in Germany based on
a sample of events covering the period between 1999 and 2010. The results I por-
tray indicate that—all-in-all—hedge fund activism in German firms is ineffective.
I neither find that target firms improve (or change at all, for that matter) in terms
of corporate fundamentals, nor do I find a permanent change in firm valuations,
though hedge funds seem to affect the composition of the targets’ boards of man-
agement. Interestingly, market participants seem to respond inefficiently to the ini-
tial publication of an activist’s investment. Though activist hedge fund investments
are accompanied by substantial and significantly positive abnormal returns as well
as high abnormal trading volumes in the days around the publication of the invest-
ment, long-run abnormal returns in the post-event period are negative. Over the
entire period, i.e., from shortly before the announcement of investment to one year
later, abnormal returns are insignificant. I interpret the combination of these results
as evidence of attention-based buying in the spirit of Barber and Odean (2008). As
hedge funds invest into firms, they generate news surrounding the companies they
target. This raises the attention of investors and temporarily pushes up the targets’
prices. Eventually, prices revert to the levels before the investment.
A question left unanswered in this paper is why hedge fund activism is ineffective.
One may conjecture that intensely concentrated ownership structures in combina-
tion with rather weak shareholder rights pose a considerable challenge for share-
holder activism. It is conceivable that changes to a firm’s management as indicated
by the increase in board turnover are the only concession that large shareholders
are willing to make when confronted with hedge fund activists. This, however, may
not be enough for the latter to affect the target firm in terms of fundamentals and
valuation. I leave a more thorough discussion of this question to further research.
35

2 Recommendation Revisions and
Differences in the Interpretation of
Earnings
2.1 Introduction
Recommendations to buy, hold, or sell specific stocks are one of the main outlets
of sell-side analyst research. Existing literature (e.g., Womack, 1996 or more recently
Bradley et al., 2014) finds that recommendation revisions are associated with sig-
nificant movements in stock prices, typically increasing following upgrades and de-
creasing following downgrades. Evidence of this type, i.e., cross-sectional patterns
in returns around the release of recommendations, suggests that investors attribute
value to analysts’ opinions. What is less clear is what information investors respond
to when reacting to recommendation revisions. In this paper, I attempt to shed light
on this issue by contrasting patterns in investors’ responses to recommendations—
a proxy for the information investors extract—to patterns in how recommendations
relate to firms’ earnings processes—a proxy for the information recommendations
contain.
Post-earnings revisions of pre-earnings recommendations provide a unique set-
ting to compare investors’ and analysts’ earnings interpretation. When revising their
recommendations, analysts indicate that the difference between their own estimate
of a firm’s value and the current market price has changed (e.g., Francis and Soffer,
1997). An upgrade from a hold to a buy recommendation, for example, reveals that
a firm’s market value has fallen below the value the analyst considers appropriate.
The central idea behind this paper is that recommendation revisions following an
earnings release indicate whether analysts agree with investors’ earnings interpre-
tation. Employing a simple model, I build on this premise and devise two distinct
empirical strategies to identify whether analysts have an edge over investors in the
interpretation of earnings.
The first strategy aims to approximate the process by which investors build ex-
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pectations of future earnings. If analysts’ interpretation of earnings surprises is on
average superior to investors’, then recommendation revisions should capture vari-
ation in earnings that is not predicted by the process underlying investors’ expecta-
tions. Moreover, they should do so in a specific, predictable way. While confirmatory
revisions, i.e., upgrades following positive surprises or downgrades following nega-
tive surprises, should indicate exceptionally permanent earnings surprises, contra-
dictory revisions, i.e., downgrades following positive surprises or upgrades follow-
ing negative surprises, should indicate exceptionally transitory earnings surprises.
A caveat with these predictions, however, is that empirically testing them necessi-
tates imposing a model to proxy for investors’ expectations of future earnings.
The second strategy attempts to overcome this problem. If investors value an-
alysts’ assessment of their own initial response to the earnings release, then their
response to recommendation revisions should exhibit predictable patterns. Specifi-
cally, the association between stock returns around revisions and past earnings sur-
prises should vary with the type of the recommendation. While returns should be
positively associated with the preceding earnings surprise if a revision is confirma-
tory, the association should be negative if it is contradictory. Put differently, the idea
behind the second strategy is to explore whether changes in investors’ perception of
earnings surprises induced by recommendation revisions are in line with what the
model predicts them to be if investors consider analysts’ skill at interpreting earn-
ings superior to their own.
I test these predictions using a large sample of recommendation revisions re-
leased by analysts on record with IBES in the period between 1994 and 2013. Sup-
porting the idea that revised recommendations contain information about past
earnings surprises, I find that the association between future earnings and past earn-
ings surprises varies as predicted by the model. It is exceptionally strong, i.e., more
positive than average, when earnings are followed by confirmatory revisions, and it
is exceptionally weak, i.e., less positive than average, when they are followed by con-
tradictory revisions. These results are robust to different ways of measuring earnings
surprises and they hold while accounting for firm-, industry-, size-, or time-specific
differences in how current earnings surprises relate to future earnings.
To understand whether investors value this source of information, I analyse
cross-sectional variation in returns around recommendation revisions. In support
of the model’s prediction, I find that abnormal returns are positively associated with
past surprises around confirmatory revisions, and they are negatively associated
around contradictory revisions. These results hold while accounting for a host of
covariates known to drive investors’ responses to recommendations, including the
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level of the recommendation and the change in recommendation levels, and they
are insensitive to different ways of measuring abnormal returns. This suggest that
investors are aware of the information that recommendation revisions reveal about
past earnings surprises, and they incorporate this information to reassess their esti-
mate of firm value.
In further regressions I explore differences in analyst skill. I document that rec-
ommendations by more experienced analysts and analysts from larger brokerage
firms provide stronger signals, suggesting enhanced skill at assessing whether an
earnings surprise is likely to reflect a persistent change in earnings. I then show that
cross-sectional differences in investors’ responses to revisions indicate awareness of
these between-analyst differences. Return responses are more positively associated
with the earnings surprise around confirmatory revisions and more negatively as-
sociated with the earnings surprise around contradictory revisions if either of them
are released by more experienced analysts or analysts working with larger brokerage
firms.
This paper relates to the literature along several lines. First, it is a contribution to
the extensive literature on the value of analyst research (e.g., Stickel, 1991; Womack,
1996; Francis and Soffer, 1997; Ivkovic´ and Jegadeesh, 2004; Asquith, Mikhail, and
Au, 2005; Chen, Cheng, and Lo, 2010; Livnat and Zhang, 2012; Bradley et al., 2014).
The extant literature’s primary focus has been the cross-sectional analysis of stock
market reactions to analyst publications. The main contribution of this paper is to
show that patterns in how revisions in analysts’ recommendations relate to funda-
mental, value-relevant information—future earnings—parallel the patterns in how
investors respond to their releases.
Second, there is some evidence that investors revise their interpretation of past
earnings using corroborating firm information like subsequent earnings releases
(Freeman and Tse, 1989), dividend changes (Koch and Sun, 2004), or insider transac-
tions (Veenman, 2012). However, little research has explored whether investors use
non-firm releases to the same end. Particularly close to my paper are Mendenhall
(1991) and Park and Pincus (2000). Findings in both papers suggest that patterns
in returns around changes in consensus forecasts and recommendations indicate a
reinterpretation of past earnings. Their results, however, remain suggestive in that
they do not relate the patterns in returns to those in actual earnings. My paper ex-
tends and lends credence to their findings by providing the fundamental analogue
to the patterns they document in investors’ responses.
Third, previous literature finds that the accuracy of analyst forecasts is larger
for more experienced analysts or analysts from larger brokerage firms (Mikhail,
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Walther, and Willis, 1997, 2003; Clement, 1999). My results provide an explanation
for this pattern in that they show the same differences in analysts’ abilities to extrap-
olate future earnings from current earnings surprises. In other words, my results
indicate that one reason for the observed differences in analysts’ forecasting accu-
racy is that more experienced analysts and analysts from larger brokerage firms are
better at deducing what current earnings surprises imply for future earnings.
The paper proceeds with the development of hypotheses in Section 2.2, where
I use a simple model to motivate my empirical analyses. Section 2.3 describes the
data collection procedure and defines the main variables. Section 2.4 presents the
results. In Section 2.5, I explore cross-sectional heterogeneity in analysts’ abilities
and the associated differences in investors’ responses. I present robustness checks
and additional analyses in Section 2.6 and conclude in Section 2.7.
2.2 Empirical Predictions
I develop my empirical predictions using a stylised model that builds on three
premises: (1) The implications of current earnings surprises for future earnings are
uncertain. (2) Market participants and analysts sometimes differ in their interpreta-
tion of earnings surprises, and (3), analysts revise recommendations when their as-
sessment of relative firm valuation changes, i.e., when the difference between their
own estimate of firm value and the current market price changes.
Based on the above premises, I derive two distinct empirical approaches to com-
pare analysts’ and investors’ skill in the interpretation of earnings. The first ap-
proach attempts to approximate investors’ estimate of the association between a
given period’s earnings surprise and the following period’s earnings. The model
makes directional predictions how addition of recommendation revisions should
improve this estimate—if analysts’ interpretation of earnings is superior to in-
vestors’. The second approach looks at investors’ responses to the publication of
recommendation revisions instead and attempts to identify analyst superiority by
exploring whether differences in the response to recommendations suggest a rein-
terpretation of previous earnings surprises.
Let q and q +1 indicate two consecutive periods and let Eq and Eq+1 be the as-
sociated actual values of earnings per share (henceforth just earnings). Denote in-
vestors’ (I NV ) and analysts’ (AN ) expectations of earnings in q just before observ-
ing the earnings announcement in q by Epr e−q [Eq ]I NV and Epr e−q [Eq ]AN . Similarly,
let Epr e−q [Eq+1]I NV and Epr e−q [Eq+1]AN be their expectations of earnings in q + 1
before observing earnings in q .
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Assume earnings surprises contain both permanent and transitory components.
While permanent components reflect shifts in the expected level of all future earn-
ings, transitory components have no consequences beyond the current period.1 Let
p I NV and p AN denote investors’ and analysts’ estimate of the fraction of an earnings
surprise that is permanent and let 1−p I NV and 1−p AN be the fractions they believe
to be transitory.
Following the announcement of period q earnings, investors’ and analysts’ ex-
pectation of earnings in period q +1 can be written as the sum of their priors and
their expectation of the permanent fraction of the earnings surprise:
Epost−q [Eq+1]I NV = Epr e−q [Eq+1]I NV +p I NV (Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ]I NV ) (2.1)
and
Epost−q [Eq+1]AN = Epr e−q [Eq+1]AN +p AN (Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ]AN ). (2.2)
Thus, both analysts and investors alter their estimates of future earnings by the
fraction of the current surprise they consider permanent.
To link this change in expectations to market valuations, I use earnings response
coefficients (e.g., Freeman and Tse, 1989). Intuitively, earnings response coefficients
or ERC s describe how a (1 unit-) change in unexpected earnings maps into stock
returns. Let ERCp and ERCt be the ERC s for permanent and transitory components
of earnings surprises and assume that both analysts and investors apply the same
ERC s. Note that because permanent changes in the level of earnings have more
pronounced implications for firm value, ERCp > ERCt .
The initial stock market response to the earnings announcement in period q (Rq )
can be written as the sum of ERC -weighted earnings surprise components:
Rq = (p I NV ERCp + (1−p I NV )ERCt )(Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ]I NV ). (2.3)
Because investors’ opinions determine market prices, this response includes p I NV
and Epr e−q [Eq ]I NV rather than p AN and Epr e−q [Eq ]AN . In consequence, the change
in value observed around the earnings announcement, Rq , does not need to coin-
cide with the change in value analysts deem appropriate. To understand how this
affects an analyst’s assessment of relative firm value, what investors can learn about
1 This dichotomy serves to keep matters as simple as possible. The essential assumption necessary
for all of the following arguments is that earnings surprises contain different components, some
of which are longer-lived and thus more relevant for firm value than others.
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p AN from recommendation revisions, and why this may help in contrasting ana-
lysts’ and investors’ skill in the interpretation of earnings, it is necessary to take a
step back and discuss why analysts revise recommendations.
Francis and Soffer (1997, p.193) view “stock recommendations as expressions of
analysts’ beliefs about share values relative to their market prices”. The release of
a “sell”, for example, suggests that an analyst believes a firm is currently trading
above its fundamental value. As an analyst revises a recommendation and upgrades,
reiterates, or downgrades a stock, the analyst reveals whether her assessment of
a firm’s relative valuation has changed since she last released a recommendation.
Thereby, a revised recommendation indicates whether an analyst agrees with how
investors’ responded to news released following the previously released recommen-
dation. This distinguishes recommendation revisions not only from earnings fore-
casts and changes in earnings forecasts but also from recommendation levels.2
Note that even though analysts and investors may disagree on their estimates
for earnings in period q+1 prior to period q (Epr e−q [Eq+1]AN and Epr e−q [Eq+1]I NV ),
there can only be changes in an analyst’s assessment of relative firm value if either
p AN differs from p I NV or Epr e−q [Eq ]AN differs from Epr e−q [Eq ]I NV , because only
the earnings surprise and its composition change analysts’ resp. investors’ estimate
of firm value. To simplify the argument, I equate Epr e−q [Eq ]I NV and Epr e−q [Eq ]AN
as well as Epr e−q [Eq+1]I NV and Epr e−q [Eq+1]AN in the following and assume that
analysts and investors agree on their expectation of Eq and Eq+1 just before the an-
nouncement in q , henceforth denoted by Epr e−q [Eq ] and Epr e−q [Eq+1]. I thus as-
sume that—at least for one and two periods ahead—analyst estimates provide a
reasonable proxy for investors’ expectations of earnings and I abstract from situa-
2 To see this, first consider a change in an analyst’s forecast following an earnings announce-
ment. Without knowing investors’ post-announcement estimate of future earnings, it is unclear
whether this new forecast is higher, lower, or equal to investors’ new expectation. Thus, revised
forecasts on their own only reveal whether the analyst changed her expectation of future earnings,
but not whether she disagrees with the market’s earnings interpretation. Similarly, without con-
trasting recommendations to their previous level, they provide an ambiguous signal about the
analysts’ assessment of the market’s response to earnings. To see this, consider a “hold” recom-
mendation following an earnings announcement. If the previous recommendation was a “buy”,
the new recommendation suggests investors’ response to the earnings release was too positive.
If the previous recommendation was a “sell”, however, the new recommendation suggests the
opposite, i.e., that investors responded too negatively to the release. Thus, while recommenda-
tion levels can indicate disagreement between analysts and market participants about the level
of a firm’s valuation, they cannot without further information indicate disagreement concerning
changes in firm valuation.
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tions in which investors and analysts disagree on the surprise itself.3,4
How will analysts revise their recommendations after observing earnings sur-
prises and the market’s response to earnings? I will now go through the possible
cases.5
If an analyst’s belief about the permanent component of the earnings surprise
coincides with investors’ (p AN = p I NV ), the immediate response in (2.3) aligns with
the analyst’s assessment and her estimate of relative firm value stays constant. Thus,
the analyst will reiterate her old recommendation. This changes when analyst and
investors disagree on the permanent fraction of the surprise.
There are two situations in which the immediate response increases an analyst’s
assessment of relative firm value: Either if the analyst perceives investors’ response
not positive enough following better-than-expected earnings or too negative follow-
ing worse-than-expected earnings. In both cases, the analyst will want to release
an upgrade following the earnings announcement. In other words, the analyst will
use an upgrade to communicate that a firm has become more undervalued / less
overvalued over the earnings release:
Upg r adeq if
 Eq > Epr e−q [Eq ] and p
AN > p I NV or
Eq < Epr e−q [Eq ] and p AN < p I NV .
(2.4)
In contrast, every time an analyst thinks that the response to a negative earnings sur-
prise is not negative enough or the response to a positive surprise is is too positive,
she will use a downgrade to communicate that a stock has become more overvalued
/ less undervalued:
Downg r adeq if
 Eq > Epr e−q [Eq ] and p
AN < p I NV or
Eq < Epr e−q [Eq ] and p AN > p I NV .
(2.5)
3 There is an extensive literature that debates whether analyst forecasts or time-series models
provide better surrogates for investors’ earnings expectations. See Kothari (2001) for a review.
I present results for a time-series model of earnings expectations in Section 2.6.
4 This does not imply that analysts and investors agree on firm value prior to earnings. For one,
differences between the analysts’ estimate of firm value and investors’ may also derive from dif-
ferences in expectations of earnings beyond period q +1. Also, in line with the basic idea of the
model, analysts’ estimate of firm value may deviate from investors’ in case they consider previous
responses to earnings inadequate.
5 I focus on the distinction between upgrades, downgrades, and reiterations, and I do not make a
distinction between upgrades and downgrades that change the level of recommendation by one
notch only and those that change it by several notches.
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Two variables, Con f i r mq and Contr adi ctq , capture these arguments and charac-
terise what recommendation revisions reveal about an analysts’ assessment of the
stock market’s immediate response to earnings:
Con f i r mq = 1 if
 Eq > Epr e−q [Eq ] and Upg r adeqEq < Epr e−q [Eq ] and Downg r adeq ,else 0, (2.6)
and
Contr adi ctq = 1 if
 Eq < Epr e−q [Eq ] and Upg r adeqEq > Epr e−q [Eq ] and Downg r adeq ,else 0. (2.7)
The labelling of the variables is borrowed from Freeman and Tse (1989) and indi-
cates that a recommendation revision with the same sign as the preceding earnings
surprise confirms the latter, while a revision with the opposite sign contradicts it.
I now turn to the derivation of empirical predictions to identify analysts’ superi-
ority in the interpretation of earnings. Assume investors’ best estimate of p I NV can
be modelled by observable characteristics Xq . Then, one can write their posterior
estimate of next period’s earnings as
Epost−q [Eq+1]I NV = Epr e−q [Eq+1]+δ′Xq (Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ]). (2.8)
Essentially, this equation states that investors use observable characteristics to esti-
mate how current surprises map into future earnings. Assume an analyst can extract
this guess from investors’ earnings response and releases recommendations accord-
ing to (2.4) and (2.5). Relying on the definitions of Con f i r mq and Contr adi ctq , her
best estimate of next period’s earnings can be written as
Epost−q [Eq+1]AN =Epost−q [Eq+1]I NV (2.9)
+Con f i r mqδ1(Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ])+Contr adi ctqδ2(Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ]),
where δ1 and δ2 indicate by how much the analyst’s estimate of p differs from in-
vestors’. The comparison of actual earnings to this posterior is the basis for Hypoth-
esis 1:
H1 If analysts’ earnings interpretation is on average superior to investors’, then cur-
rent earnings surprises should be positively (negatively) associated with unex-
pected future earnings following confirmatory (contradictory) revisions.
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Hypothesis 1 can be written in the form of a regression equation:
Eq+1−Epr e−q [Eq+1]=α+β1(Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ])+β2′Xq +β3′Xq (Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ])
+γ1Con f i r mq (Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ])
+γ2Contr adi ctq (Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ])+²q+1. (2.10)
If analysts’ skill in interpreting earnings surprises exceeds investors’, γ1 in (2.10)
should be positive and γ2 should be negative. For (2.10) to identify whether ana-
lysts’ earnings interpretation is superior to investors’, the included variables need
to contain a sufficient approximation of investors’ expectations regarding next pe-
riod’s earnings. To this end, the regression includes a vector of controls, Xq , as well
as its interaction with the earnings surprise. The interaction is intended to approx-
imate investors’ estimate of p I NV . The levels of Xq allow for the characteristics to
also have an effect on the level of next period’s earnings expectation.
The problem with (2.10) is that it jointly tests whether analysts have skill at in-
terpreting earnings and whether the choice of controls Xq adequately describes in-
vestors’ earnings expectation. Unless the controls are adequate, the coefficients γ1
and γ2 might pick up something not included in the model but part of investors’ in-
formation set. In the empirical section I will approach this issue by including a large
number of controls in Xq to allow for variation of expectations in time-, firm-, and
industry-specific factors.
An alternative way to identify whether analysts’ earnings interpretation is supe-
rior to investors’ is to look at market responses to recommendation revisions. Con-
sider the return around a recommendation revision following an earnings release,
RREV . This return can be written as
RREV =(pN EW −p I NV )(ERCp −ERCt )(Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ])+β′XREV . (2.11)
While part of the response is due to factors unrelated to past earnings, XREV , (2.11)
includes the product of the past earnings surprise, Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ], and the differ-
ence between investors’ revised expectation of p after observing the revision, pN EW ,
and their initial estimate, p I NV . Because ERCp > ERCt , the sign of the association
between the return around the revision and the past surprise depends on the sign
of pN EW −p I NV . In consequence, this sign can be used to infer how investors alter
their estimate of the permanent fraction of the surprise, p I NV , upon observing an
analyst’s recommendation revision. The previous arguments suggest three possible
situations.
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If analysts release confirmatory revisions, they indicate that p AN > p I NV . In-
vestors who attribute value to this signal should adjust their estimate p I NV to some
value pN EW > p I NV ,6 and returns around confirmatory revisions should be posi-
tively associated with the preceding earnings surprise. In case analysts release a
contradictory revision, they signal that p AN < p I NV . Thus, investors who believe
that an analyst’s interpretation is valuable should adjust their estimate of p to some
value pN EW < p I NV . In consequence, returns should be negatively associated with
the past earnings surprise around contradictory revisions. Finally, if analysts reiter-
ate their previous recommendation, they indicate that the market’s estimate of p
coincides with their own. In this situation, returns should not be associated with
past earnings.
Following this argument and using the previous definitions, I can rewrite (2.11)
as a regression equation:
RREV =α+β′XREV +γ1Con f i r mq (Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ]) (2.12)
+γ2Contr adi ctq (Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ])+²REV .
If revisions conform to the logic outlined previously and if investors believe that an-
alysts’ interpretation of earnings is superior to their own, then γ1 should be positive,
whereas γ2 should be negative.
H2 If investors consider analysts’ earnings interpretation superior to their own,
then abnormal returns should be positively (negatively) related to past earn-
ings surprises around confirmatory (contradictory) recommendation revi-
sions.
Equation (2.12) identifies (investor-assessed) analyst superiority in interpreting
earnings in case the controls in XREV adequately control for alternative drivers’ of
investors’ responses to recommendation revisions.
Taken together, I propose two hypotheses aimed at testing for analyst superiority
in the interpretation of earnings. Both attempt to identify skill relative to investors.
Testing of the first hypothesis relies on the assumption that equation (2.10) is suc-
cessful at capturing investors’ information set concerning the relation between cur-
rent surprises and future earnings. Essentially, the underlying idea is to treat in-
vestors like an econometrician who attempts to model the mapping between cur-
rent earnings surprises and future earnings and see whether the addition of analyst
6 How strongly investors’ posterior moves into the direction of p AN depends—among other
things—on how strong a signal a revision is. I will return to this point in Section 2.5
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information improves upon her hypothesised model in the way predicted by theory.
Testing the second hypothesis instead requires that specification (2.12) is successful
at modelling the determinants of (abnormal) stock returns around recommenda-
tions revisions.
2.3 Sample and Central Variables
2.3.1 Sample
I obtain data for this study from 2 sources. I download data on earnings, earnings
forecasts, and recommendations from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System
(IBES), and I download data on stocks, indices, and industry affiliations from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). My sample covers the period between
January 1994 and December 2013.
Because the focus of this study lies on recommendation revisions released be-
tween two adjacent quarterly earnings announcements that revise older recommen-
dations released prior to the earlier announcement, I impose the following data re-
quirements:
1. Actual values for earnings per share and earnings announcement dates for
period q and q +1 are available on the IBES tapes;
2. Data on CRSP are available around the recommendation date and for at least
30 days prior to the period q announcement;
3. The recommendation has a non-zero analyst identifier on the IBES tapes;
4. The old recommendation is released prior to the period q earnings announce-
ment; The new recommendation is released between the announcements in
q and q +1;
5. There is at least 1 trading day between the release of the new recommendation
and both the previous and subsequent earnings release;
6. There are at least 3 analyst forecasts for earnings in period q and period q +1
in the 120 calendar days preceding the announcement for period q ;
7. The earnings surprise in period q is not 0.
Data requirements (1) to (3) are necessary to construct the variables employed in
the empirical analyses. Criterion (4) restricts the sample to post-earnings revisions
47
2 Recommendation Revisions and Differences in the Interpretation of Earnings
of recommendations released prior to the earnings release. (5) is a precaution to
ensure that revisions are released strictly after the period q announcement and
strictly before the period q+1 announcement. (6) ensures that the measures of earn-
ings expectation I employ are sufficiently accurate. I impose (7) because there is no
new value-relevant information that might later be reconsidered in situations where
earnings are as expected.7
From all observations that fulfil these requirements, I drop firms with stock
prices below 10 dollars or market values below 100 million dollars. The market value
requirement ensures that my results are not driven by small firms. I impose the price
requirement because I standardise the earnings variables by the stock price. Setting
a minimal value of 10 dollars prevents the occurrence of extreme values. I also re-
quire that there are at most 180 calendar days between the two earnings announce-
ments and thus drop cases with an unusually large period of time between releases
for consecutive quarters.
My final sample comprises 85,011 pairs of sequential earnings announcements
with 187,288 intermittent recommendation revisions.
2.3.2 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 requires expectations of the current and the next pe-
riod’s earnings before the announcement in period q , Epr e−q [Eq ] and Epr e−q [Eq+1].
As a surrogate for the unobservable market expectations I employ the consensus an-
alyst forecasts in IBES. To construct the consensus, I download the IBES Detail tape
with all individual analyst forecasts for earnings per share over the sample period. I
then calculate Epr e−q [Eq ] as the mean of all most recent analyst forecasts over the
120 days preceding the earnings announcement in q . Analogously, I calculate ex-
pectations for period q +1 earnings before period q , Epr e−q [Eq+1], as the mean of
all most recent analyst forecasts for earnings in q + 1 over the 120 days preceding
the earnings release of q . Thus, both the expectations for earnings in q and q+1 are
calculated in the days preceding the period q earnings release.
Using actual earnings for Eq and Eq+1 from the IBES Detail tape and the split-
adjusted stock price (Pq ) 30 days prior to the announcement in q , I then define
SU Eq =
Eq −Epr e−q [Eq ]
Pq
(2.13)
7 Koch and Sun (2004) impose a similar restriction when exploring whether dividend announce-
ments convey information about previously released earnings. They eliminate observations
where seasonal earnings changes are zero.
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and




SU E (standardised unexpected earnings) quantifies the period q earnings surprise.
F SU E is the difference between period q+1 earnings and the expectation for period
q+1 earnings that prevailed prior to observing the announcement in period q . I em-
ploy the price to deflate both variables to make earnings comparable across firms
and mitigate heteroskedasticity in later regressions.8 In all my analyses, I winsorise
SU E and F SU E at the lower and upper 1 percent tails of their respective distribu-
tions to reduce the impact of outlying observations.
From IBES I also download all recommendations released over the sample pe-
riod. IBES records recommendations as a numerical score from 1 (“strong buy”) to
5 (“sell”). I use these ranks to quantify the content of a recommendation revision
as in Jegadeesh et al. (2004) or Loh and Stulz (2011). To this end, I first invert the
numerical rank (5 = “strong buy”, 1 = “sell”) and then calculate the recommenda-
tion change (4Rec) as the difference between the new recommendation rank and
the last preceding recommendation rank. 4Rec thus ranges from -4 to +4. While
positive values correspond to upgrades, negative values indicate downgrades.
I then define two binary variables to characterise whether a given recommen-
dation revision on some day t confirms or contradicts the last preceding earnings
surprise (in quarter q):
Con f i r mt = 1 if
 SU Eq > 0 and 4Rect > 0SU Eq < 0 and 4Rect < 0 ,else 0; (2.15)
Contr adi ctt = 1 if
 SU Eq < 0 and 4Rect > 0SU Eq > 0 and 4Rect < 0 ,else 0. (2.16)
Thus, Con f i r mt is 1 when the revision on day t is an upgrade and the last preced-
ing earnings surprise is positive or when the revision is a downgrade and the last
preceding earning surprise is negative. Contr adi ctt is 1 if a downgrade follows a
positive surprise or an upgrade follows a negative surprise.
Table 2.1 shows that 36.7 percent of the sample’s revisions are confirmatory and
8 Using the standard deviation of actual earnings over the 20 quarters preceding the earnings re-
lease in q instead of the price does not affect the results.
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics
Panel A: Earnings announcements and recommendation revisions
N SD P5 Mean P50 P95
SU Eq 85,011 0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.000 0.006
F SU Eq 85,011 0.008 -0.014 -0.001 0.000 0.008
4Rect 187,288 1.263 -2 -0.115 0 2
Con f i r mt = 1 68,693
Contr adi ctt = 1 71,544
Rei ter ati ont = 1 47,051
ARt 187,288 0.072 -0.120 -0.005 -0.001 0.094
Panel B: Joint distribution of4Rect and SU Eq
Upgrade Reiteration Downgrade
(4Rect > 0) (4Rect = 0) (4Rect < 0)
Better-than-expected earnings 43,151 32,780 52,022
(SU Eq > 0) 33.7% 25.6% 40.7%
Worse-than-expected earnings 19,522 14,271 25,542
(SU Eq < 0) 32.9% 24.1% 43.0%
Panel A presents summary statistics for the sample’s earnings announcements and recommenda-
tion revisions. Panel B presents the distribution of revision types conditional on the sign of the pre-
ceding earnings surprise.
SU Eq is the earnings surprise in quarter q , measured as the difference between actual earnings
for q and the consensus forecast on the IBES Detail tape in the 120 days preceding the earnings
release in q , divided by the stock price 30 days prior to the release. F SU Eq+1 is the difference be-
tween period q +1 earnings and the IBES consensus for earnings in q +1 in the 120 days preceding
the announcement for period q , divided by the stock price 30 days prior to the release in q . 4Rect
is the change in IBES recommendation ranks associated with a recommendation revision on day t .
Con f i r mt is 1 if4Rect has the same sign as the last preceding earnings surprise, SU Eq , and 0 other-
wise. Contr adi ctt is 1 if4Rect and the last preceding surprise have opposite signs, and 0 otherwise.
Rei ter ati ont is 1 if 4Rect is 0. ARt is a firm’s buy-and-hold return in excess of the value-weighted
CRSP market index from day−1 to+1 around a recommendation revision on day t . SU Eq , F SU Eq+1,
and ARt are winsorised at the lower and upper 1% tails of their respective distributions.
have the same sign as the preceding earnings surprise, 38.2 percent are contradic-
tory with the opposite sign, and 25.1 percent reiterate the old recommendation.
Panel B presents the distribution of recommendation revisions conditional on the
sign of the preceding earnings surprise. The distributions differ only slightly be-
tween positive and negative surprises. The Spearman correlation (not tabulated)
between 4Rect and SU Eq is very close to zero (0.018). Similar to findings in prior




Hypothesis 2 requires estimates of the market’s response to the release of recom-
mendation revisions. I measure buy-and-hold excess returns as the difference be-
tween a firm’s buy-and-hold return and the buy-and-hold return of the CRSP value-
weighted market index from day -1 to +1 around the revision date (t ):
AR f i r m,t =
t+1∏
τ=t−1








Hypothesis 1 builds on the idea that recommendation revisions reveal differences in
the interpretation of earnings surprises between analysts and investors. It predicts
that—if analysts’ earnings interpretation is superior to investors’—there will be an
(unexpectedly) positive association between current earnings surprises and future
earnings following confirmatory revisions and an (unexpectedly) negative associa-
tion following contradictory revisions. I estimate the following pooled OLS regres-
sion as the analogue of equation (2.10) to evaluate these predictions:10
F SU Eq+1 =α+β′1Xq +β′2Xq SU Eq +γ1Con f i r mq +γ2Contr adi ctq +γ3SU Eq
+γ4Con f i r mq SU Eq +γ5Contr adi ctq SU Eq +²q+1. (2.18)
Hypothesis 1 predicts that γ4 should be positive and γ5 should be negative. I es-
timate (2.18) with the sample’s 85,011 earnings announcements as the unit of ob-
servation. (2.18) includes earnings releases followed by reiterations. Therefore, they
serve as the base group against which I judge differences in the association between
current surprises and future earnings. Because many earnings announcements in
q are followed by several recommendation revisions before q +1, I set Con f i r mq
and Contr adi ctq to 1 if at least one of the revisions between the announcements
in period q and q +1 is either confirmatory or contradictory. In case there is both a
confirmatory and a contradictory revision, both variables are 1, and if there are only
9 Section 2.6.2 presents results for alternative approaches to estimating the immediate response.
10 For notational convenience, I omit a firm index in all equations.
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reiterations, both variables are 0.11 I cluster standard errors by firm and year-quarter
of the earnings announcement.
The vector of control variables (Xq ) includes dummies for each quarter of the
sample period, dummies for each of the 48 Fama-French industries, and 10 size
dummies, which I construct by ranking firms into quarterly market value deciles.
(2.18) also includes SU Eq as well as the interaction between SU Eq and Xq . Owing
to the large number of controls in many of the following regressions, I restrict the
tabulation of coefficients to those of the variables of interest. The inclusion of in-
dustry dummies as well as their interactions with SU Eq alone would, for example,
add 47∗2= 94 additional coefficients to the tables.12
Table 2.2 presents the results with the main variables printed in bold. Model 1
in the first column estimates (2.18) with the period q earnings surprise as the only
explanatory variable. Its coefficient is 0.709 and highly significant (p-value < 0.01),
suggesting that the average fraction of earnings surprises that is permanent is about
70.9 percent. Model 2 adds Con f i r mq , Contr adi ctq , and the interactions of SU Eq
with Con f i r mq and Contr adi ctq . As predicted by Hypothesis 1, the coefficient of
the interaction between period q earnings surprises and confirmatory revisions is
positive and highly significant (γ4 = 0.298, p-value< 0.01), whereas the coefficient of
the interaction with contradictory revisions is negative and highly significant (γ5 =
−0.106, p-value< 0.01). When I add the controls in Model 3, the coefficients become
slightly smaller in absolute magnitude, though both still support Hypothesis 1 (γ4 =
0.265, p-value < 0.01, and γ5 =−0.067, p-value ≈ 0.06).
To put the coefficients into perspective and get an understanding of their eco-
nomic magnitudes, it is helpful to consider γ4 and γ5 in relation to γ3 in Model 2
as relative measures of differences in how current surprises relate to future earn-
ings between announcements followed by different types of recommendation revi-
sions.13 When earnings surprises are followed by a reiteration, about 60 percent of
the current surprise (γ3) maps into future earnings. This fraction increases to about
90 percent (γ3+γ4) when the earnings release is followed by a confirmation, but it
drops to about 50 percent (γ3+γ5) when it is followed by a contradiction.
Taken together, revised recommendations contain information that may help in-
vestors in reinterpreting past earnings surprises. Next, I turn to the analysis of in-
11 Estimation of (2.18) without observations where both Con f i r mq and Contr adi ctq equal 1 does
not qualitatively affect the results.
12 Tables including all coefficients are available upon request.
13 I use the coefficients from Model 2 because Model 3 does not allow for this comparison due to
the inclusion of interactions with SU Eq .
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Table 2.2. Recommendation revisions, past earnings surprises, and future earnings
F SU Eq+1
(1) (2) (3)
SU Eq 0.709*** 0.599*** 0.475***
(0.032) (0.042) (0.140)
Con f i r mq -0.000*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)






Const ant -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls No No Yes
R-squared 0.121 0.128 0.186
Observations 85,011 85,011 85,011
Table 2.2 reports results of pooled OLS regressions that estimate equation (2.18) to evaluate whether
recommendation revisions contain information about the mapping of past earnings surprises into
future earnings. The left-hand variable in all columns is F SU Eq+1, the difference between period
q +1 earnings and the IBES consensus for earnings in q+1 in the 120 days preceding the announce-
ment for period q , divided by the stock price 30 days prior to the release in q .
The units of observation are individual earnings announcements. SU Eq is the earnings surprise in
quarter q . It is defined as the difference between actual earnings for q and the consensus forecast
on the IBES Detail tape in the 120 days preceding the earnings release in q , divided by the stock
price 30 days prior to the release. Con f i r mq is 1 if at least one of the recommendation revisions be-
tween quarter q and q+1 has the same sign as earnings surprise in period q , SU Eq , and 0 otherwise.
Contr adi ctq is 1 if at least one of the recommendation revisions between quarter q and q +1 has
the opposite sign of the quarter q surprise, and 0 otherwise. Controls in (3) include dummies for 48
Fama-French industries, dummies for each quarter of the sample period, and dummies for a firm’s
size decile in q . All controls are interacted with SU Eq . To save space, I do not report the coefficients
of the control variables. They are available upon request. Standard errors are clustered by firm and
by year and quarter of the earnings announcement. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 0.01,
0.05, and 0.1.
vestors’ responses to recommendation revisions to assess whether this is informa-
tion that investors extract from recommendations.
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2.4.2 Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicts that investors use recommendation revisions to update their
interpretation of past earnings surprises. It predicts a positive association between
earnings surprises and abnormal returns around confirmatory revisions and a nega-
tive association around contradictory revisions. To test these predictions, I estimate
the following version of equation (2.12) using the 177,792 firm-days with recom-
mendation revisions following one of the sample’s earnings surprises:
ARt =α+β′Xt +γ1Con f i r mt +γ2Contr adi ctt +γ3SU Eq+ (2.19)
+γ4Con f i r mt SU Eq +γ5Contr adi ctt SU Eq +²t .
(2.19) regresses abnormal returns surrounding a recommendation revision on day
t on the last preceding earnings surprise interacted with dummies to indicate
whether the revision on day t is confirmatory or contradictory. While individual
earnings surprises can enter the estimation through different firm-day observations,
each firm-day with at least one recommendation revision is included once at most.
As some of the sample’s recommendation revisions are made concurrently with
other recommendations for the same firm, I pool all recommendations released for
a firm on the same day into one observation. For these observations Con f i r mt and
Contr adi ctt are 1 in case at least one analyst confirmed or contradicted the preced-
ing earnings surprise on this day, and 0 otherwise.
The focus in (2.19) is on γ4 and γ5. Hypothesis 2 suggests that as investors in-
crease their initial estimate of the fraction of an earnings surprise that is permanent
around confirmatory revisions, returns move into the direction of the earnings sur-
prise (γ4 > 0), and they decrease this estimate around contradictory revisions, result-
ing in a negative association between past surprise and abnormal returns (γ5 < 0).
Recommendation revisions are likely to bring more to the market than only new
information about past earnings surprises. I thus add a set of controls (Xt ) to (2.19).
The controls include the change in recommendation ranks (4Rect ) since Womack
(1996) shows that stock prices respond strongly to changes in recommendations.
I calculate 4Rect as the average recommendation change across all analysts that
release a revision for the same firm on the same day t . Prior literature finds that
recommendation revisions tend to have larger effects in worse information envi-
ronments (e.g., Stickel, 1985). Xt therefore includes dummies for quarterly firm size
deciles and their interaction with 4Rect . It is possible that the response to recom-
mendation revisions depends both on the level of the recommendation as well as
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the recommendation change (e.g., Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Barber, Lehavy, and True-
man, 2010; Stickel, 1995). I add indicator variables for all 5 IBES recommendation
ranks and their interaction with 4Rect as additional controls.14 Finally, I include
dummy variables for each quarter of the sample period and the 48 Fama-French in-
dustries as well as their interactions with 4Rect to allow the impact of revisions to
vary in time and across industries.





Con f i r mt -0.003***
(0.000)











Table 2.3 reports results of pooled OLS regressions that estimate equation (2.19) to assess whether
investors reinterpret past earnings surprises using recommendation revisions. The left-hand variable
is ARt , a firm’s buy-and-hold return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP market index from day −1
to +1 around the date of a recommendation revision (t ).
The units of observation are firm-days with recommendation revisions. SU Eq is the last earnings sur-
prise preceding the recommendation revision. Con f i r mt is 1 if at least one of the recommendation
revisions on day t has the same sign as the last preceding earnings surprise, SU Eq , and 0 otherwise.
Contr adi ctt is 1 if at least one of the recommendation revisions on day t and the last preceding
surprise have opposite signs, and 0 otherwise. Controls include the average change in IBES recom-
mendation ranks associated with the recommendation revisions on t , size decile dummies, indicator
variables for all 5 IBES recommendation ranks (rounded to the nearest integer in case I average over
several recommendations on the same day), dummies for each quarter of the sample period, and
dummies for 48 Fama-French industries. All controls are interacted with the change in recommen-
dation ranks. For brevity, I again omit the coefficients of the control variables. They are available
upon request. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by calendar date of the recommendation
revision. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1.
14 Since recommendation ranks are averaged across all recommendations on a given day, I round
them to the nearest integer before generating rank-dummies.
55
2 Recommendation Revisions and Differences in the Interpretation of Earnings
Table 2.3 presents the results. I again restrict the presentation to the central coef-
ficients.15 In line with the predictions of Hypothesis 2, abnormal returns are pos-
itively associated with past surprises around confirmatory revisions (γ4 = 0.805)
and negatively associated around contradictory revisions (γ5 =−0.538). Both coeffi-
cients are highly significant (p-values < 0.01).
The magnitudes of the coefficients imply an economically relevant adjustment
in investors’ interpretation of past earnings. To see this, consider the predicted ef-
fects of confirmatory and contradictory revisions on abnormal returns at the 1 per-
cent and 99 percent quantiles of SU Eq (−0.019 and 0.015). For stocks with excep-
tionally positive surprises, the coefficient estimates predict an abnormal return of
1.21 percent around confirmatory revisions and an abnormal return of −0.81 per-
cent around contradictory revisions. In contrast, for stocks with exceptionally nega-
tive earnings surprises, the coefficients imply an abnormal return of −1.53 percent
around confirmatory revisions and an abnormal return of 1.02 percent around con-
tradictory revisions.
The results suggest that investors extract information about past earnings sur-
prises from recommendation revisions and use this information to alter their own
interpretation as predicted by Hypothesis 2. This reaffirms the findings concerning
Hypothesis 1 and indicates that part of what revisions reveal about past earnings
surprises reflects genuinely new information.




2.5.1 Empirical Predictions and Variable Construction
My central analyses show that analysts’ recommendation revisions are on average
informative about the permanence of past earnings surprises (Hypothesis 1), and
that investors on average respond to revisions in a way that suggests they recognise
this association (Hypothesis 2). I now examine whether there is heterogeneity be-
tween analysts in interpreting earnings surprises, and whether investors’ responses
to revisions indicate that they are aware of this heterogeneity.
Prior work (e.g., Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 1997; Clement, 1999) finds that
more experienced analysts and analysts from larger brokerage firms provide more
accurate forecasts of future earnings. I contend that one reason for differences in
analysts’ ability to forecast earnings is that they vary in their ability to extrapolate
future earnings from current earnings surprises.
To measure differences in analyst ability to interpret earnings, I compare the
strength of the association between recommendation revisions, earnings surprises,
and future earnings across analysts. If more experienced analysts and analysts from
larger brokerage firms are more able to extrapolate from current earnings surprises,
then their recommendation revisions should more accurately signal differences in
future earnings. This suggests Hypothesis 3:
H3 The positive (negative) association between future earnings and past earnings
surprises around confirmatory (contradictory) revisions is more positive (neg-
ative) as analyst experience or the size of the employing brokerage firm in-
creases.
If investors recognise that analysts vary in their ability to interpret earnings sur-
prises as suggested in Hypothesis 3, then they should respond more strongly to
revisions by analysts whose recommendations indicate larger differences in the as-
sociation between future earnings and past surprises. This provides the basis for
Hypothesis 4:
H4 The positive (negative) association between past earnings surprises and abnor-
mal returns around confirmatory (contradictory) revisions is more positive
(negative) as analyst experience or the size of the employing brokerage firm
increases.
Both hypotheses can be motivated in a slightly different way: Assume analysts signal
their perception of differences in the components of earnings surprises via recom-
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mendation revisions, but their ability to do so is imperfect. In consequence, in some
situations they will falsely suggest that earnings surprises contain an exceptionally
large or small permanent component. The rationale behind Hypotheses 3 is that
the probability of this happening decreases as analysts’ experience or the size of the
employing brokerage firm increases. As a result, the revisions of more experienced
analysts and analysts from larger brokerage firms are more strongly associated with
actual differences in how current surprises relate to future earnings. Hypothesis 4
suggests that investors recognise which analysts are more likely to correctly inter-
pret earnings.
To construct operational measures of analyst experience and brokerage size, I
use variants of the approaches in Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) and Clement
(1999). I then follow Clement and Tse (2005) and scale the resulting variables to allow
for a simple interpretation of their coefficients.
I construct analyst experience by first counting the number of past quarters on
the IBES Detail tape with at least one forecast by an analyst a prior to every quar-
ter q (PastQuar ter sa,q ). Then, I calculate the maximum and minimum values of
PastQuar ter sa,q across all analysts within a quarter, max[PastQuar ter sq ] and
mi n[PastQuar ter sq ], and define E xpa,q as
E xpa,q =
PastQuar ter sa,q −mi n[PastQuar ter sq ]
max[PastQuar ter sq ]−mi n[PastQuar ter sq ]
−0.5. (2.20)
E xpa,q ranks all analysts within a quarter by the number of past quarters they have
actively released forecasts in. While the most experienced analysts within a quarter
are assigned a value of 0.5, the least experienced analysts are assigned −0.5.
The variable used to describe the size of the employing brokerage firm, BSi zea,q ,
is constructed in a similar way. First, I use all recommendations in the sample to
count the number of distinct analysts releasing recommendations for each broker-
age firm b within a quarter q (Anal y st sb,q ). Next, I calculate the maximum and min-
imum values of Anal y st sb,q across all brokers within a quarter, max[Anal y st sq ]
and mi n[Anal y st sq ]. For each analyst a working for a brokerage firm b in a quarter
q , I then define
BSi zea,q =
Anal y st sb,q −mi n[Anal y st sq ]
max[Anal y st sq ]−mi n[Anal y st sq ]
−0.5. (2.21)
BSi zea,q measures the size of the brokerage firm an analyst a is working with. An-
alysts from the largest brokerage firms are assigned a value of 0.5, whereas analysts
from the smallest brokerage firms are assigned −0.5.
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2.5.2 Regressions and Results
To test Hypothesis 3, I estimate an augmented version of the specification used to
test Hypothesis 1. The specification allows the effects of the interactions between
confirmatory and contradictory revisions and the earnings surprise to vary in ana-
lysts’ experience and brokerage size. I construct two variants of both variables that
each distinguish between the ability of the analysts releasing confirmatory revisions
and the analysts releasing contradictory revisions. E xp+q is defined as the maximum
of E xpa,q of all analysts releasing confirmatory revisions (for a particular firm) fol-
lowing the announcement in q , and E xp−q is the maximum of E xpa,q of the analysts
releasing contradictory revisions. Analogously, I define BSi ze+q and BSi ze−q as the
maxima of BSi zea,q for all analysts releasing confirmatory and contradictory revi-
sions, respectively.
Using these definitions, I then estimate the following regression:16
F SU Eq+1 =α+β′1Xq+β′2XqSU Eq+ (2.22)
+γ1SU Eq +γ2Con f i r mq +γ3Contr adi ctq +γ4E xpq +γ5BSi zeq
+γ6Con f i r mq SU Eq +γ7Contr adi ctq SU Eq
+γ8E xpq SU Eq +γ9BSi zeq SU Eq
+γ10Con f i r mq E xp+q +γ11Contr adi ctq E xp−q
+γ12Con f i r mq BSi ze+q +γ13Contr adi ctq BSi ze−q
+γ14Con f i r mq E xp+q SU Eq +γ15Contr adi ctq E xp−q SU Eq
+γ16Con f i r mq BSi ze+q SU Eq +γ17Contr adi ctq BSi ze−q SU Eq +²q+1.
The regression again uses earnings announcements as the unit of observation. The
variables of interest in (2.22) are γ14,γ15,γ16, and γ17. Because E xp and BSi ze are
standardised, their coefficients indicate the difference in the baseline effects (γ6 and
γ7) as one moves from the lowest to the highest levels of the variables, i.e., from−0.5
to +0.5. Hypothesis 3 predicts that revisions by more experienced analysts and an-
alysts from larger brokerage firms are more informative than those by less experi-
enced analysts or analysts from smaller brokerage firms. Thus, it predicts that γ14
and γ16 are positive, whereas γ15 and γ17 are negative. The regression includes the
same set of controls I used when testing Hypothesis 1.
16 (2.22) also includes E xpq and BSi zeq , the maximal experience / broker size of all analysts revis-
ing recommendations between q and q +1 and their interactions with SU Eq .
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SU Eq 0.609*** 0.577*** 0.580***
(0.129) (0.131) (0.131)
Con f i r mq -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Contr adi ctq -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ConfirmqSUEq 0.271*** 0.364*** 0.365***
(0.039) (0.043) (0.044)
ContradictqSUEq -0.082** -0.069 -0.077*
(0.038) (0.045) (0.046)
E xpq -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
E xpq SU Eq -0.156 -0.186
(0.113) (0.117)
Con f i r mq E xp+q -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Contr adi ctq E xp−q -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
ConfirmqExp+q SUEq 0.488*** 0.496***
(0.119) (0.121)
ContradictqExp−q SUEq -0.089 -0.018
(0.125) (0.124)
BSi zeq -0.000** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
BSi zeq SU Eq 0.050 0.082
(0.076) (0.079)
Con f i r mq BSi ze+q -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Contr adi ctq BSi ze−q -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ConfirmqBSize+q SUEq 0.084 0.011
(0.081) (0.084)
ContradictqBSize−q SUEq -0.281*** -0.288***
(0.073) (0.071)
Const ant -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.187 0.187 0.188





Table 2.4 reports results of pooled OLS regressions that estimate equation (2.22) to evaluate whether
the information that recommendation revisions contain about the mapping of past earnings sur-
prises into future earnings varies between analysts. The left-hand variable in all columns is F SU Eq+1,
the difference between period q+1 earnings and the IBES consensus for earnings in q+1 in the 120
days preceding the announcement for period q , divided by the stock price 30 days prior to the release
in q .
E xp+q and E xp−q are the maximum values of experience for analysts releasing confirmatory (E xp+q )
and contradictory (E xp−q ) revisions between the announcements of quarter q and q +1. Both vari-
ables are scaled to range between −0.5 and 0.5. Larger values correspond to more experienced an-
alysts. An individual analyst’s experience is defined as the number of quarters with forecasts by the
same analyst prior to quarter q . BSi ze+q and BSi ze−q are the maximum values of brokerage size for an-
alysts releasing confirmatory (BSi ze+q ) and contradictory (BSi ze+q ) revisions between the announce-
ments of quarter q and q +1. Both variables are scaled to range between −0.5 and 0.5. Larger values
correspond to larger brokerages. Brokerage size is measured as the number of different analysts re-
leasing recommendations for the same broker in quarter q . The remaining variables and controls are
defined as in Table 2.2. For brevity, I omit the coefficients of the controls. They are available upon re-
quest. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by year and quarter of the earnings announcement.
***, **, and * denote significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1.
Table 2.4 presents the results including only analyst experience (Model 1), only
brokerage size (Model 2), and both variables jointly (Model 3). Because the qualita-
tive results are very similar across specifications, I discuss only Model 3. 2 of 4 coeffi-
cients are highly significant (p-values< 0.01) and have the predicted sign. The other
two coefficients have the correct sign, albeit they are insignificant. The standardisa-
tion of the variables allows for an intuitive interpretation of the coefficients’ magni-
tudes. The increase in the fraction of earnings surprises that maps into future earn-
ings associated with confirmatory revisions varies from 12 percent (γ6 − 0.5γ14 =
0.12) for novice analysts (E xp+q =−0.5) to 61 percent (γ6+0.5γ14 = 0.61) for very ex-
perienced analysts (E xp+q = 0.5). The decrease in the fraction of earnings surprises
that maps into future earnings for contradictory revisions by analysts from large
brokerage firms (BSi ze−q = 0.5) is about 22 percent (γ7+0.5γ17 =−0.22). The effect
switches signs for analysts from very small brokerage firms (BSi ze−q =−0.5), whose
contradictory revisions are associated with an increase of 7 percent (γ7− 0.5γ17 =
0.07) in the fraction of earnings surprises that maps into future earnings.17
In combination, the results thus suggests that there is pronounced heterogene-
ity in the information that revisions contain about the implications of past earnings
surprises. Experienced analysts and analysts from large brokerage firms seem to ex-
hibit substantially more skill at extrapolating future earnings from current surprises
17 Since γ7 is estimated with limited precision, the abilitiy to make quantitative statements about
variation in the effect of contradictory revisions in general is limited.
61
2 Recommendation Revisions and Differences in the Interpretation of Earnings
than novice analysts or analysts from small brokerage firms.
Do investors recognise these differences as suggested in Hypothesis 4? To evalu-
ate this, I use an augmented version of the specification used to test Hypothesis 2
that allows the effect of confirmatory and contradictory revisions on abnormal re-
turns to vary in analyst experience and brokerage size. For this regression, I define
BSi ze+t and BSi ze
−
t as the maximal values of BSi zea,q over all analysts a releasing
confirmatory and contradictory revisions (for a firm) on day t . In the same way, I
construct E xp+t and E xp
−
t . I then estimate the following specification:
18
ARt =α+β′Xt +γ1SU Eq +γ2Con f i r mt +γ3Contr adi ctt +γ4E xpt +γ5BSi zet
+γ6Con f i r mt SU Eq +γ7Contr adi ctt SU Eq +γ8E xpt SU Eq +γ9BSi zet SU Eq
+γ10Con f i r mt E xp+t +γ11Contr adi ctt E xp−t
+γ12Con f i r mt BSi ze+t +γ13Contr adi ctt BSi ze−t
+γ14Con f i r mt E xp+t SU Eq +γ15Contr adi ctt E xp−t SU Eq
+γ16Con f i r mt BSi ze+t SU Eq +γ17Contr adi ctt BSi ze−t SU Eq +²t . (2.23)
The focus in (2.23) is on coefficients γ14 to γ17. Hypothesis 4 predicts that if investors
are aware of the differences in analysts’ abilities to extrapolate from past earnings
surprises, then γ14 and γ16 will be positive and γ15 and γ17 will be negative.
Table 2.5 presents the results for E xp and BSi ze separately (Model 1 and Model
2) and jointly (Model 3). All models include the same set of control variables em-
ployed in the testing of Hypothesis 2. Because the results on individual coefficients
are largely insensitive to whether the variables are included separately or jointly, I
discuss the results from Model 3. All coefficients have the sign predicted in Hypoth-
esis 4 and all of them are significant at conventional levels. The positive associa-
tion between abnormal returns and past surprises around confirmatory revisions is
more positive and the negative association around contradictory revisions is more
negative for both more experienced analysts and analysts from larger brokerage
firms.
In summary, the results in this section suggest that analysts differ in their abilities
to interpret earnings and investors incorporate these differences in their response
to recommendation revisions.
18 Similar to (2.22), (2.23) also includes E xpt and BSi zet , the maximal experience / broker size of
all analysts releasing recommendations on t and their interactions with SU Eq .
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Table 2.5. Returns around recommendation revisions and analyst heterogeneity
ARt
(1) (2) (3)
SU Eq 0.069 0.066 0.060
(0.080) (0.108) (0.110)
Con f i r mt -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Contr adi ctt -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ConfirmtSUEq 1.003*** 1.115*** 1.240***
(0.122) (0.161) (0.165)
ContradicttSUEq -0.772*** -0.812*** -0.977***
(0.125) (0.158) (0.163)
E xpt -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
E xpt SU Eq -0.021 -0.045
(0.342) (0.345)
Con f i r mq E xp+t -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Contr adi ctq E xp−t -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
ConfirmtExp+t SUEq 1.397*** 1.156**
(0.487) (0.495)
ContradicttExp−t SUEq -1.218** -0.961*
(0.506) (0.505)
BSi zet -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
BSi zet SU Eq 0.175 0.170
(0.233) (0.234)
Con f i r mq BSi ze+t 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Contr adi ctq BSi ze−t -0.003** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
ConfirmtBSize+t SUEq 1.764*** 1.670***
(0.383) (0.386)
ContradicttBSize−t SUEq -2.426*** -2.358***
(0.345) (0.344)
Const ant 0.005** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.119 0.118 0.119
Observations 177,792 177,792 177,792
Continued
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Table 2.5. Continued
Table 2.5 reports results of pooled OLS regressions that estimate equation (2.23) to evaluate whether
investors adjust their interpretation of past earnings surprises more strongly when responding to
recommendation revisions of more experienced analysts or analysts from larger brokerages.
ARt is a firm’s buy-and-hold return in excess of the value-weighted CRSP market index from day
−1 to +1 around the date of a recommendation revision (t ). E xp+t and E xp−t are the maximum val-
ues of experience for analysts releasing confirmatory (E xp+t ) and contradictory (E xp
+
t ) revisions on
day t . Both variables are scaled to range between −0.5 and 0.5 with larger values corresponding to
more experienced analysts. An individual analyst’s experience is defined as the number of quarters
with forecasts by the same analyst prior to quarter q . BSi ze+t and BSi ze
−
t are the maximum values
of brokerage size for analysts releasing confirmatory (BSi ze+t ) and contradictory (BSi ze
−
t ) revisions
released on day t . Both variables are scaled to range between −0.5 and 0.5 with larger values corre-
sponding to larger brokerages. Brokerage size is measured as the number of different analysts releas-
ing recommendations for the same broker in quarter q . The remaining variables are defined as in
Table 2.3. For brevity, I omit the coefficients of the controls. They are available upon request. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by firm and by calendar date of the recommendation revision. ***, **, and *




2.6.1 Firm-Specic Heterogeneity in Earnings Persistence
My main analyses account for variation in the relation between earnings surprises
and future earnings over time, between industries, and for firms of different sizes.
However, they do not account for firm-specific variation. If analysts release confir-
matory revisions in firms where surprises have on average larger permanent com-
ponents and release contradictory revisions for firms where surprises have on av-
erage smaller permanent components, this effect might be captured in the inter-
actions between Con f i r m and Contr adi ct and the earnings surprise. To con-
trol for this possibility, I rerun the regressions in Table 2.4, but I replace F SU Eq+1
by F SU E eq+1, the residual of firm-level regressions of F SU Eq+1 on SU Eq . In other
words, F SU E eq+1 is the share of F SU Eq+1 that cannot be explained by firm-specific
variation in the association between surprises and future earnings.19 Table 2.6
presents results in line with the previous findings. Thus, recommendation revisions
contain information about the relation between current earnings surprises and fu-
ture earnings even after accounting for firm-specific variation in this relation.
2.6.2 Alternative Models of Abnormal Return
To evaluate investors’ responses to recommendation revisions, the main analyses
use market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns surrounding the revision. Though the
estimation of abnormal short-term returns is typically insensitive to the choice of
normal return model, I re-estimate (2.23) using two alternative models of normal
return. Table 2.7 presents results when I either use the return of the size-matched
decile of CRSP stocks (Model 1) or the characteristic-based matching portfolio of
Daniel et al. (1997) (Model 2) to model normal returns.20 Again, the results confirm
the previous findings.
The results are also insensitive to measuring the market’s response to recommen-
dation revisions using cumulative abnormal returns, C AR f i r m,t =
∑t+1
τ=t−1(R f i r m,τ−
Rcr sp,τ), instead of buy-and-hold abnormal returns.
19 I require at least three observations per firm to run the firm-level regressions.
20 The DGTW benchmarks are available via http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/
rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm.
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Table 2.6. Heterogeneity in rms’ earnings processes




Con f i r mq -0.001***
(0.000)








E xpq SU Eq -0.038
(0.102)
Con f i r mq E xp+q -0.001***
(0.000)








BSi zeq SU Eq 0.005
(0.074)
Con f i r mq BSi ze+q -0.000
(0.000)











Table 2.6 revisits the analysis from Table 2.4. First, I estimate F SU Eq+1 =α+βSU Eq +²q+1 for each
firm and over the entire sample period. Then, I define F SU E eq+1 = F SU Eq+1 − αˆ− βˆSU Eq and re-
estimate equation (2.22).
The regression includes only firms with at least three observations of SU Eq . Otherwise, the specifi-
cation is the same as the one in the third column of Table 2.4. Standard errors are clustered by firm
and by year and quarter of the earnings announcement. I again omit coefficients of controls from
the presentation due to their large number. They are available upon request. ***, **, and * denote
significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1.
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Table 2.7. Alternative models of normal return
AR si zet AR
d g t w
t
(1) (2)
SU Eq 0.075 0.100
(0.109) (0.117)
Con f i r mt -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)






E xpt 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
E xpt SU Eq 0.037 0.021
(0.338) (0.389)
Con f i r mq E xp+t -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Contr adi ctq E xp−t -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
ConfirmtExp+t SUEq 0.953** 0.959*
(0.486) (0.551)
ContradicttExp−t SUEq -0.974* -0.996*
(0.498) (0.557)
BSi zet -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
BSi zet SU Eq 0.217 0.138
(0.225) (0.252)
Con f i r mq BSi ze+t 0.003*** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Contr adi ctq BSi ze−t -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
ConfirmtBSize+t SUEq 1.423*** 1.382***
(0.371) (0.387)
ContradicttBsize−t SUEq -2.246*** -2.170***
(0.340) (0.384)





Table 2.7 reports results for regressions that vary the model of normal return used to calculate ARt .
The model in the first column defines abnormal returns as the firms’ returns in excess of the return of
CRSP-firms in the same size decile. The model in the second column uses the approach of Daniel et
al. (1997) to define abnormal return as the firms’ return in excess of the return of a portfolio matched
on size, momentum, and book-to-market. Owing to a lack of portfolio assignment for some firms,
the second column includes less observations than the first. All remaining variables are defined as in
Table 2.5. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by calendar date of the recommendation revision.
I omit coefficients of controls from the presentation due to their large number. They are available
upon request. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1.
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2.6.3 Alternative Model of Earnings Expectations
A central aspect of all preceding analyses is the approximation of investors’ earn-
ings expectations by current and next period consensus forecasts on IBES. To probe
whether the results are robust to this choice, I repeat my central analyses using a
time-series model to calculate earnings expectations and surprises. To capture pre-
dictable variation in firms’ earnings processes, I take a model suggested in Foster
(1977) that allows for trend growth in earnings, seasonal dependence, and business
cycle effects.21
For each stock on the IBES Actuals History file and each quarter q of the sample
period, I first run the following time-series regression over quarters q−21 to q−1:22
Eq =φ0+φ1Eq−4+φ2(Eq−1−Eq−5)+²q . (2.24)
I use the estimated parameters from (2.24) to predict earnings for period q , denoted
Eseasonalpr e−q [Eq ], and q + 1, denoted Eseasonalpr e−q [Eq+1].23 Employing these two variables
as proxies for period q and q +1 expectations, I then define F Eq and F F Eq+1 as the
analogues of SU Eq and F SU Eq+1:
F Eq = (Eq −Eseasonalpr e−q [Eq ])/sd(²) (2.25)
and
F F Eq+1 = (Eq+1−Eseasonalpr e−q [Eq+1])/sd(²). (2.26)
I deflate both variables by the standard deviation of the residuals over the respec-
tive estimation period of (2.24), sd(²), to mitigate heteroskedasticity and make them
comparable across firms. Using F Eq to redefine which revisions are confirmatory
21 Much recent research like Battalio and Mendenhall (2011) uses a seasonal random walk to model
earnings expecations. I opt for a more complex model to explicitely capture variation in earnings
an investor might have deduced from historical patterns.
22 I require at least 10 observations in each regression.
23 To predict earnings for q + 1, I use the parameters estimated up to (but not including) pe-
riod q and the forecast for q instead of the actual value for q : Eseasonalpr e−q [Eq+1] = φˆ0 + φˆ1Eq−3 +
φˆ2(Eseasonalpr e−q [Eq ]−Eq−4).
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and which are contradictory, I then re-estimate the main regressions:24
F F Eq+1 =α+β′1Xq+β′2XqF Eq+
+γ1F Eq +γ2Con f i r mq +γ3Contr adi ctq +γ4E xpq +γ5BSi zeq
+γ6Con f i r mq F Eq +γ7Contr adi ctq F Eq +γ8E xpq F Eq +γ9BSi zeq F Eq
+γ10Con f i r mq E xp+q +γ11Contr adi ctq E xp−q
+γ12Con f i r mq BSi ze+q +γ13Contr adi ctq BSi ze−q
+γ14Con f i r mq E xp+q F Eq +γ15Contr adi ctq E xp−q F Eq
+γ16Con f i r mq BSi ze+q F Eq +γ17Contr adi ctq BSi ze−q F Eq +²q+1 (2.27)
and
ARt =α+β′Xt +γ1F Eq +γ2Con f i r mt +γ3Contr adi ctt +γ4E xpt +γ5BSi zet
+γ6Con f i r mt F Eq +γ7Contr adi ctt F Eq +γ8E xpt F Eq +γ9BSi zet F Eq
+γ10Con f i r mt E xp+t +γ11Contr adi ctt E xp−t
+γ12Con f i r mt BSi ze+t +γ13Contr adi ctt BSi ze−t
+γ14Con f i r mt E xp+t F Eq +γ15Contr adi ctt E xp−t F Eq
+γ16Con f i r mt BSi ze+t F Eq +γ17Contr adi ctt BSi ze−t F Eq +²t . (2.28)
As before, I winsorise ARt and F Eq at the upper and lower 1 percent tails of their re-
spective distributions. Table 2.8 presents the results of these regressions with spec-
ification (2.27) in the first column and (2.28) in the second column. All of the coef-
ficients have the predicted sign and with the exception of two, γ15 and γ17 in (2.27),
they are significant at conventional levels. This supports the main findings and sug-
gests that they persist when I use a statistical model instead of analyst forecasts to
approximate investors’ earnings expectations.
24 I restrict this robustness check to the sample of the main analyses. Owing to insufficient quar-
terly observations of Eq , the eventual sample size in this robustness check is smaller than in the
original analyses.
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Table 2.8. Alternative model of expected earnings
F F Eq+1 ARt
(1) (2)
F Eq 0.924*** -0.000
(0.152) (0.000)
Con f i r mq,t -0.243*** -0.005***
(0.023) (0.001)






E xpq,t 0.422*** 0.008***
(0.079) (0.001)
E xpq,t F Eq -0.081 -0.001
(0.054) (0.001)
Con f i r mq,t E xp+q,t -0.528*** -0.012***
(0.077) (0.002)






BSi zeq,t 0.087* 0.005***
(0.050) (0.001)
BSi zeq,t F Eq 0.004 -0.001
(0.041) (0.000)
Con f i r mq,t BSi ze+q,t -0.147*** -0.004***
(0.051) (0.001)











The analyses in Table 2.8 replace earnings expectations based on analyst forecasts by predictions
from a time-series model as described in Section (2.6.3). The left-hand variable in the first column
is the next period’s forecast error of this model. The left-hand variable in the second column is the
abnormal return around the recommendation revision. Controls in the first column are the same as
in Table 2.4. Controls in the second column are the same as in Table 2.5. All remaining variables are
defined as beforehand. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by year and quarter of the earnings
announcement in the first column and by firm and by calendar date of the recommendation revision
in the second column. I omit coefficients of controls from the presentation due to their large number.




This paper uses post-earnings revisions of pre-earnings recommendations to con-
trast analysts’ and investors’ skill in the interpretation of earnings surprises. Build-
ing on the predictions of a simple model, I show that patterns in how revisions in an-
alysts’ recommendations relate to future earnings parallel patterns in how investors
respond to their releases. In addition, I show that cross-sectional differences in the
response to the release of recommendation revisions align with cross-sectional dif-
ferences in the information they contain about future earnings, each varying in char-
acteristics that prior work associates with analyst skill.
In combination, the results indicate that recommendation revisions help in-
vestors in understanding the implications of current earnings surprises for future
earnings and that investors correctly recognise whose recommendations contain
on average more accurate information. Contrasting investors’ and analysts’ opin-
ion via recommendation revisions provides a means of assessing how analysts con-
tribute to the market’s information environment. This approach lends itself to dif-
ferent types of news like mergers or dividend announcements, where comparing
analysts’ and investors’ abilities may provide a worthwhile field for future research.
71

3 Measurement Error in Subjective
Expectations and the Empirical
Content of Economic Models
3.1 Introduction
Stock market expectations are among the most important primitives of economic
models of portfolio choice, but measurement error is pervasive in subjective beliefs
data. For example, many empirical studies have discarded large fractions of data be-
cause answers do not obey the laws of probability (Manski, 2004; Hurd, Rooij, and
Winter, 2011). The semantics of measurement error in subjective expectations data,
however, is potentially quite different from contexts in which measurement error is
usually studied, like past income, savings, or consumption. In the latter cases, there
is a precisely defined “true” value and measurement error arises because of imper-
fect recall (Hoderlein and Winter, 2010) or incongruent variable definitions.
In case of subjective expectations, however, analysts may be chasing an elusive
target: It is not evident that all people hold well-formed beliefs about a given phe-
nomenon. For example, the prevalence of 50-50 responses in expectations surveys
has been interpreted in exactly this way by Bruine de Bruin et al. (2000) or Bruine de
Bruin and Carman (2012). In consequence, key structural parameters of economic
models might not be present in the form envisioned by the econometrician (Stiglitz,
2002; Rust, 2014). If this is the case, standard techniques of using corrected esti-
mates instead of the misreported values (Wansbeek and Meijer, 2000; Schennach,
2013) will not lead to improved estimates of choice models because the corrected
estimates do not form the basis of decisions, either.
In this paper, we take a very different route and use the extent of measurement
error to uncover heterogeneity in choice behaviour. Put differently, we argue that
the magnitude of measurement error in stated beliefs should provide insights into
the extent to which an economic model constitutes an adequate description of an
individual’s portfolio choice behaviour.
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To explore this channel and motivate our empirical strategy, Section 3.2.1
presents a simple economic model of stock market participation that clarifies the
roles of expectations, preferences, and transaction costs. In Section 3.2.2, we argue
that for a variety of alternative decision modes —trusting others’ advice or following
rules of thumb, among others— individuals need not hold particularly meaningful
beliefs about the future evolution of the stock market. Consequently, the data for
individuals who entertain such choice rules will be characterised by two features.
First, their stated beliefs will be prone to measurement error. Second, the sensitiv-
ity of their stockholdings to changes in model primitives will be low. In order to
empirically evaluate this hypothesis, we estimate a Klein and Vella (2009) semipara-
metric double index model. In this model, the first index contains the primitives of
our theoretical model (such as beliefs and preferences), while the second index in-
cludes quantitative and qualitative indicators of measurement error. Both indices
may interact in a fully nonparametric fashion to obtain predicted probabilities of
stock market participation.
Section 3.3 describes the dataset that we collected specifically for this study.
Section 3.4 presents the results of our empirical application. We demonstrate that
changes in primitives of the economic model induce large variation in stock market
participation at low levels of the measurement error index. If measurement error
is high, the effect of changes in beliefs and preferences on stockholdings is much
smaller. We perform a number of variations on this theme and show that the results
hold up in several different specifications. We then demonstrate the usefulness of
our modelling approach for the analysis of less detailed data by estimating a spec-
ification with variables that are commonly available or inexpensive to collect. In
particular, we show that restricting ourselves to a simple measure of expectations
and purely qualitative measurement error proxies yields a similar overall pattern.
Though, as one would expect, the differences along the measurement error distri-
bution are less pronounced. We discuss our results and conclude in Section 3.5.
3.2 Motivation and Empirical Strategy
We develop our econometric strategy in three steps. First, we characterise a house-
hold’s portfolio problem by means of a simple choice model. We then explain in
detail why we conjecture that the degree to which this model serves as an adequate
description of the decision-making process varies across households and why we ex-
pect that variation in measurement error can be exploited to capture this adequacy.
In the third step, we present our econometric strategy that implements these ideas.
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3.2.1 A Simple Economic Model of Stock Market Participation
In our description of a household’s portfolio choice problem we follow Campbell
and Viceira (2002). We assume that the household maximises a power utility func-
tion defined over next period’s expected financial wealth Et [Wt+1] by allocating frac-
tions of period t wealth to one safe and one risky asset. If the household can neither











s.t. 0≤ θ ≤ 1
Risk aversion and a household’s beliefs about the returns of the two assets deter-
mine the optimal decision. Denote a household’s expected return for the safe asset
byµsafet+1 and assume that the household’s expectations for the risky asset’s return can
be described by a log-normal distribution with mean µriskyt+1 and standard deviation
σ
risky
t+1 . When returns are log-normally distributed, so is Wt+1. For a log-normal vari-
able it holds that logE [X ] = E[ log X ]+ 1/2 Var[ log X ]. Thus, the maximisation prob-













s.t. 0≤ θ ≤ 1
where lower case letters are logarithms. Using a first-order Taylor series approxima-
tion, next period’s log wealth can be written as:











































At plausible parameter values of γ, the optimal risky asset share will be positive
when historical return data are used to estimate µsafe,µrisky, and σrisky as proxies
of households’ expectations. However, studies on stock ownership find that a large
fraction of the population does not participate in the stock market (e.g., Haliassos
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and Bertaut, 1995). Arguably the most prominent explanation for why households
abstain from participation is the existence of (broadly defined) transaction costs
(Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). These transaction costs are likely to vary with house-
hold characteristics. If participation comes with fixed monetary costs, for example,
wealthy households will be more likely to invest in risky assets, since for them the
fixed costs are spread over larger investments. If information costs play an impor-
tant role, transaction costs will be lower for numerate respondents who are quicker
to grasp the basic functioning of the stock market. We assume that the variables af-
fecting transaction costs can be modeled by observable household characteristics





We now combine the optimal risky asset share (3.1), transaction costs, and ran-
dom influences ε in a simple random utility model of stock market participation:
Y ≡ I {θ > 0}=









− f (X ta)> ε
0 otherwise.
(3.2)
According to (3.2), the probability of participating in the stock market will depend
on the mean and variance of beliefs over the risky asset, the expected risk-free rate,
risk aversion, variables proxying transaction costs, and the stochastic properties of
ε. If the latter was normally distributed, one could estimate (3.2) by means of a
standard Probit model. Estimators that make minimal distributional assumptions
but enable the researcher to recover marginal effects still require ε to either be ho-
moskedastic or have a very particular form of heteroskedasticity (Klein and Vella,
2009). If our conjecture about a varying explanatory content of θopt− f (X ta) is cor-
rect, this will be reflected in a form of heteroskedasticity that violates these assump-
tions. In particular, the variance of εwill vary with measurement error in a form that
is unknown a priori.
3.2.2 Putting Measurement Error in Subjective Beliefs to Productive Use
The model combines effortful reasoning about future states of the world with per-
sonal risk tolerance to form a choice rule. While such behavior is at the heart of
economic thinking, there are a number of reasons why the explanatory content of
this model is likely to vary in the population. For example, almost half of the Dutch
population report that they mostly rely on the advice of family, friends, or profes-
sionals when it comes to important financial decisions (Gaudecker, forthcoming).
Individuals may take decisions intuitively (Kahneman, 2011; Binswanger and Salm,
2013) or follow simple rules of thumb like holding an equity share of 100 minus age
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(see, e.g., the discussion in Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004).
However, if some households base their investment decisions on such alterna-
tives, then they have less incentives to maintain a meaningful, up-to-date, and/or
reasonably stable belief about the evolution of the stock market. This should have at
least two sets of consequences. First, different methods to elicit beliefs should lead
to divergent reports, self-expressed confidence in one’s estimates should decrease,
and one should find tasks related to belief elicitation rather difficult: Measurement
error in subjective beliefs will be high. Second, the marginal effects of changes in
beliefs on portfolio choice behavior should be much smaller than for individuals
whose choice behavior is well approximated by the economic model. Thus, the mag-
nitude of measurement error in beliefs will be informative about economic quanti-
ties of interest.
There is a vast literature on measurement issues in subjective expectations
of stock market developments. Manski (2004) and Hurd (2009) provide excellent
overviews. First-order evidence for measurement error is provided by the facts that
many answers to probabilistic survey questions violate basic laws of probability and
that non-response tends to be concentrated among sub-groups who do not follow
the development of the stock market (Hurd, 2009). In addition, consistent with our
interpretation of measurement error as reflecting the absence of meaningful expec-
tations, several authors argue that the prevalence of 50-50 responses to probability
questions (Manski, 2004; Hurd, 2009; Kleinjans and Soest, 2014) reflects epistemic
uncertainty rather than a genuine belief (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2000). This inter-
pretation finds support in explicit follow-up questions (Hurd, 2009; Bruine de Bruin
and Carman, 2012; Binswanger and Salm, 2013).
Similar patterns of imprecise measurements have been documented for risk pref-
erences. Gaudecker, Soest, and Wengström (2011) and Choi et al. (2014) show that
for respondents with high socio-economic status, sequences of lottery decisions are
much more consistent with flexible parametric utility functions and the generalised
axiom of revealed preferences, respectively. Put differently, risk preference parame-
ters are much more precisely measured for these subgroups.
In sum, different pieces of evidence suggest that subjective stock market beliefs
are measured with error and that such error-laden responses provide information
about the meaningfulness of the underlying belief distribution. To the extent that
the absence of meaningful beliefs is associated with the use of alternative choice
rules, information on measurement error can be exploited to evaluate the explana-
tory content of the simple model of stock market participation discussed above.
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3.2.3 Econometric Specication
In econometric terms, a consequence of measurement error is that ε in (3.2) will be
heteroskedastic, i.e., its variance will increase in the amount of measurement error.
Depending on the precise decision-making process, it may also have group-specific
means different from zero. For example, the most prevalent advice by family and
friends seems to be non-participation in the stock market (Gaudecker, forthcom-
ing). For the group of individuals who follow this advice, participation rates will be
low even if θopt − f (X ta) takes on positive values on average. In order to capture
these consequences, we require an econometric specification where the predictions
of the choice model (3.2) interact with the extent of measurement error in a flexible
way. The double index binary choice model of Klein and Vella (2009) is ideally suited
for the structure of our problem. The model obtains an estimate of the probability
of stock market participation by nonparametrically combining two linear indices.
We first aggregate µriskyt+1 −µsafet+1 ,σ
risky
t+1 ,γ, and X
ta into one vector X mod; X modβmod
approximates our choice model from 3.2.1.1 We will refer to X modβmod as the eco-
nomic model index in what follows. In a second vector X me, we group quantitative
and qualitative indicators of measurement error as well as covariates that we would
expect to influence the “propensity to use economic reasoning”; the latter may over-
lap with covariates included in the economic model index to proxy transaction costs.
Accordingly, we refer to X meβme as the measurement error index. The Klein and




Y = 1 ∣∣ X modβmod, X meβme)= h(X modβmod, X meβme) (3.3)
This structure is directly related to (3.2) in that the measurement index further pa-
rameterises ε (i.e., the random component is systematic to some extent). The func-
tion h(·, ·) provides a nonparametric link mapping the indices for the economic
model and measurement error into stock market participation probabilities.
To attain identification (up to location and scale) of the parameters βmod and
βme, we require that at least one continuous variable per index is excluded from the
1 We also experimented with calculating (3.1) and including it alongside X ta. This led to numerical
difficulties as the covariance matrix of the two indices was near-singular for a wide range of pa-
rameter values. We attribute this to the lack of a quantitatively meaningful measure of γ (Rabin,






. The latter is likely responsible for the numerical problems;
it is also the reason why we use the standard deviation of beliefs instead of the variance.
2 Klein and Vella (2009) frame their discussion in terms of an estimator for a single-equation bi-
nary response model with dummy endogenous variable when no instruments are present. A first
application that applies it directly to two indices is given in Maurer (2009).
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other index. We normalise the coefficients on one of these variables per index to
one. The resulting model satisfies the form in A5 of Klein and Vella (2009) without
requiring reparameterisation. Under assumptions given in Klein and Vella (2009)—
mainly smoothness of h(·, ·) and compact support of the covariates—the probability




Y = 1 ∣∣ X modβmod, X meβme)= fY =1(X modβmod, X meβme) ·P(Y = 1)
f
(
X modβmod, X meβme
) , (3.4)
where f (·) denotes the unconditional density of the bivariate index and fY =1(·) its
density conditional on participation in the stock market. Kernel density estimators
for these quantities are obtained under a multi-stage local smoothing procedure to





























where τˆi denotes a smooth trimming function ensuring that densities do not







N to its true value. While the parameter values do
not allow for a direct interpretation, various quantities of interest like average partial
effects can be computed with little effort.
In sum, our empirical model allows for a flexible interplay between traditional
economic parameters and measurement error proxies in generating choice be-
haviour. In particular, it will allow an analysis of how marginal changes in model pa-
rameters translate into stock market participation, and how this relationship varies
across respondents with differential degrees of measurement error.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data stem from the Dutch LISS study (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the So-
cial Sciences), which regularly administers Internet surveys and experiments to a
panel of households comprising a probability sample drawn from the population
register kept by Statistics Netherlands.
Implementing our empirical strategy requires data on individual stock market
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participation, subjective beliefs and risk aversion, proxies for the degree of measure-
ment error in individual responses, and a rich set of sociodemographic covariates.
Only the latter are present in the LISS panel by default. In order to obtain measures
for the main quantities of interest, we implemented a series of incentivised exper-
iments and survey questions in August and September of 2013. We restricted our
experiments to households with financial wealth in excess of 1,000e to focus on
respondents with substantial incentives to think about portfolio allocations. To in-
crease turnout, we also included individuals who refused to answer questions about
their exact amount of wealth. Within households, we selected the financial decision
maker. In total, 2,125 individuals completed both survey waves. After dropping ob-
servations with missing data, we are left with a final sample of 2,072 observations.
3.3.1 Outcome Variable: Stock Market Participation
LISS routinely collects detailed data on respondents’ financial background, includ-
ing information on asset ownership. To ensure the relevance of elicited beliefs for
current portfolio allocations, we asked respondents to update their information on
asset holdings in August 2013. For this purpose, we asked them whether they had
any type of bank or savings account and/or investments (stocks, bonds, funds, or
options). Our outcome variable is a binary index that equals 1 if the respective re-
spondent held any investments, and 0 otherwise. A quarter of the households in our
sample holds risky assets (cf. Table 3.1). This is in the range of values reported for
the Netherlands from other datasets and earlier periods (Alessie, Hochgürtel, and
Soest, 2004; Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie, 2011).
3.3.2 Variables Entering the Economic Model Index
Subjective Expectations. In August 2013, we asked respondents to describe their ex-
pectations about the one-year return of the Amsterdam Exchange Index (AEX). We
employed a variation of the ball allocation procedure developed by Delavande and
Rohwedder (2008), which was explicitly designed for usage in Internet experiments.
For each individual, the procedure yields an 8-binned histogram for the expecta-
tion of the AEX’s one-year return. Using the resulting 7 points on the cumulative
distribution function, we follow Hurd, Rooij, and Winter (2011) and fit a log-normal
distribution to obtain individual-level measures for µriskyt+1 and σ
risky
t+1 . Because our
theoretical framework requires expected excess returns, we also asked respondents
for a point estimate for the return of a one-year investment into a standard savings
account as the most prevalent safe asset. Section A.1.1.1 of the Appendix contains
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detailed descriptions of both procedures.
Recent research in the experimental economics literature has shown that finan-
cial incentives induce more truthful reporting of beliefs in tasks like ours (see, for
example, Palfrey and Wang, 2009; Gächter and Renner, 2010; Wang, 2011). In order
to incentivise subjects, we employed the binarised scoring rule of Hossain and Okui
(2013) which is incentive-compatible for a wide range of utility functions. As is com-
mon practice with large samples like ours, we randomly selected one in ten subjects
for actual payment. The maximum earnings per selected subject were 100 e and
average earnings equaled 39.66 e conditional on being selected for payment in
September 2014.
We relegate a detailed presentation of summary statistics of the belief measures
to Section A.1.1.1 of the Appendix and only discuss some notable features at this
point. First, our data exhibit the same patterns found previously in the literature,
i.e., male, richer, and better educated respondents tend to hold more optimistic ex-
pectations (e.g., Manski, 2004; Hurd, 2009; Hurd, Rooij, and Winter, 2011). Second,
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics
Statistic Index
Mean Std. Dev. Model Meas. Err.
Holds risky assets 0.25
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 -1.18 8.10 ×
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 6.25 4.01 ×
Risk aversion 0.00 1.00 ×
Absolute difference between belief measures 11.20 13.57 ×
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate 0.54 0.23 ×
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate 0.36 0.24 ×
Experimental tasks difficult 0.49 0.33 ×
Experimental tasks obscure 0.31 0.25 ×
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 0.27 × ×
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 0.27 × ×
Financial wealth missing 0.17 × ×
Net income > 2500e 0.46 × ×
Net income missing 0.07 × ×
High education 0.38 × ×
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.30 × ×
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.34 × ×
Age > 65 0.29 × ×
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. Variables related to the confidence in return estimates,
task difficulty, and task obscurity are scaled to range between 0 and 1. Risk aversion is the standard-
ised average of 3 standardised risk aversion proxies. We omit standard deviations of binary variables.
The number of observations is 2,072.
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while our respondents expect a positive AEX return on average, their expectations
are rather pessimistic relative to the AEX’s historical return distribution. Third, our
participants tend to place lower probabilities on extreme returns than what has his-
torically been observed. In contrast, expectations for the return of savings accounts
are high relative to the rates actually offered at the time of the survey and on average
even exceed the expected return for the AEX. In our empirical analyses, we employ
the difference between the expected mean return for the AEX and the expected re-
turn for the savings account as the empirical analogue of the expected excess return.
Risk Preferences. In September 2013, we elicited risk preferences by asking re-
spondents to complete a variant of the “Preference Survey Module”, which was de-
veloped in Falk et al. (2014) to measure economic preference parameters in large-
scale surveys. As part of this survey module, which we describe in more detail
in Section A.1.1.3 of the Appendix, respondents first provided a qualitative self-
assessment of their willingness to take risks in general and in the financial domain.
They then made choices in a series of hypothetical binary lottery tasks. In our main
analysis, we employ the average of the three measures’ standardised values.
Transaction Costs. We include several variables to empirically model the impact
of transaction costs on stock market participation decisions. We focus on variables
that proxy for variation in transaction costs in the form of either monetary or infor-
mation costs. If monetary expenses of stock market participation are to some degree
fixed—e.g., because banks charge a constant amount for setting up and keeping an
investment account—then these costs will be less relevant for wealthy households.
We therefore include net household income and financial wealth in the economic
index to control for variation in the relevance of monetary transaction costs. If com-
prehension of the basic functioning of the stock market comes with information
costs, then these costs will be lower for more numerate and cognitively able house-
holds. Both vary with educational attainment and age (McArdle, Smith, and Willis,
2011), which we include as further controls.
3.3.3 Variables Entering the Measurement Error Index
Several quantitative and qualitative measures serve to capture measurement error
in individual responses. We employ variables for (i) the consistency with which par-
ticipants report their expectations, (ii) their confidence in their own beliefs, and (iii)
their self-assessment concerning both difficulty and clarity of our survey tasks. On
top of such direct proxies, we also include the variables proxying transaction costs
in the measurement error index. Indeed, it is difficult to argue for exclusion restric-
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tions in one direction or another for education, income, financial wealth, or age.
In September 2013, one month after eliciting the distribution of beliefs, we asked
the same set of respondents to provide a point estimate for the one-year return of
the AEX. As a quantitative proxy for measurement error, we compute the absolute
difference between the response to this question and the mean belief from the ball
allocation task. We conjecture that large discrepancies between the two estimates
are indicative of measurement error because respondents who do not have a stable
set of beliefs or are incapable of articulating them meaningfully are likely to provide
less consistent estimates.3
The first two qualitative proxies for measurement error relate to the confidence
respondents have in their own estimates. Following the elicitation of the point es-
timates for the expected returns of the AEX and the savings account, we asked re-
spondents to use a slider interface to express their confidence in their own belief
on a scale from 0 to 10. We conjecture that respondents with little faith in their own
estimates (e.g., because they did not put much cognitive effort into developing their
prediction or did not have much of an interest in financial matters) provide error-
ridden estimates. We invert responses to these questions so that higher values cor-
respond to less confidence in ones estimates and scale them to the unit interval.
Both in August and September 2013, we asked subjects to use five-point scales
to indicate how clear they found the task descriptions and how difficult they con-
sidered the belief elicitation itself. We expect that respondents without an elaborate
belief distribution will find it hard to understand and to complete the tasks. For both
questions, we aggregate the responses for August and September to create two fur-
ther measurement error proxies.
The Appendix provides a more detailed description and further summary statis-
tics of all measurement error proxies. The pairwise correlations between the indi-
vidual proxies are all positive and range between .08 and .52. Notably, all of the prox-
ies’ correlations with sociodemographic variables show the same tendencies. For
example, all measurement error proxies tend to be lower for highly educated house-
holds or households with higher net income, resembling previously-found patterns
regarding inconsistent survey responses or item non-response (Manski, 2004; Hurd,
2009).
3 We are not aware of changes in the economic environment between the two surveys that could
have induced people to systematically and substantially revise their beliefs. Between August and
September 2013, the AEX varied little with closing prices between 362.93 and 382.58.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Main Specication
Table 3.2 presents parameter estimates for the coefficients of the main specification.
In the economic model index, we normalise the coefficient on µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 to 1,
thus expressing the remainder of βmod relative to subjective excess return expecta-
tions. In the measurement error index, we proceed in the same way with the coeffi-
cient on the absolute difference between the belief measures. As we will discuss in
detail below, the link function h(·, ·) is (close to) monotonically increasing in the eco-
nomic model index and monotonically decreasing in the measurement error index.
This allows us to infer the direction of partial effects from the coefficient estimates.
The coefficients in both indices are estimated with reasonable precision; their
signs and relative magnitudes are plausible given the aforementioned shape of the
link function and the scaling of the variables (see Table 3.1). In particular, all vari-
ables with exclusion restrictions have the expected signs and most of them are sig-
nificant. The economic model index increases in the level of the expected excess re-
turns; it decreases in the standard deviation of returns and in risk aversion. The mea-
surement error index increases in all of the 5 employed measurement error proxies.
Both indices vary significantly with a number of the common covariates. For ex-
ample, financial wealth is positively related to the economic model index and nega-
tively related to the measurement error index. This is consistent with wealthy house-
holds facing lower transaction costs, while at the same time having stronger incen-
tives to form an opinion about stock market developments. Interestingly, education
seems to mostly work through the measurement error index, but it has little impact
on the economic model index.
For presenting the results of semi- and nonparametric methods, it is particularly
important to clarify the support of the data, which in our case refers to the two in-
dices. Figure 3.1 shows a contour plot of the joint density of the estimated indices.
We limit the area of Figure 3.1 and of all subsequent plots to the rectangle spanned
by the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions of both indices. With a
correlation coefficient of -0.45, the indices are characterised by a pronounced neg-
ative correlation. Note that this negative correlation does not arise purely mechan-
ically due to the previously noted influence of wealth on both indices—in a model
that drops all variables common to both indices (described in the next section), we
find the same pattern.
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Table 3.2. Coefcient estimates for the economic model index and the measurement index
Model Measurement Error
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.70 0.36 · ·
Risk aversion -9.62 2.30 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 44.54 24.49
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 17.09 21.43
Experimental tasks difficult · · 37.29 16.89
Experimental tasks obscure · · 30.58 18.99
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 20.54 6.77 -23.17 26.11
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 39.81 9.74 -77.90 41.40
Financial wealth missing 45.29 10.57 -12.78 29.30
Net income > 2500e 8.85 3.73 22.45 11.73
Net income missing -12.26 5.38 -5.90 13.13
High education 2.24 4.00 -47.84 19.50
30 < Age ≤ 50 20.34 7.87 34.20 21.52
50 < Age ≤ 65 16.42 6.51 5.32 15.21
Age > 65 4.64 6.26 -10.62 15.54
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The table shows coefficient estimates for the double in-
dex binary choice model of Klein and Vella (2009); see Section 3.2.3 for a detailed description. The
dependent variable is a household’s stock market participation decision, a binary variable equalling
1 in case the household reports holding any investments, and 0 otherwise. Columns 2 and 3 present
estimates of the coefficients and standard errors for the variables contained in the economic model
index. Columns 4 and 5 present estimates for the variables contained in the measurement error in-
dex.
Figure 3.1. Joint density of the two indices












































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices
of the Klein and Vella (2009) model; see Section 3.2.3 for a detailed description.
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Measurement error index at 10% quantile
Measurement error index at 90% quantile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock
market participation for varying levels of the economic model and measurement error indices. The
right panel plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic
model index for the 10 and 90% quantiles of the measurement error index (-40 and 115). Ranges are
limited to the interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
The left panel of Figure 3.2 plots the link function h(·, ·), i.e., the predicted proba-
bility of stock market participation, for varying levels of the economic model and
measurement error indices. Three features of the plot stand out: First, predicted
stock market participation rates vary substantially, ranging from single-digit values
to more than 70%. Second, participation rates in general vary monotonically in both
indices, increasing in the index for the economic model and decreasing in the mea-
surement error index. Third and most importantly, the effects are highly non-linear
and interact strongly. In particular, stock market participation is much more respon-
sive to changes in the economic model ingredients at low levels of the measurement
error index than at high levels.
To illustrate the last point more clearly, the second panel in Figure 3.2 extracts
two slices from the first panel. The solid line shows the average response of stock
market participation to variation in the model index at the 10% quantile of the mea-
surement error index. There is a pronounced gradient in the middle region, causing
predicted risky asset participation to rise from just over 10% to 70%. The dashed line
plots the same relation for the 90% quantile of measurement error. Again, predicted
stock market participation varies in the economic model index as expected, but to a
much lesser extent. In particular, even for the highest levels of the economic model
index, the predicted probability of participation does not rise above 30%. The dis-
crepancy in shapes of the two lines highlights the importance of measurement error




Table 3.3. Average partial effects
Model Meas. Err. Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.032 · 0.032
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.012 · -0.012
Risk aversion -0.041 · -0.041
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.020 -0.020
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.015 -0.015
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.006 -0.006
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.019 -0.019
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.011 -0.011
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 0.101 0.030 0.103
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 0.215 0.153 0.369
Financial wealth missing 0.241 0.014 0.222
Net income > 2500e 0.038 -0.034 0.003
Net income missing -0.053 0.009 -0.045
High education 0.010 0.087 0.097
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.088 -0.054 0.034
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.073 -0.010 0.066
Age > 65 0.021 0.019 0.039
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The table presents average partial effects of the Klein and
Vella (2009) model; see Section 3.2.3 for a detailed description. The effects are calculated for a change
of 1 standard deviation in continuous variables. For binary variables, we calculate the effect by assign-
ing individuals in the left-out category a value of 1.
We calculate average partial effects to quantify the dependence between individ-
ual covariates and stock market participation probabilities. In Table 3.3, we show
how changes in covariates affect participation through either the economic or mea-
surement error index. We also show the combined effect that operates through both
indices simultaneously. To calculate average partial effects, we increase continuous
variables by one standard deviation. For binary variables, we assign individuals in
the left-out category a value of 1.
For the variables solely included in the economic model index, the average par-
tial effects of expected excess return and risk aversion are somewhat larger than the
effect of a change in the expected standard deviation of returns. An increase in the
expected excess return by one standard deviation is associated with an increase of
3.2 percentage points in the probability to hold investments. Comparable increases
in the expected standard deviation and risk aversion reduce the predicted partici-
pation rate by 1.2 and 4.1 percentage points, respectively. Increases in either of the
measurement error proxies by one standard deviation reduce the propensity to par-
ticipate by between 0.6 and 2 percentage points. If one thinks of the different indi-
cators in terms of a factor structure (Section A.1.2 in the Appendix shows that all
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indicators are positively correlated), varying the underlying factor would likely yield
effects comparable in magnitude to those of beliefs or risk aversion.
The effects of financial wealth tend to work through both indices, increasing the
propensity to participate in the stock market through the economic model index as
well as the measurement error index. In contrast, education seems to affect partici-
pation mainly through the measurement error index.
In sum, this section indicates that respondents’ beliefs and risk attitudes are in-
deed predictive of economic choices. However, the extent to which this is the case
varies strongly in the population. Hence, measurement error in the primitives of the
economic model can be used to uncover heterogeneity in its explanatory power.
3.4.2 Robustness
To illustrate the robustness of our results to alternative specifications of both the
economic model and the measurement error index, we now present an overview
of a number of additional analyses. Section A.2 of the Appendix contains all tables,
figures, and some additional information.
No Transaction Cost Proxies. Our main specification includes several covariates
that proxy transaction costs. Some of them—financial wealth in particular—have
strong effects on stock market participation through both the economic model in-
dex and the measurement error index. To investigate whether the predicted interac-
tions between the economic model and measurement error are driven by these so-
ciodemographics only, we estimate one specification without all of the correspond-
ing proxies, i.e., we only include beliefs, risk preferences, and measurement error
proxies. Except for lower predicted levels of stock market participation at high val-
ues of the model index, the overall results on h(·, ·) look very similar. Naturally, the
partial effects change.
Mean Beliefs Only. In this specification, we restrict the model index to consist
of expected excess returns only, thus endowing it with an interpretable scale. Sec-
tion A.2.2 of the Appendix shows that the gist of our main results is present even
in this stripped-down version. The relationship between beliefs and stock market
participation is essentially flat at the 90th percentile of the measurement error in-
dex, while the probability to hold stocks doubles along the beliefs distribution at
the 10th percentile of the measurement error index. This doubling is concentrated
around expected excess returns of zero, whereas the relationship is flat at both ex-
tremes of the beliefs distributions. The pattern illustrates the usefulness of our semi-
parametric approach; typical parametric models such as Logit or Probit would yield
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the steepest gradient at the right tail of the support of the index instead of its center.
Additional Covariates. We also check the other extreme and employ a “kitchen-
sink”-type approach, including binary variables for gender, having children, and be-
ing married in both indices along with the variables from our main specification. It
turns out, however, that neither of these is significantly associated with the index of
the economic model or the measurement error index nor does their inclusion affect
the general tendency of our results.
Discarding Individuals with Missing Data on Financial Wealth. In our main
specification, we included dummies for financial wealth terciles and for whether
information on financial wealth was missing. Since wealth is among the strongest
drivers of stock market participation in our model, it is possible that inclusion of
respondents with missing information on portfolio value affects our results. To ad-
dress this concern, we estimate our main specification only with respondents who
provided all components of financial wealth. The results are very similar. In particu-
lar, the shape of h(·, ·) is virtually unchanged and the average partial effects of beliefs
and preferences are almost identical to those in the main specification.
Alternative Belief Measure. We showed our main results using stated beliefs over
the future development of the Amsterdam Exchange Index (AEX). While it is plausi-
ble that expectations over a composite index with high media exposure are a good
proxy for “the” risky asset in our model, it is still conceivable that our results are
biased due to this specific choice. We therefore elicited the same set of belief vari-
ables for the future stock return of Philips N.V., one of the largest publicly traded
companies of the Netherlands. As one would expect for a single stock with addi-
tional idiosyncratic risk, average partial effects relating to the moments of the belief
distribution are reduced by one third (mean) and one half (standard deviation), re-
spectively. The general shape of the link function and all other results are essentially
unchanged.
Disaggregated Risk Aversion Measures. By averaging over three distinct vari-
ables, we employed a particularly simple aggregation procedure for the risk aversion
measure used in our main analysis. When including the three variables separately
in the model index, aversion to risk in financial matters emerges as its most impor-
tant component (Section A.2.6 of the Appendix). The remainder of our results is not
affected.
Alternative Ways of Calculating the Moments of Belief Distributions. We ar-
rived at our individual-level measures of µAEXt+1 and σ
AEX
t+1 by fitting log-normal dis-
tributions to respondents’ stated cumulative distribution functions. We obtain very
similar results when we estimate the moments assuming uniformly distributed ex-
89
3 Measurement Error in Subjective Expectations
pectations within bins (Section A.2.7 of the Appendix) or when we follow Bellemare,
Bissonnette, and Kröger (2012) in approximating each respondent’s distribution us-
ing a spline interpolation method (Section A.2.8).
3.4.3 Specication with Less Customised Data
Our analyses employ very detailed data on respondents’ stock market expectations
based on an incentivised online experiment. Our proxies for measurement error in-
clude a quantitative variable derived from repeated belief measurements and sev-
eral qualitative indicators. In many surveys, asking for information this detailed is
either impossible or impractical. We now evaluate the applicability of our empirical
approach to situations with less customised data.
In the model index, we replace the mean of the log-normal belief distribution
derived from the ball allocation task by individuals’ point estimates. We drop the
standard deviation of beliefs and use aversion towards risks in general instead of
our composite variable (see Section A.1.1 of the Appendix for a detailed description
of all measures). In the measurement error index, we only keep the answers to the
qualitative questions which asked respondents about the difficulty and obscurity
of our survey. We retain all sociodemographic covariates. We then re-run our main
analyses using this limited set of variables.
Figure 3.3 illustrates that the main results for this model are broadly similar to
those of our main specification.4 As the left panel indicates, the predicted probabil-
ity of holding risky assets strongly varies with both model indices. Importantly, we
find strong variation in the gradient of the economic model even with these much
coarser data: While the probability of investing in the stock market is sensitive to
changes in the economic model index at low values of measurement error, the rela-
tionship is essentially flat for high levels of measurement error. The average partial
effects in Table 3.4 again suggest that beliefs and willingness to take risks positively
affect stock market participation, while the measurement error proxies decrease the
probability to invest. All magnitudes are roughly similar to our main specification.
These results entail two consequences: On the one hand, they suggest that mea-
surement error will also interfere with our understanding of stock market participa-
tion decisions when working with simple measures of beliefs and risk preferences.
On the other hand, they suggest that our empirical approach to making productive
use of measurement error of this kind does not seem to rely on very detailed data to
work.
4 Section A.3 of the Appendix provides the remaining results for this model.
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Measurement error index at 10% quantile
Measurement error index at 90% quantile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock
market participation for varying levels of the economic model and measurement error indices. The
right panel plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic
model index for the 10 and 90% quantiles of the measurement error index. The estimation is based
on a limited set of variables. Ranges are limited to the interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of
the marginal distributions.
Table 3.4. Average partial effects, specication with less customised data
Model Meas. Err. Combined
Subjective beliefs (direct question): Log expected excess return 0.029 · 0.029
Aversion to risks in general -0.028 · -0.028
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.034 -0.034
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.010 -0.010
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 0.073 0.040 0.103
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 0.049 0.355 0.400
Financial wealth missing 0.088 0.117 0.205
Net income > 2500e 0.026 -0.011 0.014
Net income missing -0.092 0.046 -0.053
High education -0.001 0.117 0.116
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.091 -0.079 0.014
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.054 0.013 0.070
Age > 65 -0.032 0.059 0.024
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The table presents average partial effects of the Klein and
Vella (2009) model with a limited number of variables. The effects are calculated for a change of 1
standard deviation in continuous variables. For binary variables, we calculate the effect of assigning
individuals in the left-out category a value of 1.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Attempts to measure subjective stock market expectations have dramatically in-
creased over the last two decades. By and large, the results have been encourag-
ing, but obvious signs of poor data quality remain for large fractions of the popula-
tion regardless of particular survey devices (Manski, 2004; Hurd, 2009; Kleinjans and
Soest, 2014). When these measures have been employed to predict portfolio choice
behaviour (e.g., Hurd and Rohwedder, 2012; Hurd, Rooij, and Winter, 2011; Kézdi
and Willis, 2011; Hudomiet, Kézdi, and Willis, 2011; Huck, Schmidt, and Weizsäcker,
2014), significant correlations in the expected direction have emerged. Neverthe-
less, it seems fair to say that these are not of the magnitude economists might have
hoped for. In this paper, we have explored a mechanism that can explain both facts.
We have argued that differences in the “propensity to use economic reasoning” may
drive heterogeneity in measurement error and explain why the empirical content of
portfolio choice models has been moderate on average.
While the idea of heterogeneous decision rules is certainly not new (e.g., Ameriks
and Zeldes, 2004; Kahneman, 2011; Binswanger and Salm, 2013, among many oth-
ers), we are the first to suggest that the magnitude of measurement error in subjec-
tive expectations data can be used to uncover such heterogeneity. To explore this
link empirically, we have used a semiparametric double index model due to Klein
and Vella (2009) on a dataset specifically collected for this purpose. Our results show
that stock market participation reacts much more strongly to the primitives of an
economic model (preferences, beliefs, and transaction costs) for low values of the
measurement error index than for high values. This pattern obtains in a wide variety
of specification choices, including a setting where we restrict ourselves to variables
that are available in many datasets.
Two pieces of evidence lend further support to our interpretation of these pat-
terns. First, if we were dealing with classical measurement error in beliefs, taking av-
erages of multiple measurements with uncorrelated idiosyncratic variation should
increase the predictive power of expectations. A simple exercise shows that such a
pattern does not obtain in our data. We run OLS regressions of stock market par-
ticipation on convex combinations of our two belief measures (the results are un-
changed if we add controls). In Section A.4 of the Appendix, we show that the max-
imum R2 is reached close to the point where all the weight is on the mean from
the ball allocation task. In other words, the addition of the second measure hardly
helps at all. Second, we found lower levels of stock market participation for high
values of the measurement error index in all our specifications. This suggests that
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measurement error does not arise purely because of differential effort put into the
subjective belief tasks. If some subjects gave random answers which were uncorre-
lated with portfolio allocations, participation rates should be the same on average.
This suggests that the patterns we found do not merely reflect attenuation bias due
to respondents’ carelessness in providing subjective data.
Our method is applicable to a wide range of settings where subjective data
is used. For example, we noted above that the precision of individual-level
risk preference parameters obtained from experiments via revealed-preference
paradigms varies tremendously in heterogeneous populations (Gaudecker, Soest,
and Wengström, 2011; Choi et al., 2014). These findings strongly suggest that the
degree to which meaningful structural parameters of economic models exist (Rust,
2014) varies across individuals. We have shown how the individual-level measure-
ment error in structural parameters can be used when these parameters are em-
ployed to explain economically interesting outcomes. Doing so should help dampen
the hostility of economists to subjective data (Manski, 2004) that has arisen largely
because of perceived data quality. We have turned this argument around and shown
that once there is direct information on measurement error at the individual level,
it can be used to learn about the economic mechanism of interest.
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A Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Extended Data Description
A.1.1 Variable Denitions and Descriptives
A.1.1.1 Subjective Expectations of Stock Market Returns
AEX return - Ball allocation task. In August 2013, we asked respondents to describe
their expectations for the one-year return of the Amsterdam Exchange Index (AEX).
To elicit the distribution of individual expectations, we employed a variation of the
procedure presented in Delavande and Rohwedder (2008), which was explicitly de-
veloped for usage in Internet experiments and pays particular attention to the cogni-
tive burden placed on heterogeneous subject pools. We asked respondents to imag-
ine that they invested 100 e into an exchange traded AEX index fund today and to
think about the likely value of this investment in one year. To aid respondents’ think-
ing process and ensure comprehension of the task, the instructions clarified what an
index fund is and provided an explicit formula for the value of the investment in one
year (value in a year = 100e - 0.30e (fees) + change in the AEX index).
We then provided respondents with a visual interface that employed an itera-
tive procedure to allow them to state their beliefs as accurately as possible (see Fig-
ure A.1). To familiarise subjects with the interface, we showed them an introductory
video before asking for their beliefs about the stock market. The video used the ex-
ample of expected annual rainy days in London to describe the intuition behind the
ball allocation procedure and guided subjects through the controls of the interface.
In the first step of the iterative procedure, the interface presented all possible val-
ues of the investment as two intervals, [0,100] and (100,∞). We asked participants
to use a slider to allocate 100 balls to indicate their relative confidence that the final
value of the investment would fall into either of these intervals. We then split up the
interval (100,∞) into (100,105] and (105,∞), and we asked subjects to re-allocate
the balls from the previous interval to this finer grid. This procedure continued suc-
cessively until subjects had distributed all balls into 6 interior bins covering inter-
vals of 5e each and two exterior bins covering the intervals [0,85] and (115,∞). Fig-
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Figure A.1. Visual interface to elicit belief distribution (nal step)
The figure shows the final step of the belief eliciation procedure. Respondents used the slider above
to allocate 100 balls to the 8 bins below. The figure shows both the remaining balls and the number
of balls assigned to each return interval in the previous steps.













































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The picture shows Kernel density estimates of the distribu-
tion of probabilites for each of the 8 return intervals.
ure A.2 shows the resulting distribution of balls for each interval expressed in terms
of expected returns. While the exterior bins contained only a small number of balls
for the large majority of respondents, the distribution of balls in the interior bins
was substantially more dispersed.
The iterative procedure provides an intuitively simple way of eliciting beliefs and
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the resulting distribution of balls lends itself to a straightforward interpretation as
a histogram. One of its desirable properties is that it does not ask respondents for
cumulative probabilities. In contrast, standard survey questions based on the elici-
tation of points on a cumulative probability distribution often yield logically incon-
sistent responses due to frequent monotonicity violations. This regularly forces re-
searchers to discard large amounts of data, thereby potentially introducing severe
selection effects into the empirical analyses (see, e.g., Manski, 2004; Hurd, Rooij,
and Winter, 2011).
To obtain estimates of the mean and variance of individual belief distributions,
we employ a procedure similar to Hurd, Rooij, and Winter (2011). We first cumulated
the number of balls each respondent assigned to the bins to arrive at a discrete cu-
mulative distribution function. We then used the 7 interior boundary points (b) and
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over µ and σ, our estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the repondent’s
belief distribution. On average, respondents expect a mean return of 2.01% and a
standard deviation of 6.25%. Figure A.3 shows the distribution of estimated mean
returns and the distribution of estimated standard deviations. As is evident from the
two distributions, subjects have very heterogenuous expectations regarding both
the expected return of the AEX as well as its expected standard deviation.
Figure A.3. Distribution of expected mean and standard deviation of returns








Subjective beliefs for AEX return: µt+1








Subjective beliefs for AEX standard deviation: σt+1
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
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To financially incentivise the task, we used the binarised scoring rule of Hossain
and Okui (2013). Subjects could either earn 100e or 0e, depending on their stated
beliefs, the actually realised value of a 100e investment into the AEX after one year,
and the outcome of a random draw. For each subject, we computed the sum of the
squared deviations of the belief distribution from the actual value of a 100e invest-
ment after 12 months,
8∑
i=1
(bi −100×1i )2, where 1i equalled 1 if the realised value of
the investment fell into bin i and 0 otherwise. We then drew a random number from
U [1,20.000]. If that random number turned out to be larger (smaller) than the sum
of squared deviations, the participant received 100 (0)e.
AEX return - One-shot estimate. In September 2013, we asked our full set of re-
spondents for a second, this time non-incentivised, estimate of the one-year return
of the AEX using a one-shot question similar to those commonly employed in large-
scale surveys:
Please consider the Dutch stock market. The AEX index aggregates the
stock prices of many of the largest Dutch companies. Now consider an in-
vestment fund tracking the AEX index, i.e., this investment exactly moves
up and down with the AEX after subtracting rather small fees. If you in-
vested 100e in such a fund today, the amount of money you would have
in a year from now will be:
value in a year= 100e−0.30e (fees)+ change in the AEX index
What do you think will be this value in a year from now? Please type in
your estimate (in Euros).
Figure A.4 shows the distribution of expected returns implied by subjects’ re-
sponses to this question. With an average expected return of 4.76%, subjects’ point
estimates are more optimistic than the mean estimates from the visual task. As is of-
ten the case in large-scale representative surveys, we observe a number of outliers
in the unrestricted point estimates. Many of these are likely due to typing mistakes
or lack of comprehension. Thus, before calculating returns, we winsorise the point
estimates at the values of a 100e investment into the AEX at the 2.5% and 97.5%
percentiles of its historical return distribution (49.6e and 151.3e). This affected 99
responses.
Joint distribution. Figure A.5 shows the joint distribution of the mean estimate
from the visual task and the direct estimate from the one shot question. With stan-
dard deviations of 6.19% and 17.47%, respectively, the distribution of mean esti-
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Figure A.4. Distribution of one-shot estimates for return of AEX







Subjective beliefs (direct question): Expected return
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure A.5. Joint distribution of both average belief measures





















Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
mates from the visual task is substantially less dispersed than the distribution of
direct estimates.
Comparison to historical distribution of AEX returns. Figure A.6 plots the his-
torical distribution of (inflation-adjusted) AEX returns alongside the average prob-
abilities expected by our sample respondents. Respondents considered returns at
both ends of the spectrum of the intervals we provided, i.e., in excess of +15% as
well as below −15%, far less likely than what has historically been observed. For ex-
ample, while our average repondent expects less than a 1 in 20 chance of observing
returns below −15%, the historical probability of this happening exceeded 20%.
99
A Appendix to Chapter 3

































































Subjective and Empirical AEX distribution
Subjective probability
Empirical frequency
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Return to savings account - One-shot estimate. In August 2013, we asked re-
spondents for an estimate of the return of a one-year investment into a standard
savings account:
Suppose you invested 100e into a standard savings account with a large
Dutch bank. Then, in a year from now, the total amount of money you
would have will be:
value in a year= 100e+ interest payments
What do you think will be this value in a year from now? Please type in
your estimate (in Euros).
To ensure comprehension of the question, the computer screen also contained
a link with more detailed information and the example of a savings account with
Rabobank (Rabo SpaarRekening). Figure A.7 shows the distribution of savings esti-
mates. Somewhat surprisingly, subjects’ average return estimate for the savings ac-
count is 3.35% and thus larger than their average estimate for the AEX in the visual
task, though it is smaller than the average point estimate for the AEX. Similar to the
one-shot AEX estimates, we winsorise point estimates for the savings account at the
5 and 95% percentiles of the sample distribution before calculating returns.
A.1.1.2 Measurement Error Proxies
Our rich data allow us to employ a number of different variables to proxy for mea-
surement error. We use 5 proxies in total, 1 based on the consistency in stated beliefs,
100
A.1 Extended Data Description
Figure A.7. Distribution of one-shot estimates for savings account










Subjective beliefs for return of savings account: µt+1
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
2 based on subjects’ confidence in their estimates, and 2 based on the subjects’ per-
ception of our survey.
Consistency in beliefs. As discussed in Section A.1.1.1, we used the survey in
September 2014 to ask our full set of respondents for a second estimate of the one-
year return of the AEX. We use the absolute difference between the response to this
question and the mean belief from the visual task as a quantitative proxy for mea-
surement error. Figure A.8 shows a histogram of the absolute differences. On aver-
age, subjects’ second estimate deviates from the mean estimate in the visual task by
a considerable margin, 11.20 percentage points. This seems particularly large when
compared to the average expected standard deviation of returns from the ball alloca-
tion task (6.25%). Note that these differences are not artifacts of the method we em-
ploy to estimate mean beliefs. Other methods, which we describe in Sections A.2.7
and A.2.8 of this appendix, yield very similar results.
Confidence in estimates. Following the elicitation of the point estimates for the
expected returns of the AEX and the savings account, we asked respondents how
certain they felt about their responses:
Please use the slider to indicate how certain you are that the value in
a year will equal your estimate. 0 indicates “not certain at all” and 10
means “absolutely certain”.
We conjecture that respondents with little confidence in their own estimates
(e.g., because they know that they did not expend much cognitive effort into devel-
oping their predictions) provide estimates that are likely plagued by measurement
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Figure A.8. Distribution of absolute differences between mean belief in visual task and
point estimate










Absolute difference between belief measures
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
Figure A.9. Distribution of slider values for condence in estimates











Confidence in AEX return estimate











Confidence in sav. acc. return estimate
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
error and hence not very predictive of actual choices. Figure A.9 shows histograms
for the answers to both questions. Respondents seem to be on average less confi-
dent in their estimates for the return of the AEX as compared to their estimates for
the saving account. For the empirical analyses, we invert the responses so that larger
values correspond to a lack of confidence and scale the resulting variables to range
between 0 and 1.
Difficulty. Following the surveys in August 2013 and September 2013, we asked
subjects to use five-point scales to indicate how difficult they considered the preced-
ing belief elicitation task. We conjecture that answers by respondents who found it
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Figure A.10. Distribution of assessments of difculty











Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
very hard to detail their stock market expectations are likely measured with error.
Figure A.10 shows the distribution of the average of the responses in both surveys.
Respondents vary greatly in their assessment of the tasks’ difficulties. While some
considered it simple, others seemed to find the task very demanding. We scale the
average to range between 0 and 1 for our empirical analysis.
Clarity. In August 2013 and September 2013, we also asked subjects to use five-
point scales to indicate how vague/obscure they found our questions. We expect
that limited comprehension of the task on the side of respondents will introduce
measurement error into the answers provided. Figure A.11 shows a histogram of the
average response to this question in both surveys. For the empirical analysis, we also
scale the average to range between 0 and 1.
A.1.1.3 Risk Preferences
We use a composite variable to measure risk aversion. To construct this variable, we
ask respondents two questions on their self-assessed willingness to take risks and
we elicit one quantitative measure based on hypothetical lottery choices. In our em-
pirical analyses, we use the average of the standardised values of all three measures
to proxy for risk aversion, suitably coded so that larger values of individual variables
as well as the composite variable correspond to larger values of risk aversion.
Risk questions. The subjective self-assessments directly ask for an individual’s
willingness to take risks, both in general terms and in financial matters:
“Different people have different opinions and characteristics. We are in-
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Figure A.11. Distribution of assessments of obscurity








Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
terested in how you describe yourself. In general, to what extent are you
willing to take risks? You can answer this question by clicking somewhere
on the slider (0-10).”
“And, in general, to what extent are you willing to take risks in finan-
cial matters? You can answer this question by clicking somewhere on the
slider (0-10).”
Risk lottery. We derive a quantitative measure of risk aversion from a series
of five interdependent hypothetical binary lottery choices, a format commonly re-
ferred to as the “staircase procedure”. In each of the questions, participants had to
decide between a 50/50 lottery to win 300e or nothing and a varying safe payment.
The questions were interdependent in the sense that the choice of a lottery resulted
in an increase of the safe amount being offered in the next question, while the choice
of the safe payment resulted in a decrease of the safe amount in the next question.
For instance, the fixed payment in the first question was 160 e. In case the respon-
dent chose the lottery, the safe payment increased to 240 e in the second question.
In case the respondent chose the safe payment, the next question’s fixed payment
was reduced to 80e. By adjusting the fixed payment according to previous choices,
the questions allow for a relatively fine quantitative assessment of an individual’s at-
titudes towards risk. With 32 possible outcomes evenly spaced between 0 and 320e,
the procedure can in principle pin down a respondent’s certainty equivalent to a
range of 10 euros. Because of the task’s abstract nature and our heterogeneous sub-
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Figure A.12. Graphical illustration of hypothetical lottery choice
The figure shows the visual interface accompanying one of the lottery deci-
sions.
ject pool, we accompanied each lottery decision with a visual representation of the
current lottery to ensure comprehension (see Figure A.12).
The above variables resemble the variables developed for the “Preference Survey
Module” in Falk et al. (2014) to measure economic preference parameters in large-
scale surveys. Falk et al. (2014) use an experimental validation procedure to select
behaviorally valid survey items to measure economic preferences. Dohmen et al.
(2011) show that responses to our qualitative survey items correlate with many risky
field choices, including stockholdings. Thus, even though the questions we asked
were not financially incentivised, they are known to be behaviorally valid and were
explicitly developed for the purpose of large-scale studies like ours.
In Figure A.13, we show histograms of the indiviual components as well the com-
posite variable. There is substantial variation in the answers to all three questions.
In the lottery task, most of our subjects end up with estimated certainty equivalents
below 160e, suggesting that the majority of our subjects is risk averse.
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Figure A.13. Distribution of risk aversion components and aggregate variable











Willingness to take risks in general










Willingness to take financial risks







Certainty equivalent in staircase lottery task











Sources: LISS panel and own calculations.
A.1.1.4 Transaction Cost Proxies / Sociodemographics
Portfolio value. LISS collects detailed information on the value of a respondent’s
financial assets. To calculate an estimate of the total value of a respondent’s port-
folio, we sum the amounts held as investments and and those in the bank, which
we set to 0 in case the household reported negative values. LISS allows respondents
to provide either continuous or interval statements for each category of assets. To
calculate the overall portfolio value, we replace categorical answers by the midpoint
of the respective interval. For example, we set an answer like “7.500 to 10.000 e”
to 8.750 e. For all respondents, we use the most detailed level of information avail-
able. For investments, LISS asks both for the aggregate value of investments as well
as for the value of the subcategories (stocks, funds, and other investments). We use
the more detailed data if available, and we use the answer to the aggregate question
otherwise.
Employing the resulting estimate of a respondent’s portfolio value, we create cat-
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egorical variables for each of the sample’s portfolio value terciles. Some respondents
prefer not to answer the questions concerning their financial situation, so we create
one more binary variable for missing portfolio values.
Net household income. Using LISS’s information, we create a binary variable for
net household income in excess of 2.500 e, the median income of households pro-
viding an answer to the income question. We create a further dummy for house-
holds with missing values for income (≈ 7% of the sample).
Education. LISS asks respondents for their highest educational degree. In our
main estimation, we include a dummy variable for respondents who either report
having a university degree or higher vocational education.
Age. Using LISS’s data on birthyears, we create binary variables for several differ-
ent age groups (31 to 50, 51 to 65, and for respondents older than 65).
A.1.2 Correlations
Table A.1 shows the correlation matrix for the main variables.
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Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1
Risk aversion
Abs. diff. between belief measures
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate
Experimental tasks difficult
Experimental tasks obscure
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e]
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞)
Net income > 2500e
High education
30 < Age ≤ 50
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A.1.3 Correlates of Beliefs
Table A.2 presents regressions of various measures of expectations on sociodemo-
graphic covariates. The dependent variable in column (1) is the mean belief from
the ball allocation task, in column (2) it is the corresponding standard deviation,
and column (3) employs the point estimate of the return of a savings account.
Table A.2. Beliefs and sociodemographics
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 2.012∗∗∗ 6.824∗∗∗ 5.716∗∗∗
(0.506) (0.352) (0.608)
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 0.027 -0.552∗∗∗ -0.437
(0.318) (0.203) (0.319)
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 1.100∗∗∗ -0.785∗∗∗ -0.896∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.216) (0.288)
Financial wealth missing -0.791∗∗ -0.209 0.167
(0.376) (0.254) (0.417)
Net income > 2500e 0.482∗ 0.044 -0.357
(0.254) (0.161) (0.249)
Net income missing 0.203 0.042 -1.299∗∗∗
(0.442) (0.329) (0.475)
High education 0.693∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗ -1.130∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.155) (0.218)
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.324 -0.028 -1.094∗
(0.475) (0.337) (0.625)
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.196 -0.347 -2.333∗∗∗
(0.486) (0.343) (0.596)
Age > 65 -0.626 -0.118 -1.766∗∗∗
(0.497) (0.342) (0.620)
Female -1.413∗∗∗ 0.265∗ 1.251∗∗∗
(0.237) (0.156) (0.237)
Married -0.043 -0.036 -0.563∗∗
(0.254) (0.166) (0.249)
Has children 0.251 -0.251 0.078
(0.273) (0.185) (0.280)
Observations 2,108 2,108 2,125
Adj. R2 (%) 5.3 1.2 6.6
The left-hand variable in column (1) is the mean return from the visual task. Column (2) contains
the standard deviation of returns in the visual task. Column (3) includes the estimate for the return
of the savings account as the left-hand variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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A.2 Robustness Checks
A.2.1 No Transaction Cost Proxies
Table A.3. Coefcient estimates for the economic model index and the measurement index,
model without transaction cost proxies
Model Measurement Error
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.75 0.24 · ·
Risk aversion -4.56 1.00 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · -4.18 11.51
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 55.99 20.65
Experimental tasks difficult · · 34.07 10.30
Experimental tasks obscure · · 10.07 10.67
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.2 in the main text. The model excludes all transaction cost proxies (financial wealth, net income,
education, age).
Figure A.14. Joint density of the two indices, model without transaction cost proxies



































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices
of the Klein and Vella (2009) model.
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Table A.4. Average partial effects, model without transaction cost proxies
Model Meas. Err. Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.065 · 0.065
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.031 · -0.031
Risk aversion -0.046 · -0.046
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.034 -0.034
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · 0.002 0.002
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.035 -0.035
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.029 -0.029
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.006 -0.006
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.3 in the main text. The model excludes all transaction cost proxies (financial wealth, net income,
education, age).





























































































Measurement error index at 10% quantile
Measurement error index at 90% quantile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock
market participation for varying levels of the economic model and measurement error indices. The
right panel plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic
model index for the 10 and 90% quantiles of the measurement error index. Ranges are limited to the
interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
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A.2.2 Mean Beliefs Only
Table A.5. Coefcient estimates for the economic model index and the measurement index,
model with mean beliefs and measurement error proxies only
Model Measurement Error
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 11.54 10.07
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 80.10 25.04
Experimental tasks difficult · · 26.35 8.74
Experimental tasks obscure · · 12.40 10.75
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.2 in the main text. The model excludes the standard deviation of beliefs, risk preferences, and
all transaction cost proxies (financial wealth, net income, education, age).
Figure A.16. Joint density of the two indices, model with mean beliefs and measurement
error proxies only


































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices
of the Klein and Vella (2009) model.
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Table A.6. Average partial effects, model with mean beliefs and measurement error proxies
only
Model Meas. Err. Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.036 · 0.036
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.036 -0.036
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.007 -0.007
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.051 -0.051
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.023 -0.023
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.008 -0.008
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.3 in the main text. The model excludes the standard deviation of beliefs, risk preferences, and
all transaction cost proxies (financial wealth, net income, education, age).
Figure A.17. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, model with mean beliefs and




























































































Measurement error index at 10% quantile
Measurement error index at 90% quantile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock
market participation for varying levels of the economic model and measurement error indices. The
right panel plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic
model index for the 10 and 90% quantiles of the measurement error index. Ranges are limited to the
interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
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A.2.3 Additional Covariates
Table A.7. Coefcient estimates for the economic model index and the measurement index,
model with additional covariates
Model Measurement Error
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.82 0.28 · ·
Risk aversion -7.98 2.07 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 51.16 26.69
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 34.38 22.91
Experimental tasks difficult · · 51.04 18.85
Experimental tasks obscure · · 16.93 18.47
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 20.20 6.17 -19.07 18.50
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 42.29 9.71 -86.06 31.11
Financial wealth missing 30.35 7.82 -56.90 25.32
Net income > 2500e 8.30 2.86 22.50 11.19
Net income missing -6.92 4.13 -7.66 12.76
High education 2.32 3.30 -60.10 16.76
30 < Age ≤ 50 11.90 5.80 19.76 17.95
50 < Age ≤ 65 7.91 6.11 -21.13 15.98
Age > 65 0.69 6.09 -28.83 17.25
Female -0.97 2.74 1.30 8.36
Married -4.03 2.61 13.45 9.41
Has children 2.82 3.30 3.35 9.90
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.2 in the main text, except for the female, marriage, and having children dummies.
Figure A.18. Joint density of the two indices, model with additional covariates










































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices
of the Klein and Vella (2009) model.
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Table A.8. Average partial effects, model with additional covariates
Model Meas. Err. Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.034 · 0.034
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.015 · -0.015
Risk aversion -0.038 · -0.038
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.015 -0.015
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.012 -0.012
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.009 -0.009
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.018 -0.018
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.004 -0.004
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 0.101 0.018 0.099
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 0.245 0.119 0.369
Financial wealth missing 0.173 0.072 0.226
Net income > 2500e 0.041 -0.024 0.017
Net income missing -0.033 0.009 -0.026
High education 0.011 0.081 0.093
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.056 -0.022 0.027
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.039 0.027 0.063
Age > 65 0.004 0.036 0.033
Female -0.004 -0.001 -0.006
Married -0.018 -0.015 -0.034
Has children 0.013 -0.004 0.009
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.3 in the main text, except for the female, marriage, and having children dummies.




























































































Measurement error index at 10% quantile
Measurement error index at 90% quantile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock
market participation for varying levels of the economic model and measurement error indices. The
right panel plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic
model index for the 10 and 90% quantiles of the measurement error index. Ranges are limited to the
interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
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A.2.4 Discarding Individuals with Missing Data on Financial Wealth
Table A.9. Coefcient estimates for the economic model index and the measurement index,
sample restricted to individuals with available information on nancial wealth
Model Measurement Error
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.94 0.42 · ·
Risk aversion -10.72 2.90 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 47.76 28.36
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 16.69 25.15
Experimental tasks difficult · · 38.28 19.24
Experimental tasks obscure · · 17.83 17.17
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 24.20 7.52 -6.35 16.73
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 48.56 13.36 -46.36 29.01
Net income > 2500e 6.24 3.35 23.50 12.67
Net income missing -10.15 7.24 -16.84 12.81
High education -1.26 4.13 -42.15 17.40
30 < Age ≤ 50 12.08 7.80 24.16 17.82
50 < Age ≤ 65 2.81 7.38 -6.44 13.48
Age > 65 -4.40 7.10 -16.90 15.26
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.2 in the main text. The model excludes respondents with missing information on financial
wealth.
Figure A.20. Joint density of the two indices, sample restricted to individuals with available
information on nancial wealth




































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices
of the Klein and Vella (2009) model.
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Table A.10. Average partial effects, sample restricted to individuals with available
information on nancial wealth
Model Meas. Err. Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.031 · 0.031
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.016 · -0.016
Risk aversion -0.045 · -0.045
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.021 -0.021
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.017 -0.017
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.006 -0.006
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.021 -0.021
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.007 -0.007
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 0.059 0.010 0.068
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 0.268 0.101 0.375
Net income > 2500e 0.026 -0.038 -0.012
Net income missing -0.043 0.028 -0.020
High education -0.005 0.083 0.078
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.045 -0.042 -0.001
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.011 0.012 0.024
Age > 65 -0.019 0.032 0.009
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.3 in the main text. The model excludes respondents with missing information on financial
wealth.
Figure A.21. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, sample restricted to individuals with






























































































Measurement error index at 10% quantile
Measurement error index at 90% quantile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock
market participation for varying levels of the economic model and measurement error indices. The
right panel plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic
model index for the 10 and 90% quantiles of the measurement error index. Ranges are limited to the
interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
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A.2.5 Alternative Belief Measure
Table A.11. Coefcient estimates for the economic model index and the measurement index,
Philips instead of AEX
Model Measurement Error
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µPhilipst+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σPhilipst+1 -0.57 0.66 · ·
Risk aversion -14.05 5.21 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in Philips return estimate · · 3.65 18.13
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 32.04 20.87
Experimental tasks difficult · · 54.23 19.41
Experimental tasks obscure · · 19.89 16.68
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 47.93 21.12 2.04 30.91
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 72.04 27.57 -60.64 38.99
Financial wealth missing 50.37 20.90 -46.67 30.85
Net income > 2500e 29.14 13.83 52.94 17.97
Net income missing -9.02 10.39 17.44 19.06
High education 27.47 11.23 -2.90 12.20
30 < Age ≤ 50 44.24 19.13 53.61 29.27
50 < Age ≤ 65 30.75 15.15 5.49 22.40
Age > 65 6.23 11.92 -11.83 21.96
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.2 in the main text, except for the belief measures pertaining to Philips N.V..
Figure A.22. Joint density of the two indices, Philips instead of AEX

































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices
of the Klein and Vella (2009) model.
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Table A.12. Average partial effects, Philips instead of AEX
Model Meas. Err. Combined
Subjective beliefs: µPhilipst+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.022 · 0.022
Subjective beliefs: σPhilipst+1 -0.005 · -0.005
Risk aversion -0.039 · -0.039
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.026 -0.026
Lack of confidence in Philips return estimate · -0.001 -0.001
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.011 -0.011
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.027 -0.027
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.007 -0.007
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 0.144 -0.003 0.107
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 0.240 0.131 0.373
Financial wealth missing 0.154 0.099 0.233
Net income > 2500e 0.095 -0.066 0.020
Net income missing -0.026 -0.026 -0.050
High education 0.088 0.004 0.093
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.129 -0.088 0.038
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.090 -0.010 0.089
Age > 65 0.017 0.020 0.036
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.3 in the main text, except for the belief measures pertaining to Philips N.V..
























































































Measurement error index at 10% quantile
Measurement error index at 90% quantile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock
market participation for varying levels of the economic model and measurement error indices. The
right panel plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic
model index for the 10 and 90% quantiles of the measurement error index. Ranges are limited to the
interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
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A.2.6 Disaggregated Risk Aversion Measures
Table A.13. Coefcient estimates for the economic model index and the measurement index,
separate risk measures
Model Measurement Error
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.81 0.42 · ·
Aversion to risks in general 4.66 2.18 · ·
Aversion to financial risks -15.79 3.74 · ·
Risk aversion index based on staircase lottery task -0.15 1.39 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 15.16 11.92
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 14.65 15.61
Experimental tasks difficult · · 9.37 8.93
Experimental tasks obscure · · 17.42 9.19
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 24.06 7.41 0.78 10.15
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 39.92 10.50 -35.93 14.90
Financial wealth missing 38.77 9.96 -8.01 13.43
Net income > 2500e 6.79 3.32 7.37 4.18
Net income missing -7.33 5.33 5.26 6.24
High education 20.49 6.02 24.61 6.39
30 < Age ≤ 50 17.23 7.20 9.46 10.36
50 < Age ≤ 65 16.28 6.48 5.17 8.47
Age > 65 5.52 5.91 -2.47 8.81
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Table 3.2
in the main text, except for the disaggregated risk aversion measure.
Figure A.24. Joint density of the two indices, separate risk measures







































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices
of the Klein and Vella (2009) model.
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Table A.14. Average partial effects, separate risk measures
Model Meas. Err. Combined
Subjective beliefs: µAEXt+1 −µsav. acc.t+1 0.038 · 0.038
Subjective beliefs: σAEXt+1 -0.015 · -0.015
Aversion to risks in general 0.022 · 0.022
Aversion to financial risks -0.069 · -0.069
Risk aversion index based on staircase lottery task -0.000 · -0.000
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.027 -0.027
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.007 -0.007
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.007 -0.007
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.006 -0.006
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.008 -0.008
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 0.115 -0.002 0.093
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 0.218 0.139 0.358
Financial wealth missing 0.210 0.026 0.224
Net income > 2500e 0.033 -0.014 0.019
Net income missing -0.034 -0.011 -0.044
High education 0.116 -0.031 0.077
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.080 -0.019 0.063
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.075 -0.010 0.067
Age > 65 0.024 0.005 0.030
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.3 in the main text, except for the disaggregated risk aversion measure.


























































































Measurement error index at 10% quantile
Measurement error index at 90% quantile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock
market participation for varying levels of the economic model and measurement error indices. The
right panel plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic
model index for the 10 and 90% quantiles of the measurement error index. Ranges are limited to the
interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
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A.2.7 Moments of the Belief Distribution Calculated Using Uniformly
Distributed Expectations within Bins
The simplest way to approximate the individual-specific distribution of beliefs is
to assume that respondents’ expectations are uniformly distributed within bins. To
calculate moments under this assumption, we need to assign values to the outer
bounds of the exterior bins. We fix these bounds at the values a 100 e investment
would have had at the 2.5% and 97.5% percentile of the AEX’s historical return dis-
tribution, 49.6e and 151.3e. We then compute the moments of the distribution
assuming that the balls are uniformly distributed within each of the resulting 8 in-
tervals.
Table A.15. Coefcient estimates for the economic model index and the measurement index,
moments of beliefs calculated assuming uniform distributions within bins
Model Measurement Error
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs (uniform): Expected excess return 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs (uniform): Expected standard deviation -0.75 0.24 · ·
Risk aversion -8.06 1.76 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 72.82 24.75
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 57.22 21.68
Experimental tasks difficult · · 31.45 15.41
Experimental tasks obscure · · 13.43 14.45
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 22.85 6.47 -7.40 15.21
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 46.75 9.74 -54.92 23.20
Financial wealth missing 32.75 7.85 -40.87 19.52
Net income > 2500e 6.35 2.69 34.35 11.47
Net income missing -5.97 3.98 2.25 12.42
High education 5.48 2.81 -44.49 13.39
30 < Age ≤ 50 14.59 6.14 37.30 18.67
50 < Age ≤ 65 12.77 5.72 6.70 15.98
Age > 65 4.76 5.44 -6.96 15.01
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.2 in the main text, except for the estimated moments of the belief distribution.
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Figure A.26. Joint density of the two indices, moments of beliefs calculated assuming
uniform distributions within bins
































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices
of the Klein and Vella (2009) model.
Table A.16. Average partial effects, moments of beliefs calculated assuming uniform
distributions within bins
Model Meas. Err. Combined
Subjective beliefs (uniform): Expected excess return 0.041 · 0.041
Subjective beliefs (uniform): Expected standard deviation -0.016 · -0.016
Risk aversion -0.042 · -0.042
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.013 -0.013
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.016 -0.016
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.013 -0.013
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.010 -0.010
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.003 -0.003
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 0.112 0.008 0.109
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 0.290 0.069 0.364
Financial wealth missing 0.191 0.051 0.224
High education 0.029 0.049 0.079
Net income > 2500e 0.035 -0.028 0.007
Net income missing -0.032 -0.002 -0.033
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.080 -0.040 0.041
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.070 -0.007 0.070
Age > 65 0.027 0.006 0.033
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.3 in the main text, except for the estimated moments of the belief distribution.
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Figure A.27. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, moments of beliefs calculated





























































































Measurement error index at 10% quantile
Measurement error index at 90% quantile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock
market participation for varying levels of the economic model and measurement error indices. The
right panel plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic
model index for the 10 and 90% quantiles of the measurement error index. Ranges are limited to the
interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
A.2.8 Moments of the Belief Distribution Calculated Using Piecewise Cubic
Hermite Interpolating Splines
We also approximate individual belief distributions using piecewise cubic Hermite
interpolating splines, very similar to the method proposed in Bellemare, Bisson-
nette, and Kröger (2012). For each respondent, we first calculate a discrete cumu-
lative distribution function by successively summing the probabilities assigned to
each of the 8 bins. The method is less sensitive to the assumptions concerning the
support of the exterior bins, so we fix these at more conservative values, the mini-
mum and maximum of the AEX’s historical return distribution over a calendar year,
i.e., 47.0e and 176.9e. We then use a Hermite spline to connect the 9 points on
the resulting CDF. The spline interpolates the CDF between each pair of neighbour-
ing points by a monotonically increasing cubic polynomial, whose first derivative at
each of the 7 interior points coincides with the respective first derivative of the poly-
nomial in the next-higher interval. We employ the resulting estimate of an indivual’s
belief distribution to calculate the mean and standard deviation of the individual’s
return estimate.1
1 We use the SciPy functions scipy.interpolate.PchipInterpolator to fit the splines and
scipy.integrate.quad to calculate their moments.
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Table A.17. Coefcient estimates for the economic model index and the measurement index,
moments of beliefs calculated by approximating the distribution using splines
Model Measurement Error
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs (Splines): Expected excess return 1.00 · · ·
Subjective beliefs (Splines): Expected standard deviation -0.73 0.17 · ·
Risk aversion -7.15 1.43 · ·
Absolute difference between belief measures · · 1.00 ·
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · · 54.82 24.96
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · · 23.28 21.51
Experimental tasks difficult · · 49.76 17.83
Experimental tasks obscure · · 13.43 16.79
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 19.98 5.11 -3.65 20.03
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 40.82 7.18 -63.10 29.48
Financial wealth missing 28.21 5.92 -36.99 24.25
Net income > 2500e 6.58 2.46 26.56 10.78
Net income missing -6.15 4.07 -8.72 13.58
High education 3.94 2.90 -54.08 17.93
30 < Age ≤ 50 10.50 5.28 22.88 16.45
50 < Age ≤ 65 8.06 5.25 -12.07 14.03
Age > 65 0.25 5.04 -22.64 14.94
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.2 in the main text, except for the estimated moments of the belief distribution.
Figure A.28. Joint density of the two indices, moments of beliefs calculated by
approximating the distribution using splines



































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices
of the Klein and Vella (2009) model.
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Table A.18. Average partial effects, moments of beliefs calculated by approximating the
distribution using splines
Model Meas. Err. Combined
Subjective beliefs (Splines): Expected excess return 0.043 · 0.043
Subjective beliefs (Splines): Expected standard deviation -0.020 · -0.020
Risk aversion -0.038 · -0.038
Absolute difference between belief measures · -0.014 -0.014
Lack of confidence in AEX return estimate · -0.013 -0.013
Lack of confidence in sav. acc. return estimate · -0.006 -0.006
Experimental tasks difficult · -0.017 -0.017
Experimental tasks obscure · -0.003 -0.003
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 0.110 0.004 0.102
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 0.265 0.090 0.367
Financial wealth missing 0.177 0.049 0.211
High education 0.021 0.072 0.093
Net income > 2500e 0.037 -0.026 0.011
Net income missing -0.033 0.010 -0.025
30 < Age ≤ 50 0.057 -0.025 0.026
50 < Age ≤ 65 0.044 0.015 0.058
Age > 65 0.001 0.027 0.022
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.3 in the main text, except for the estimated moments of the belief distribution.
Figure A.29. Predicted probability to hold risky assets, moments of beliefs calculated by




























































































Measurement error index at 10% quantile
Measurement error index at 90% quantile
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The left panel presents the predicted probability of stock
market participation for varying levels of the economic model and measurement error indices. The
right panel plots the relation between the predicted probability of participation and the economic
model index for the 10 and 90% quantiles of the measurement error index. Ranges are limited to the
interval between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the marginal distributions.
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A.3 Specication with Less Customised Data
This section reports additional results for the specification with less customised
data described in Section 3.4.3 of the main text. The specification is restricted to (i)
the point estimate of AEX returns, (ii) one qualitative question to elicit risk attitudes,
(iii) two simple qualitative measurement error proxies, and (iv) sociodemographics.
Table A.19. Coefcient estimates for the economic model index and the measurement index,
specication with less customised data
Model Measurement Error
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Subjective beliefs (direct question): Log expected excess return 1.00 · · ·
Aversion to risks in general -15.42 4.26 · ·
Experimental tasks difficult · · 1.00 ·
Experimental tasks obscure · · 0.38 0.32
Financial wealth ∈ (10000e, 30000e] 37.52 16.10 -0.52 0.44
Financial wealth ∈ (30000e, ∞) 24.81 30.76 -2.33 0.67
Financial wealth missing 46.98 22.68 -1.10 0.54
Net income > 2500e 13.98 11.20 0.11 0.22
Net income missing -49.30 19.05 -0.41 0.35
High education -0.69 14.69 -0.94 0.29
30 < Age ≤ 50 54.41 19.00 0.79 0.43
50 < Age ≤ 65 28.49 15.03 -0.11 0.30
Age > 65 -17.08 15.09 -0.50 0.31
Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The analyses in this table are analogous to those in Ta-
ble 3.2 in the main text. The model includes the point estimate to measure beliefs, a qualitative ques-
tion to elicit risk attitudes, two qualitative measurement error proxies, and sociodemographics.
Figure A.30. Joint density of the two indices, specication with less customised data








































Sources: LISS panel and own calculations. The figure plots the joint density of the estimated indices
of the Klein and Vella (2009) model.
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A.4 Can We Correct for Measurement Error Using Multiple
Measures?
This section argues that correcting for measurement error in subjective beliefs
through multiple measures is infeasible. To this end, Figure A.31 presents the R2
of an OLS regression of a stock market participation dummy on various linear com-
binations of the mean belief constructed from the ball allocation task and the point
estimate. The figure shows that—contrary to what one would expect if repeated
measurements reduce measurement error—the variance explained is maximised
by putting almost maximal weight on the belief from the ball allocation task. This
suggests that traditional methods of correcting for measurement error do not apply
in the case of subjective beliefs because there is not necessarily a “true” quantity
that an analyst can elicit.
Figure A.31. Variance in stockholdings explained by different linear combinations of two
belief measures
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